This application is directed to trusted platform module certification and attestation utilizing an anonymous key system. In general, TPM certification and TPM attestation may be supported in a device utilizing integrated TPM through the use of anonymous key system (AKS) certification. An example device may comprise at least combined AKS and TPM resources that load AKS and TPM firmware (FW) into a runtime environment that may further include at least an operating system (OS) encryption module, an AKS service module and a TPM Certification and Attestation (CA) module. For TPM certification, the CA module may interact with the other modules in the runtime environment to generate a TPM certificate, signed by an AKS certificate, that may be transmitted to a certification platform for validation. For TPM attestation, the CA module may cause TPM credentials to be provided to the attestation platform for validation along with the TPM and/or AKS certificates.

Devices, systems, and methods for conducting trusted computing tasks on a distributed computer system are described. In some embodiments, a client device initiates a trusted task for execution within a trusted execution environment of a remote service provider. The devices, systems, and methods may permit the client to evaluate the trusted execution capabilities of the service provider via a planning and attestation process, prior to sending data/code associated with the trusted task to the service provider for execution. Execution of the trusted task may be performed while enforcing security and/or compartmentalization context on the data/code. Systems and methods for managing and exchanging encryption keys are also described. Such systems and methods may be used to maintain the security of the data/code before during, and/or after the execution of the trusted task.

A system and method for secure peer-to-peer mobile communications using cryptographic mobile unlock tokens (CK tokens) in conjunction with mobile devices. Each CK token integrates an entire cryptosystem. Executing these cryptographic based functions entirely in the token have significant operational advantages over the typically memory-only tokens. A more secure, scalable, and lower overall system cost are just a few advantages of the CK token over executing these functions within the smartphone. Of the many uses discussed for the CK token, mobile phone enabling, stored value and medical applications, most have centered on the use of the card in conjunction with a smartphone as the touch point in the transaction.

This disclosure relates to systems and methods for enabling the use of secret digital or electronic information without exposing the sensitive information to unsecured applications. In certain embodiments, the methods may include invoking, by a client application executing in an open processing domain, a secure abstraction layer configured to interface with secret data protected by a secure processing domain. Secure operations may be securely performed on the secret data by the secure abstraction layer in the secure processing domain based on an invocation from a client application running in the open processing domain.

During booting of a computing device, multiple security boundaries are generated. A security boundary refers to a manner of operation of a computing device or a portion of the computing device, with a program executing in one security boundary being prohibited from accessing data and programs in another security boundary. As part of booting the computing device measurements of (e.g., hash values or other identifications of) various modules loaded and executed as part of booting the computing device are maintained by a boot measurement system of the computing device. Additionally, as part of booting the computing device, public/private key pairs of one of the security boundaries is generated or otherwise obtained. Private keys of the public/private key pairs are provided to the one security boundary, and the public keys of the public/private key pairs are provided to the boot measurement system.

Systems and methods for securely passing user authentication data between a Pre-Boot Authentication (PBA) environment and an Operating System (OS) are described. In some embodiments, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include a processor; and a Basic I/O System (BIOS) coupled to the processor, the BIOS having program instructions stored thereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause the computer system to: identify an encrypted Single-Sign-On (SSO) token and a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) key pair provisioned by an Operating System (OS) and stored in an OS registry; extract a TPM public key from the TPM key pair; encrypt a PBA private key generated by a PBA application with the TPM public key; and store the encrypted PBA private key, the TPM key pair, and the encrypted SSO token in a shadow partition of a self-encrypting hard drive coupled to the IHS.

A field replaceable unit authentication system provides for a field replaceable unit device to be positioned in a chassis. A trusted platform module is included in the field replaceable unit device. A network operating system engine may be provided in the field replaceable unit device and coupled to the trusted platform module. The network operating system engine participates in a boot process with a booting subsystem to generate current boot metric data that is provided for storage in the trusted platform module. A platform management controller in the field replaceable unit device retrieves the current boot metric data from the trusted platform module, authenticates the trusted platform module, and compares the current boot metric data to previously stored boot metric data to determine whether to authenticate the network operating system engine. If authenticated, the network operating system engine then authenticates the platform management controller.

Managing encrypted datasets is illustrated. A method includes obtaining a first decryption key. The first decryption key is configured to be used to decrypt an encrypted dataset that has been encrypted using a first encryption mechanism. The first encryption mechanism is associated with the first decryption key that can be used to decrypt the dataset. The method further includes encrypting the first decryption key with a second encryption mechanism. The method further includes encrypting the first decryption key with a third encryption mechanism. The method further includes creating a package including at least the first decryption key encrypted with the second encryption method and the first decryption key encrypted with the third encryption method. The method further includes signing the package with a guardian signature and signing the package with a signature created from the first decryption key.

A method of checking the authenticity of the content of a non-volatile memory of an electronic device including a microcontroller and an embedded secure element includes starting the microcontroller with instructions stored in a first non-reprogrammable memory area associated with the microcontroller, starting the secure element, executing, with the secure element, a signature verification on the content of a second reprogrammable non-volatile memory area associated with the microcontroller, and if the signature is verified, using the secure element to send the first key to the microcontroller.

A method of using a hardware security module and an adjunct application programming interface to harden tokenization security and encryption key rotation is disclosed. In various embodiments, the method comprises receiving encrypted data at a processor of a computer system, decrypting the encrypted data to cleartext in the processor, and issuing a unique token associated with the data.