A key distribution host determines a trust level of a user authentication server, wherein the trust level is based, at least in part, on one or more attributes of the user authentication server and provides one or more authentication keys to the user authentication server only if the trust level of the user authentication server is above a threshold value.

A method for a device comprises enrolling a specified application installed on the device into a chain of trust provided by a private key infrastructure. In the chain of trust, a child certificate is attested as valid by an attestor associated with a parent certificate in the chain of trust. Enrolling includes generating an application certificate 20-A for verifying that the specified application is installed on the device 2. The application certificate is a descendant certificate of the device certificate associated with the device and the chain of trust.

It is provided a method, including checking if an indication is received that a certificate installed in a communication entity is to be revoked at a revocation time in the future; preparing, if the indication is received, a first revocation list, wherein the first revocation list includes an identifier of the certificate and the revocation time; providing the first revocation list to the communication entity.

A measurement device (14) includes a measuring unit (42) for obtaining health related parameters of a patient (12), and a body-coupled communication unit (40) for sending at least measurement results. An identification device (20), associated with the patient, includes a body-coupled communication unit (26) for receiving and sending out the measurement results. A gateway device (72) includes a body-coupled communication unit (78) for receiving patient's measurement results. Additionally, a hierarchical relational deployment model (100) facilitates grouping wireless devices in a healthcare environment into subgroups based on relationships between the devices, and a hierarchical key pre-distribution scheme (110) permits distribution of unique keying material for security domains of respective groups of devices, prior to deploying the devices in a healthcare network. Devices can then execute a handshake protocol by which they identify their deepest common node in the deployment model (100), and employ keying material assigned to that nodes group in the pre-distribution scheme (110) to facilitate granular communication security.

In various embodiments, there is provide a method for organizing devices in a policy hierarchy. The method includes creating a first node. The method further includes assigning a first policy to the first node. The method further includes creating a second node, the second node referencing the first node as a parent node such that the second node inherits the first policy of the first node.

Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communication are described. A user equipment (UE) may determine that a security context with a network node has been established for more than a threshold time period. The UE may identify, based on a key hierarchy, a parent network node associated with the network node. The UE may transmit a key refresh request message to the parent network node to trigger a key refresh procedure between the parent network node and the network node. The UE may perform a procedure with the network node to establish a new security context based on the key refresh procedure.

A certificate manager allows a particular entity such as an individual computer system, computer application, or network service, to define a customized set of rules that are used to identify digital certificates that are trusted by the particular entity. When a digital certificate is presented to the entity, the certificate manager determines whether the digital certificate is trustworthy by examining the characteristics of the certificate such as the expiration of the certificate, the characteristics of the certificate authorities that signed the digital certificate, or the signing algorithms used to generate the digital signatures on the certificate. The certificate manager may be combined with trusted root CA stores, pinned certificate stores, and other certificate management systems to define a customized set of potentially trusted certificates based on the characteristics of the particular entity.

Disclosed are techniques for securing electronic control units (ECUs) in a vehicle. A security platform for a vehicle includes a key distribution center (KDC) for the vehicle. The KDC is configured to verify that a digital certificate associated with a first electronic control unit (ECU) on the vehicle is a valid certificate, where the digital certificate indicates a first security level of the first ECU. The KDC is configured to generate, based on the first security level of the first ECU, one or more security keys for secure communication between the first ECU and a set of ECUs on the vehicle, and provision the one or more security keys to the first ECU and the set of ECUs. In some embodiments, the KDC uses the provisioned keys to authenticate each ECU when the vehicle is powered up.

The present invention relates to a method for distributing digital keys. The method includes the steps of a first database storing a plurality of keys relating to a plurality of products; for each product, transferring keys from the first database to a corresponding cache in a second database; in response to a request for a key for a product, retrieving and distributing a key from the corresponding cache; and refreshing the corresponding cache by transferring further keys from the first database to the corresponding cache. A system for distributing digital keys is also disclosed.

This document describes a system and method for managing communications between modules in a Controller Area Network (CAN) in a secure manner. In particular, the system employs a hierarchical key generation method that allows a module in the CAN to use a single ascendant key together with relevant identifiers to generate descendant keys for CAN identities in the Controller Area Network. These keys are then used by the broadcasting and receiving CAN modules to authenticate published messages.