A security system for a vehicle network of a vehicle is provided. The vehicle network includes a gateway and domain controllers for specific areas of the vehicle. The security system may validate messages sent from the gateway. The security system may also utilize split decryption keys in order to decrypt messages in the vehicle network. The security system may also utilize asymmetrical encryption keys in order to secure data within the vehicle network.

Some embodiments enable distributing data (e.g., recorded video, photographs, recorded audio, etc.) to a plurality of users in a manner which preserves the privacy of the respective users. Some embodiments leverage homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption techniques to manipulate the respective data so that selected portions of it are revealed according to an identity of the user currently accessing the respective data.

An embodiment of a semiconductor apparatus may include technology to receive data with a unique identifier, and bypass encryption logic of a media controller based on the unique identifier. Other embodiments are disclosed and claimed.

Cryptographic methods and systems for key exchange, digital signature and zero-knowledge proof. In the digital signature scenario, there is provided a method of signing a digital document, comprising: obtaining a private cryptographic key associated with the signer; obtaining a digital asset from the digital document; selecting a base data element; computing a plurality of signature data elements from (i) the digital asset, (ii) the base data element and (iii) the private cryptographic key; and transmitting the digital document and the plurality of signature data elements to a recipient over a data network. Provenance of the digital document is confirmable by the recipient carrying out a predefined computation involving the digital document, the signature data elements, a plurality of noise variables and a public cryptographic key corresponding to the private cryptographic key associated with the signer. In the zero-knowledge proof scenario, the digital asset plays the role of a challenge data element.

A method includes obtaining, from a server, a filter including a set of encrypted identifiers each encrypted with a server key controlled by the server. The method includes obtaining a request that requests determination of whether a query identifier is a member of a set of identifiers corresponding to the set of encrypted identifiers. The method also includes transmitting an encryption request to the server that requests the server to encrypt the query identifier. The method includes receiving, from the server, an encrypted query identifier including the query identifier encrypted by the server key and determining, using the filter, whether the encrypted query identifier is not a member of the set of encrypted identifiers. When the encrypted query identifier is not a member of the set of encrypted identifiers, the method includes reporting that the query identifier is not a member of the set of identifiers.

A device can (i) operate a primary platform (PP) within a tamper resistant element (TRE) and (ii) receive encrypted firmware images for operating within the primary platform. The TRE can store in nonvolatile memory of the TRE (i) a PP static private key (SK-static.PP), (ii) a server public key (PK.IDS1), and (iii) a set of cryptographic parameters. The TRE can generate a one-time PKI key pair of SK-OT1.PP and PK-OT1.PP and send the public key PK-OT1.PP to a server. The TRE can receive a one-time public key from the server comprising PK-OT1.IDS1. The TRE can derive a ciphering key using an elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange and the SK-static.PP, SK-OT1.PP, PK.IDS1, and PK-OT1.IDS1 keys. The TRE can decrypt the encrypted firmware using the derived ciphering key. The primary platform can comprise a smart secure platform (SSP) and the decrypted firmware can comprise a virtualized image for the primary platform.

The invention relates to a method for managing exchanges of data between: —a probe (1) comprising a memory containing a probe digital certificate including a probe public key, —a terminal (2) comprising a memory containing a terminal digital certificate including a terminal public key, —a remote platform (3) configured to: .sup.∘deliver the probe digital certificate to the probe and .sup.∘deliver the terminal digital certificate to the terminal, characterised in that the method comprises the implementation of an authentication procedure consisting of the following steps:—a first step in which the probe verifies the identity of the terminal from the terminal digital certificate; —a second step in which the terminal verifies the identity of the probe from the probe digital certificate, and—a third step in which the probe, the terminal and the platform each generate an identical session key from the probe and terminal public keys.

A method for transmitting security settings between a first automation engineering field device and a second automation engineering field device includes: identifying and authenticating an operator by means of a service unit; assigning an authorization group based on the identifying and authenticating of the operator; in the case, in which the operator is assigned the administrator authorization group: encrypting at least one security setting, which is present in cleartext, by the first field device; exporting the encrypted security setting; importing the encrypted security setting into the second field device; decrypting the encrypted security setting; loading the decrypted security setting into the data memory of the second field device and operating the second field device with the loaded security setting of the first field device.

A server establishes a secure session with a client device where a private key used in the handshake is stored in a different server. An encrypted connection is established between the first server and the second server. A message is received from the client device that initiates a procedure to establish the secure session between the client device and the first server. As part of this procedure, the first server transmits over the encrypted connection a request to the second server to use the private key. The first server receives, over the encrypted connection, a response to the request that includes a result of the use of the private key. The first server uses the result during the procedure to establish the secure session.

The present disclosure provides systems and methods for content quasi-personalization or anonymized content retrieval via aggregated browsing history of a large plurality of devices, such as millions or billions of devices. A sparse matrix may be constructed from the aggregated browsing history, and dimensionally reduced, reducing entropy and providing anonymity for individual devices. Relevant content may be selected via quasi-personalized clusters representing similar browsing histories, without exposing individual device details to content providers.