H04L9/3252

METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR THIRD-PARTY MANAGED DATA TRANSFERENCE AND CORROBORATION VIA TOKENIZATION

A protocol that is managed by a coordinating network element or third-party intermediary or peer network elements and utilizes tokens prohibits any subset of a union of the coordinating network element or third-party intermediary, if any, and a proper subset of the processors involved in token generation from substantively accessing underlying data. By one approach, processors utilize uniquely-held secrets. By one approach, an audit capability involves a plurality of processors. By one approach, the protocol enables data transference and/or corroboration. By one approach, transferred data is hosted independently of the coordinating network element. By one approach, the coordinating network element or third-party intermediary or a second requesting network element is at least partially blinded from access to tokens submitted by a first requesting network element. By one approach, a third-party intermediary uses a single- or consortium-sourced database. By one approach, network elements provisioned with tokens jointly manage the protocol.

ECDHE key exchange for mutual authentication using a key server
11626979 · 2023-04-11 · ·

A server can record a device static public key (Sd) and a server static private key (ss). The server can receive a message with (i) a device ephemeral public key (Ed) and (ii) a ciphertext encrypted with key K1. The server can (i) conduct an EC point addition operation on Sd and Ed and (ii) send the resulting point/secret X0 to a key server. The key server can (i) perform a first elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using X0 and a network static private key to derive a point/secret X1, and (ii) send X1 to the server. The server can conduct a second ECDH key exchange using the server static private key and point X0 to derive point X2. The server can conduct an EC point addition on X1 and X2 to derive X3. The server can derive K1 using X3 and decrypt the ciphertext.

BLOCKCHAIN-IMPLEMENTED METHOD FOR CONTROL AND DISTRIBUTION OF DIGITAL CONTENT
20230070963 · 2023-03-09 ·

The disclosure relates to a blockchain-implemented system and method of controlling the transmission and/or distribution of digital content. A first user transfers a deposit quantity of cryptocurrency to a common address. A first node associated with the first user: sends a request to the second node to provide an episode of digital content from a series of digital content; determines a payment transaction to transfer a payment quantity of cryptocurrency to the second user based on a quantity of episodes of digital content in the series; and signs and sends the payment transaction to a second node. The second node associated with the second user: receives the request and the payment transaction; verifies the payment transaction; and based on a result of verifying: provides access to the episode of digital content to the first node; and co-signs and sends the payment transaction to a distributed ledger.

DIGITAL FORENSIC IMAGE VERIFICATION SYSTEM

A digital forensic image verification system according to an embodiment of the present disclosure includes an imaging device having a imaging unit configured to produce an image, a first hash value generator configured to generate a first hash value for the image, and a transmitting unit configured to transmit the image and the first hash value; and an image storage device having a receiving unit configured to receive the image and the first hash value from the imaging device, a second hash value generator configured to generate a second hash value for the image, and a controller configured to compare the first hash value and the second hash value with each other.

ENCRYPTION DEVICE AND AUTHENTICATION METHOD AND SIGNATURE GENERATING METHOD OF SYSTEM INCLUDING THE SAME

The present disclosure relates to methods, devices, and systems for generating a signature of a message by a first device based on a secret key and a public key. The method includes generating a first parameter based on a first multiplication operation on the secret key and a first random number. The method further includes generating a first electronic signature based on the first parameter and the public key. The method further includes generating a second parameter based on the first random number, a second random number, and the message. The method further includes generating a second electronic signature based on the first parameter, the second parameter, the second random number, and the first electronic signature. The method further includes outputting, to a second device, the message, the first electronic signature, and the second electronic signature.

A PROTOCOL FOR TRUSTWORTHY, PRIVACY PRESERVING GENOMIC DATABASE DISCOVERY
20230076882 · 2023-03-09 ·

A system and method for validating by a requestor that a responder has genomic data meeting specified requirements, including: digitally publishing the specified requirements, performing a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof with the responder; verifying that the responder has genomic data meeting the specified requirements based upon the results of the NIZK proof; and receiving encrypted genomic data meeting the specified requirement from the responder.

Method and system for quantum-resistant hashing scheme

A method for moderation in a permissioned blockchain using a hash-oriented scheme includes: storing a blockchain including a most recent block; receiving transaction data values; receiving a first reference value and a second reference value; generating a first hash value by hashing the first reference value; generating a block proof including the first hash value, a second hash value, a third reference value, and a block value; verifying a block header of the most recent block using the block proof; receiving a new block value; generating a new block header including the first reference value, the second reference value, a fourth reference value, and the new block value; generating a new block for the blockchain including the new block header and the transaction data values; and transmitting the new block to one or more additional nodes associated with the blockchain.

PERSONAL DEVICE SECURITY USING CRYPTOCURRENCY WALLETS
20230107243 · 2023-04-06 ·

A method of encrypting data at an electronic device where the electronic device is associated with a key device. Each device is associated with an asymmetric cryptography pair, each pair including a first private key and a first public key. Respective second private and public keys may be determined based on the first private key, first public key and a deterministic key. A secret may be determined based on the second private and public keys. The data at the electronic device may be encrypted using the determined secret or an encryption key that is based on the secret. Information indicative of the deterministic key may be sent to the key device where the information may be stored.

HASH FUNCTION ATTACKS
20220321360 · 2022-10-06 ·

At least one proof transaction is received at a node of a blockchain network and comprises at least one Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature and at least one zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) component. The node verifies the ECDSA signature of the at least one proof transaction based on a public key associated with the ECDSA signature and a signed part of the at least one proof transaction, and determined whether the ZKP component is correct for the ECDSA signature and a defined hash value and a defined hash function, in that it proves an ephemeral key counterpart to an r-part of the ECDSA signature to be a preimage of the defined hash value with respect to the defined hash function.

Secure multiparty loss resistant storage and transfer of cryptographic keys for blockchain based systems in conjunction with a wallet management system

A solution for controlling access to a resource such as a digital wallet implemented using a blockchain. Use of the invention during set-up of the wallet can enable subsequent operations to be handled in a secure manner over an insecure channel. An example method comprises splitting a verification element into multiple shares; determining a common secret at multiple nodes in a network; and using the common secret to transmit a share of the verification element between nodes. The shares can be split such that no share is sufficient to determine the verification element and can be stored at separate locations. Upon share unavailability, the share can be retrieved a location accessibility. For safe transmission of the share(s), the common secret is generated at two different nodes independently and used to generate an encryption key for encrypting at least one share of the verification element to be transmitted securely.