Patent classifications
H04L63/1475
SCORING DOMAINS AND IPS USING DOMAIN RESOLUTION DATA TO IDENTIFY MALICIOUS DOMAINS AND IPS
Domains and IPs are scored using domain resolution data to identify malicious domains and IPs. A domain and IP resolution graph for a set of domains and IPs in a system. A seed set of known malicious domains and known malicious IPs is selected from a malicious domain and malicious IP database. A graphical probabilistic propagation inference from the domain and IP resolution graph and the seed set of known malicious domains and known malicious IPs is generated. A malicious score is calculated for each domain in the set of domains and each IP in the set of IPs, and the malicious domain and malicious IP database is updated.
SECURING POLAR CODES
Aspects are provided which allow a first device to secure transmission of polar encoded control information by encoding at least a portion of frozen bits and/or information bits with a shared key with a second device before these bits are encoded by a polar encoder. The first device determines whether to encode at least one of a plurality of frozen bits or a plurality of information bits using the shared key. Based on the determination, the first device encodes the frozen bits and/or the information bits, and sends the encoded frozen bits and/or the encoded information bits to the second device. Since the receiving device has the shared key, the receiving device may successfully decode the control information, while an eavesdropper who receives the encoded bits may fail to decode the control information due to lack of knowledge of the shared key.
PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY ACTIVATION
Methods, systems, and devices for wireless communications are described. In some wireless communications systems, a user equipment (UE) may receive, from a base station, control signaling identifying a configuration of a set of time intervals for communication with the base station, the set of time intervals including a subset of the time intervals for which the UE is to perform a physical layer security procedure. In some cases, the UE may activate a timer associated with performing the physical layer security procedure in response to a trigger. The UE and the base station may communicate one or more messages using the physical layer security procedure, for example, in the subset of the time intervals identified by the control signaling, while the timer is active, or both. The physical layer security procedure may involve the UE performing physical layer security encoding, signal jamming, or both.
Methods and systems for risk data generation and management
Risk data generation for an organizational network involves a risk assessment server that communicates with organizational computing devices. The server transmits risk data request and receives responses identifying organizational risks. The server generates and transmits assessment templates, and receives risk evaluation data from a plurality of computing devices in response. The server automatically generates a risk assessment score for an organizational risk based on the values in the plurality of risk evaluation responses, the risk assessment score defining an expected organizational impact of that particular organizational risk and transmits the risk assessment score to an administrator. The server collects benchmark risk data and risk outcomes from similar networks and generates the scores using the benchmark data. The server also provides comparative results between similar organizational networks.
Systems and methods of intelligent and directed dynamic application security testing
Disclosed are systems, methods and computer readable mediums for intelligent and directed dynamic application security testing. The systems, methods and computer-readable mediums can be configured to receive an attack location and an attack type for a web-application, transmit the attack location and attack type to a ID-DAST platform, receive from the ID-DAST platform a payload, attack the web-application using the payload, and receive results of the attack.
COMMUNICATION DEVICES AND METHODS FOR SECURE COMMUNICATION
A first communication device for use in a wireless communication system to communicate with a second communication device comprises circuitry configured to perform beamforming training with the second communication device to train a plurality of antenna beam combinations of antenna beams used by the first and second communication devices for transmitting and/or receiving signals, select one or more of the trained antenna beam combinations according to a security criterion that is directed to reducing the probability that a third communication device can eavesdrop on the communication between the first communication device and the second communication device, and communicate with the second communication device using the selected one or more antenna beam combinations.
USER VERIFICATION SYSTEMS AND METHODS
This disclosure relates to systems and methods for verifying the presentation of content to a target audience using generated metrics indicative of a likelihood that the content was presented to actual human individuals within the target audience. In some instances, such a metric may be associated with a probability model estimating that a user (e.g., a user of a device) is human and not a bot and/or other automated service. Metrics consistent with aspects of the disclosed embodiments may be generated based, at least in part, on user information received from a user and/or associated devices and/or associated services. Consistent with various disclosed embodiments, metrics indicative of whether a user is human, content distribution decisions and user agency decisions may use such metrics
Determine a trusted dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server in a DHCP snooping environment
Presented herein are systems and methods to determine whether a dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server in DHCP snooping environment is a trusted device without requiring trusted port configuration. In one or more embodiments, a DHCP snooping-enable switch/router adds an indicator to a message intended for a DHCP server, thereby notifying the DHCP server that the DHCP switch/router is enabled for or capable of “detection of trusted DHCP server.” The DHCP server includes a unique trusted identifier in its reply that the DHCP switch/router uses to verify whether the DHCP server can be considered a trusted device.
Security mode enhancement for Connectivity Fault Management (CFM)
Systems and methods for enhancing the Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) protocol defined in IEEE 802.1Q are provided. In particular, the enhancements include adding a security or safety feature to prevent malicious attacks. A method, according to one implementation, includes the step of operating a Network Element (NE) in a safety mode associated with a link connectivity protocol (e.g., CFM) that involves receiving one or more messages used for detecting link connectivity issues of an Ethernet service in a section of a network and responding to the link connectivity issues. In response to receiving the one or more messages used for detecting link connectivity issues while operating the NE in the safety mode, the method includes the step of storing the one or more messages as one or more untrusted messages in an isolated database of the NE without processing information in the one or more untrusted messages.
Monitoring a network connection for eavesdropping
A method for detecting unauthorized eavesdropping. A first subscriber determines a transit time for the transmission of data to a second subscriber, adds the random value to the transit time to obtain a waiting time, waits for the waiting time, creates a data packet containing a time stamp and transmits this data packet to the second subscriber. The second subscriber records the time it receives the data packet and compares it with the time stamp contained in the data packet, determines that the data packet has arrived either: before the time indicated in the time stamp, more than a predefined tolerance time after the time indicated in the time stamp, or before or more than a predefined tolerance time after a time at which it can be expected in the second subscriber as an indication that communication between the first subscriber and the second subscriber is being eavesdropped on.