Patent classifications
H04W12/037
METHODS, APPARATUS AND SYSTEMS FOR ADDRESS CONFIGURATION FOR INTEGRATED ACCESS AND BACKHAUL LINKS
Methods, apparatus and systems for address configuration for integrated access and backhaul (IAB) links are disclosed. In one embodiment, a method performed by a first network node is disclosed. The method comprises: obtaining, from an operations administration and maintenance (OAM) or a second network node, a first address information related to at least one Internet Protocol security (IPsec) address; generating, based on the first address information, a second address information; and transmitting, to the second network node, the second address information based on a radio resource control (RRC) message, wherein the first network node and the second network node are connected via a backhaul link in an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) network.
DIRECT SMF CONTROL PLANE WITH gNB
The disclosed technology separates session management function signaling from the AMF. In particular, an SMF key is created for each SMF following the AMF generating an SM context request that contains gNB information and UE subscription information. Each PDU session creates a direct connection between the SMF and a local gNB. The gNB communicates with each SMF directly over a new interface (N3-C) for session management that is independent of the N2 interface used by the gNB to communicate with the AMF for mobility management. In this way, each SMF independently handles NAS signaling with the UE, using the SMF key and gNB related session-management signaling over an independent interface with the gNB. This removes the burden of relaying these communications through the AMF, which is then freed up to solely to handle mobility management signaling, resulting in an improved architecture.
DIRECT SMF CONTROL PLANE WITH gNB
The disclosed technology separates session management function signaling from the AMF. In particular, an SMF key is created for each SMF following the AMF generating an SM context request that contains gNB information and UE subscription information. Each PDU session creates a direct connection between the SMF and a local gNB. The gNB communicates with each SMF directly over a new interface (N3-C) for session management that is independent of the N2 interface used by the gNB to communicate with the AMF for mobility management. In this way, each SMF independently handles NAS signaling with the UE, using the SMF key and gNB related session-management signaling over an independent interface with the gNB. This removes the burden of relaying these communications through the AMF, which is then freed up to solely to handle mobility management signaling, resulting in an improved architecture.
Direct SMF control plane with gNB
The disclosed technology separates session management function signaling from the AMF. In particular, an SMF key is created for each SMF following the AMF generating an SM context request that contains gNB information and UE subscription information. Each PDU session creates a direct connection between the SMF and a local gNB. The gNB communicates with each SMF directly over a new interface (N3-C) for session management that is independent of the N2 interface used by the gNB to communicate with the AMF for mobility management. In this way, each SMF independently handles NAS signaling with the UE, using the SMF key and gNB related session-management signaling over an independent interface with the gNB. This removes the burden of relaying these communications through the AMF, which is then freed up to solely to handle mobility management signaling, resulting in an improved architecture.
Direct SMF control plane with gNB
The disclosed technology separates session management function signaling from the AMF. In particular, an SMF key is created for each SMF following the AMF generating an SM context request that contains gNB information and UE subscription information. Each PDU session creates a direct connection between the SMF and a local gNB. The gNB communicates with each SMF directly over a new interface (N3-C) for session management that is independent of the N2 interface used by the gNB to communicate with the AMF for mobility management. In this way, each SMF independently handles NAS signaling with the UE, using the SMF key and gNB related session-management signaling over an independent interface with the gNB. This removes the burden of relaying these communications through the AMF, which is then freed up to solely to handle mobility management signaling, resulting in an improved architecture.
FULL-DUPLEX COMMUNICATIONS AND PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A base station may indicate for a first device to transmit random information in the direction of an adverse device on at least partially overlapping time and frequency resources that are also used for receiving a downlink message from the base station. By transmitting the random information in the direction of the adverse device, the first device may cause entropy overhead to the adverse device, impacting an ability of the adverse device to decode portions of the downlink message transmitted to and intended for the first device. Accordingly, the first device may receive the downlink message and may concurrently transmit the random information in the direction of the adverse device on time and frequency resources that at least partially overlap with time and frequency resources used for receiving the downlink message based on receiving the indication from the base station.
FULL-DUPLEX COMMUNICATIONS AND PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A base station may indicate for a first device to transmit random information in the direction of an adverse device on at least partially overlapping time and frequency resources that are also used for receiving a downlink message from the base station. By transmitting the random information in the direction of the adverse device, the first device may cause entropy overhead to the adverse device, impacting an ability of the adverse device to decode portions of the downlink message transmitted to and intended for the first device. Accordingly, the first device may receive the downlink message and may concurrently transmit the random information in the direction of the adverse device on time and frequency resources that at least partially overlap with time and frequency resources used for receiving the downlink message based on receiving the indication from the base station.
SYSTEM AND PROCESS IMPLEMENTING A SECURE NETWORK
A wireless network system configured to secure a wireless service provided to at least one wireless device from a wireless network, the wireless network system includes a secure network server implemented in at least one of a network operator cloud and a mobile network operator implementing the wireless network. The secure network server being configured to implement at least one of the following: a unique Access Point Name (APN), an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) whitelist, a virtual private network (VPN) over encrypted network, a dedicated firewall, a whitelist of IP addresses, and a unique SIM.
SYSTEM AND PROCESS IMPLEMENTING A SECURE NETWORK
A wireless network system configured to secure a wireless service provided to at least one wireless device from a wireless network, the wireless network system includes a secure network server implemented in at least one of a network operator cloud and a mobile network operator implementing the wireless network. The secure network server being configured to implement at least one of the following: a unique Access Point Name (APN), an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) whitelist, a virtual private network (VPN) over encrypted network, a dedicated firewall, a whitelist of IP addresses, and a unique SIM.
System and methods for support of secure base station almanac data in a wireless network
A reference signal periodically transmitted by a base station in a wireless network can have certain proprietary properties to help prevent detection and utilization of the signal for unauthorized positioning of mobile devices. More specifically, a network node can obscure and introduce time-variation in mapping between positioning signals and a corresponding physical base stations. The network node may also introduce time variations in fields of a base station almanac (BSA) provided to subscribing user equipments (UEs). The information transmitted to the subscribing UEs may be encrypted.