Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A communication device may detect vehicle-to-everything (V2X) fuzzing attacks. The communication device may receive a set of packets. Each packet of the set of packets includes a set of information element (IE) fields. The communication device determine a change to one or more IE fields of the set of IE fields and associated with at least a subset of packets of the set of packets based on comparing a respective value associated with each of the one or more IE fields to a respective default value associated with each of the one or more IE fields. As a result, the communication device may transmit a report indicating a plurality of fuzzing attacks at the communication device.

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. A communication device may detect vehicle-to-everything (V2X) fuzzing attacks. The communication device may receive a set of packets. Each packet of the set of packets includes a set of information element (IE) fields. The communication device determine a change to one or more IE fields of the set of IE fields and associated with at least a subset of packets of the set of packets based on comparing a respective value associated with each of the one or more IE fields to a respective default value associated with each of the one or more IE fields. As a result, the communication device may transmit a report indicating a plurality of fuzzing attacks at the communication device.

A method for processing V2X messages by an electronic vehicle system, including receiving a V2X message by a verification device of a V2X communication device, determining whether the V2X message should be verified by the verification device and if no verification of the V2X message is to be carried out: forwarding the unverified V2X message or at least a part of the message content of the unverified V2X message to a processing device, wherein the processing device determines whether an action should be initiated on the basis of the part of the message content; verifying the V2X message if it is determined that an action should be initiated. The disclosure also relates to a corresponding electronic vehicle system and a vehicle, including the vehicle system.

A method includes forming a communication channel between a user device and an access device. The communication channel is then secured using a user device key pair in the user device and an access device ephemeral key pair in the access device. The access device then generates a session key using at least a private cryptographic key in the access device ephemeral key pair, and a public key in the user device key pair. The access device then uses the session key to secure an ultra-wideband communication channel between the user device and the access device.

A method includes forming a communication channel between a user device and an access device. The communication channel is then secured using a user device key pair in the user device and an access device ephemeral key pair in the access device. The access device then generates a session key using at least a private cryptographic key in the access device ephemeral key pair, and a public key in the user device key pair. The access device then uses the session key to secure an ultra-wideband communication channel between the user device and the access device.

Example data verification methods and apparatus are described. One example method is applied to a first device in a vehicle, where the vehicle includes the first device and a second device. The first device receives a first message from the second device, where the first message includes first verification information, the first verification information is used to perform verification on first data, and the first data is configuration information of the second device that is stored in the second device. The first device performs verification on the first data based on configuration information of the second device that is stored in the first device and the first verification information.

A communication circuit for communications between a controller and a subsystem with a monitored electrical component is described. The communication circuit includes network formation circuitry configured to establish a wireless network between a primary wireless node adapted to be coupled to the controller and a secondary wireless node coupled to the subsystem. The communication circuit also includes data transfer circuitry configured to perform data transfers between the primary wireless node and the secondary wireless node. The communication circuit further includes data integrity circuitry configured to: generate a hash for data received by the communication circuit; and verify the hash before the data transfer circuitry performs a data transfer of the data between the primary wireless node and the secondary wireless node.

A communication circuit for communications between a controller and a subsystem with a monitored electrical component is described. The communication circuit includes network formation circuitry configured to establish a wireless network between a primary wireless node adapted to be coupled to the controller and a secondary wireless node coupled to the subsystem. The communication circuit also includes data transfer circuitry configured to perform data transfers between the primary wireless node and the secondary wireless node. The communication circuit further includes data integrity circuitry configured to: generate a hash for data received by the communication circuit; and verify the hash before the data transfer circuitry performs a data transfer of the data between the primary wireless node and the secondary wireless node.

This disclosure describes systems, methods, and devices related to using encrypted 802.11 association. A device may identify a beacon received from an access point (AP), the beacon including an indication of an authentication and key manager (AKM); transmit, to the AP, an 802.11 authentication request including an indication of parameters associated with the AKM; identify an 802.11 authentication response received from the AP based on the 802.11 authentication request, the 802.11 authentication response including a message integrity check (MIC) using a key confirmation key (KCK) and an indication that the parameters have been selected by the AP; transmit, to the AP, an 802.11 association request encrypted by a security key based on an authenticator address of the AP; and identify an 802.11 association response received from the AP based on the 802.11 association request, the 802.11 association response encrypted by the security key.

This disclosure describes systems, methods, and devices related to using encrypted 802.11 association. A device may identify a beacon received from an access point (AP), the beacon including an indication of an authentication and key manager (AKM); transmit, to the AP, an 802.11 authentication request including an indication of parameters associated with the AKM; identify an 802.11 authentication response received from the AP based on the 802.11 authentication request, the 802.11 authentication response including a message integrity check (MIC) using a key confirmation key (KCK) and an indication that the parameters have been selected by the AP; transmit, to the AP, an 802.11 association request encrypted by a security key based on an authenticator address of the AP; and identify an 802.11 association response received from the AP based on the 802.11 association request, the 802.11 association response encrypted by the security key.