A pseudonym credential configuration method and apparatus are provided. The method includes: receiving an identifier of a terminal device and information about N to-be-requested pseudonym credentials from the terminal device, sending N second request messages to a pseudonym credential generation server, and storing a tag of each second request message in association with the identifier of the terminal device in the registration server, so that the registration server can obtain, based on the tag, the identifier that is of the terminal device and that is associated with the tag; and generating N pseudonym credentials. The pseudonym credential generated in this application may enable a behavior investigation server to learn of a real identity of the terminal device.

A device management service to facilitate onboarding of a remote IoT device may receive, from a client service, a request for a session certificate for a remote device. The device management service may send the session certificate to the client service, where the session certificate is valid for the remote device to obtain a primary certificate during a session duration. The device management service may receive, from the remote device, a request for the primary certificate for the remote device. The device management service may send, to the remote device, the primary certificate, wherein the primary certificate enables communication between the remote device and the device management service, and wherein the primary certificate has a primary duration that is longer than the session duration. The device management service may establish a communication channel with the remote device according to the primary certificate.

Technology is shown for verifying a leaf certificate in a PM chain of trust involving receiving a leaf certificate signed by an intermediate certificate embedded in the leaf certificate. The intermediate certificate is extracted from the received leaf certificate and its public key used to calculate a signature for the received leaf certificate. The calculated signature is compared to a signature included in the received leaf certificate. The received leaf certificate is verified when the calculated signature matches the signature included in the received leaf certificate. The intermediate certificate can be included as a X.509 property of the leaf certificate.

Systems and methods provide validation of hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). An attestation certificate stored to the IHS specifies authenticated instructions for operation of a hardware component of the IHS. This attestation certificate is endorsed by a self-signed root attestation certificate. An identity certificate, also stored to the IHS, specifies an identity of the hardware component and is endorsed using an embedded keypair of the hardware component. The root attestation certificate is validated to ensure it corresponds to the hardware component specified in the identity certificate, where this validation confirms that a public key included in the identity certificate is identical to a public key included in the attestation certificate. Through use of the same public key by both certificates, the attestation certificate can be validated as corresponding to the identity certificate without accessing the embedded keypair of the hardware component used to sign the identity certificate.

An example operation may include one or more of configuring a blockchain network comprising first and second blockchain nodes, providing, by the first blockchain node, a data reference to the second blockchain node, accessing a document, by the second blockchain node, from the first blockchain node, and providing by the second blockchain node, a proof of receipt for the document to a shared blockchain ledger.

An operator station server of a technical installation upon which a certification service is implemented, wherein the certification service is configured to receive configuration information, which depends on a role of the operator station server in the technical installation, from at least one of (i) an engineering station server and (ii) a registration service of the technical installation, where the configuration information comprises information identifying which certificates of the certification service of the operator station server must be requested from a certification authority of the technical installation.

The present invention relates to a zero-knowledge proof-based certificate service method using a blockchain network, the method comprising: (a) a step in which, if a certificate registration request transaction including user trap information generated by using at least one user personal information corresponding to a user and a private key of the user is acquired from a user terminal, a certification support server confirms whether or not the user personal information included in the certificate registration request transaction is authentic; (b) a step in which, if it is confirmed that the user personal information corresponds to the user, the certification support server computes the user personal information and the user trap information included in the certificate registration request transaction by using a commitment scheme, thereby generating a user commitment corresponding to the user personal information; and (c) a step in which the certification support server transmits a certificate transaction including the user commitment to the blockchain networks such that the blockchain network registers the certificate transaction in a distributed ledger.

A second blockchain system receives a first consensus message from a first blockchain system, the first blockchain system includes first nodes that provide services to at least a first account, and the second blockchain system includes second nodes that provide services to at least a second account. The first consensus message indicates a first plurality of the first nodes reaches a consensus for transferring a resource from the first account to the second account. The second blockchain system transfers the resource in the task to the second account. The transferring includes that a node in the second nodes adds the resource to the second account and generates a fourth block that records a completion of a transfer event. A second consensus message is transmitted from the second blockchain system to the first blockchain system in response to a second plurality of the second nodes completing the transfer event.

An authentication model dynamically adjusts authentication factors required for access to a remote resource based on changes to a risk score for a user, a device, or some combination of these. For example, the authentication model may conditionally specify the number and type of authentication factors required by a user/device pair, and may dynamically alter authentication requirements based on changes to a current risk assessment for the user/device while the remote resource is in use.

This disclosure describes, in part, techniques for provisioning components. For instance, a component may be initially provisioned by a first system. To initially provision the component, the component may receive first data representing a uniform device type, a device identifier, a serial number, and/or a first certificate chain. The component may then store the first data in memory. Additionally, the component may be provisioned using a second system. To provision the component, the component may receive second data representing a product device type, a code, and a second certification chain. The second data received during the second provisioning may be associated with one more capabilities of a device. The component may then store the second data in the memory.