Method for authenticating a first and a second electronic devices associated through a communication line includes: creating a unique ID, by a third electronic device; transmitting the unique ID to the first electronic device; signing the transmitted unique ID by the first electronic device; transmitting the signed unique ID to the second electronic device, by the first electronic device; signing the transmitted signed unique ID by the second electronic device; transmitting the unique ID signed by the first and second electronic devices to the third electronic device; verifying and accepting the unique ID signed by the first device and the second device, by the third device; issuing a certificate for a secure communication line between the first electronic device and the second electronic device; and transmitting the certificate to the first electronic device and the second electronic device.

A device may transmit a packet for communicating via a tunnel. The packet may be associated with a protocol. The device may determine that the packet has been dropped by a security device. The device may selectively encrypt, after determining that the packet has been dropped, the packet using a null encryption for transport layer security (TLS) or a combination of encryption associated with the protocol and TLS encryption to generate an encrypted packet. The device may transmit the encrypted packet for communicating via the tunnel.

A network device may establish a media access control security (MACsec) key agreement (MKA) session with another network device via a MACsec communication link; establish a fast heartbeat session via the MACsec communication link, between a first packet processing engine of the network device and a second packet processing engine of the other network device, where the fast heartbeat session is to permit the first packet processing engine and the second packet processing engine to exchange fast heartbeat messages via the fast heartbeat session and the MACsec communication link; place an MKA protocol of the MKA session in a pause state until the first packet processing engine detects a rekey event; determine that a key for the MKA session is to be regenerated based on detection of the rekey event; and perform an action based on the rekey event for the MKA session.

In a trust framework that enables secure communication, a configurer establishes an initial set of potential trusted relationships between a client and one or more anchors associated with one or more hosts. Once configured, the client can use a trusted relationship to securely communicate with a host without reliance on trusted third parties.

A system and process for performing a touchless key provisioning operation for a communication device. In operation, a key management facility (KMF) imports a public key and a public key identifier uniquely identifying the public key of the communication device. The public key is associated with an asymmetric key pair generated at the communication device during its factory provisioning and configuration. The KMF registers the communication device and assigns a key encryption key (KEK) for the communication device. The KMF then provisions the communication device by deriving a symmetric touchless key provisioning (TKP) key based at least in part on the public key of the communication device, encrypting the KEK with the symmetric TKP key to generate a key wrapped KEK, and transmitting the key wrapped KEK to the communication device for decryption by the communication device.

Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communication. In some aspects, a wireless device may receive a sounding waveform via a reciprocal wireless channel. The wireless device may estimate one or more channel parameters associated with the reciprocal wireless channel based at least in part on the sounding waveform. The wireless device may generate a cryptographic key based at least in part on the one or more channel parameters associated with the reciprocal wireless channel. The wireless device may establish a secure communication session over the reciprocal wireless channel based at least in part on the cryptographic key. Numerous other aspects are provided.

Provided are embodiments for a circuit comprising for performing hardware acceleration for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The circuit includes a code array comprising instructions for performing complex modular arithmetic; and a data array storing values corresponding to one or more complex numbers. The modular arithmetic unit includes a first multiplier and a first accumulation unit, a second multiplier and a second accumulation unit, and a third multiplier and a third accumulation unit, wherein the first, second, and third multiplier and accumulation units are cascaded and configured to perform hardware computation of complex modular operations. Also provided are embodiments of a computer program product and a method for performing the hardware acceleration of super-singular isogeny key encryption (SIKE) operations.

When a system receives sensitive data, it can request an encryption key from an encryption/decryption unit. A central processing unit (CPU) of the system can encrypt the sensitive data using the encryption key before writing the sensitive data to memory. Thus, the sensitive data is encrypted when written to memory.

The present disclosure relates to a communication method and system for converging a 5.sup.th-Generation (5G) communication system for supporting higher data rates beyond a 4.sup.th-Generation (4G) system with a technology for Internet of Things (IoT). The present disclosure may be applied to intelligent services based on the 5G communication technology and the IoT-related technology, such as smart home, smart building, smart city, smart car, connected car, health care, digital education, smart retail, security and safety services. The present disclosure describes a method and device for setting the state of a bundle after the bundle has been transmitted between smart security media.

Devices, systems and methods are provided to implement key generation for secure pairing between first and second devices using embedded out-of-band (OOB) key generation and without requiring the devices to have input/output (IO) capability to enter authentication information. Bluetooth Smart or Low Energy (BLE) OOB pairing option can be used for pairing medical devices with added security of OOB key generation. The OOB key generation comprises providing first and second devices with the same predefined credential and secure hashing algorithm, and making input of the hashing algorithm of the first and second devices the same. The first device transmits unique data to second device (e.g., via BLE advertising) to share and compute a similar input. The first and second devices use the credential and shared data with the hashing function to generate a key that is the same at each of first and second devices.