A method of operating a service provider server and a computing device to provide anonymous service access. For the service provider server, the method comprises: receiving a service message from a computing device; and determining whether to send a service response message, and if so sending a service response message. The service message includes a pseudonym associated with the computing device, service data and a signature on the pseudonym generated by either the service provider server or an identity manager. The service response message is broadcast by the service provider server or transmitted to the identity manager.

A method for reporting in vehicle media consumption and user interaction with a vehicle. The method including receiving raw data of media and vehicle usage of a vehicle by a platform device, the platform device including storage, operation controls, a microprocessor, a memory component, I/O inputs and outputs and an operating system installed and running thereon; processing the raw data to remove at least one obfuscation function to anonymize at least a portion of a personally identifiable information; and producing a report with the processed raw data relating to the user interaction vehicle and the media content.

Two models are first trained and then test images are applied to the two trained models in an effort to detect signature forgeries. The first model is trained with pairs of signature images and the resultant trained model is capable of detecting blind forgeries. The second model is trained with triplets of signature images and is capable of detecting skilled signature forgeries. After the two models are trained, test images are applied to the models and determinations are made as to whether a blind or skilled forgery is present.

An authenticated, ID-based private/public key pair, with a self-certified public key, is generated using Kummer arithmetic without bilinear pairings. Two or more parties can generate such key pairs and use them as their respective long-term key pairs which, when combined with the parties' short-term key pairs, can allow the parties to establish an authenticated, short-term shared key. Some embodiments are suitable for connected vehicles communicating with each other and/or with other systems. Other features are also provided.

An electronic key pre-distribution device (110) for configuring multiple network nodes (210, 211) with local key information is provided. The key pre-distribution device comprises applies at least a first hash function (147) and a second hash function (148) to a digital identifier of a network node. The first and second hash functions map the digital identifier to a first public point (141; H.sub.1(ID)) and a second public point (142; H.sub.2(ID)) on a first elliptic curve (131) and second elliptic curve (132). A first and second secret isogeny (135) is applied to the first and second public elliptic curve point (141, 142), to obtain a first private elliptic curve point (151) and second private elliptic curve point (152) being part of private key material (155) for the network node (210).

An electronic apparatus includes a communication apparatus communicating with an external apparatus, a memory storing a message, and a processor generating a digital signature for the message, wherein the processor generates a first signature ciphertext and a message ciphertext by encrypting each of first signature information and the message by using a homomorphic encryption public key, obtains encrypted third signature information generated using second signature information, an element value corresponding to the second signature information, the first signature ciphertext, and the message ciphertext, and calculates a first digital signature value included in the digital signature by using the first signature information and the second signature information, calculate a second digital signature value included in the digital signature by decrypting the encrypted third signature information, and generate the digital signature by using the calculated first digital signature value and second digital signature value.

A decentralized group signature method for an issuer-anonymized credential system includes (a) an initial system setup operation of defining elements of a group signature method and information that is generated and shared by each group member, (b) an initial group member setup operation, (c) a group member participation operation of adding a new group member to a group, (d) a group signature operation of putting a group signature on a specific message, (e) an operation of verifying the group signature, (f) an operation of removing anonymity from a group signature for a specific group member with agreement of group members, and (g) an operation of revoking a specific group member with agreement of the group members. Exclusive authority of a group manager is distributed to the group members.

Methods, systems, and apparatus, including a method for determining network measurements. In some aspects, a method includes receiving, by a first aggregation server and from each of multiple client devices, encrypted impression data. A second aggregation server receives, from each of at least a portion of the multiple client devices, encrypted conversion data. The first aggregation server and the second aggregation server perform a multi-party computation process to generate chronological sequences of encrypted impression data and encrypted conversion data and to decrypt the encrypted impression data and the encrypted conversion data.

A method of generating a digital signature. The method comprises calculating a first random number and, based on second and third random numbers, first and second modified versions thereof. A curve point on an elliptic curve is determined based on a base point and the first modified version. A first signature part is calculated based on the curve point. Based on the second and third random numbers, the modified versions of the first random number, data to be signed, the first signature part, and a private key, a second signature part and a check value for the second signature part are calculated. The second signature part is compared with the check value for the second signature part and, responsive to the check value for the second signature part matching the second signature part, a cryptographic signature is output comprising the first signature part and the second signature part.

Quantum-level cryptography of delegated digital signatures. By implementing quantum-level computing principles, delegate signatures are provided that are unclonable, unforgeable and can not be repudiate. Specifically, at least four quantum particles are entangled, with one particle assigned to each of a third-party verification entity, a signature delegate, a delegatory signature authorizer entity and a signature requester entity. In addition, Bell State measurements (BSMs) are performed at the signature delegate, the delegatory signature authorizer entity and the third-party verification entity to allow the original signer (i.e., the signature delegator) to securely delegate signature to a signature delegate and perform an event, such as a payment process or the like.