Methods, systems, apparatus, and computer program products that can automatically answer communication sessions received from trusted callers are disclosed herein. One method includes maintaining, by a processor of an information handling device, a list of trusted callers encoded in a memory and automatically answering a communication session received by the information handling device from a trusted caller in the encoded list of trusted callers without receiving input from a user of the information handling device accepting the communication session on the information handling device. Systems, apparatus, and computer program products that include hardware and/or software that can perform the methods for automatically answering communication sessions received from trusted callers are also disclosed herein.

One example method of operation may include identifying a call to a mobile device, determining whether the call includes call content data intended for the mobile device, initiating an active session and a time to live (TTL) associated with the call content data, forwarding the call content data to the mobile device when the call includes call content data associated with the caller, and receiving a content confirmation from the mobile device that the call content data was received.

Call spoofing can be mitigated by providing geolocation information to the called device. For example, when a call rings, a geolocator can be invoked and the incoming call display screen can show a carrier logo and/or a geolocator globe illustrating the location of the call originator. The geolocation session initiation protocol data can be confirmed by a network device and compared against carrier specific data of the calling device to authenticate voice calls for called devices. In one embodiment location data of the calling device can purposely be shared in order to facilitate the mitigation of call spoofing.

Systems and methods are provided to stop both external and internal fraud, ensure correct actions are being followed, and information is available to fraud teams for investigation. The system includes components that can address: 1) behavioral analytics (ANI reputation, IVR behavior, account activity)—this gives a risk assessment event before a call gets to an agent; 2) fraud detection—the ability to identify, in real time, if a caller is part of a fraudster cohort' and alert the agent and escalate to the fraud team; 3) identity authentication—the ability to identify through natural language if the caller is who they say they are; and 4) two factor authentication—the ability to send a text message to the caller and automatically process the response and create a case in the event of suspected fraud.

A SIP telephone public key authentication device (20) includes: a certificate check unit (21a) that, when a public key (36) of a user A in a public key certificate (32) stored in an IC card (31) owned by the user A of a calling-side A telephone set (30) using SIP, the public key (36) certified by a signature of a certificate authority (50), is read and transmitted by the A telephone set (30) and then received by a SIP server (21), checks validity of the public key certificate (32) with an authentication server (50a) that authenticates the validity; a random number generation unit (22a) that generates a random number r when the validity is confirmed through the check; and a signature verification unit (22b) that verifies that personal identity information (37) on the user A in a DB (23) is legitimate when a locked random number r, which is obtained by converting the random number r by using a private key (33) kept in an IC card read by the A telephone set (30), is converted into the original random number r by using the public key (36).

Blocking of undesirable voice over internet protocol (VOIP) communications is disclosed. A communication screening service initiates operations to block a threat posed by a VOIP communication upon receiving the communication from a gateway server. The communication may include an audio/video conversation and/or an audio/video conference. Next, metadata and content of the communication is analyzed to detect a threat, such as a scamming scheme and/or a phishing scheme, from a sender of the communication. A rejection of the communication is generated to disrupt the threat associated with the communication. The rejection is transmitted to the gateway server to prompt the gateway server to block the communication.

Disclosed are method, device and system for processing a calling requires message of a mobile terminal, the method comprising: triggering a pre-embedded blocking program in the calling process; upon detecting a calling request message, the blocking program acquires an incoming call number in the calling request message; the blocking program determines whether the incoming call number is a call number defined by a preset rule, if the incoming call number is a call number defined by the preset rule, then delaying the ring of the phone number defined by the preset rule. The present invention protects a user from the harassment of a malicious harassing call, thus avoiding unnecessary financial loss.

Described herein are methods and systems for admission control of a communication session over a communication network. The methods and systems of the present disclosure may comprise determining whether a communication session originates from an originating device that is part of an autodialing system. If the communication session does originate from an autodialing system, the methods and systems can determine whether the autodialing system is a valid autodialing system or an invalid autodialing system. The methods and systems can process or block future communications sessions from the originating device depending on whether the autodialing system is a valid autodialing system or invalid autodialing system, respectively.

In one implementation, the number of half open session initiation protocol (SIP) sessions per-destination (e.g., SIP device) or globally is limited by SIP application layer gateway (ALG) as a SIP DoS/DDoS countermeasure. Compared with traditional SIP DoS/DDoS countermeasures, the proposed solution is simple to implement and, thus, less likely to degrade SIP ALG performance. Moreover, this solution automatically adapts to DoS/DDoS attack arrival rate, while at the same time not degrading legal SIP traffic even if throttling is enforced for the SIP device.

Novel tools and techniques for deterring unsolicited calls are described for deterring unsolicited telephone calls that include a service provider searching and determining that the originating telephone number is in a no-call list, and based on this determination, prohibiting the call from terminating (i.e., connecting with the destination telephone number). Penalties may also be imposed against callers (e.g., solicitors) for no-call violations. Various embodiments provide methods and systems that do not depend on the CallerID (which could be spoofed or might be unavailable) in order to identify the offending party of an unsolicited call or text message (i.e., originating entity), and to block the unsolicited call or text message.