A method for mitigating interference in a receiver, where the received signal is transmitted in a fashion having equivalent information content in at least two distinct bands. The method compares mean power per unit bandwidth in suitably normalised sidebands and sets a rejection threshold based upon the measured levels. Bands above the threshold may be rejected from further processing. The bands may include sidebands produced by a modulation process that produces sidebands having the same informational content. The threshold may be set relative to the band having the lowest mean power per unit bandwidth or according to some other function of the bands. Also extends to a signal processor in a receiver, and a receiver. The primary focus of the application is toward the Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) Satellite navigation signal.

A GNSS receiver comprises an input, at least one front end processor, and an interference mitigation unit. The input is configured to receive from a wireless communication module a control signal comprising timing information, the timing information indicating one or more transmission times during which the wireless communication module wirelessly transmits data. The at least one front end processor is configured to capture a set of data samples from a received GNSS signal and store the data samples in a memory, each sample captured at a corresponding sample time. The interference mitigation unit is configured to configured to identify data samples of the set of data samples that have a sample time that corresponds with one or more transmission times as candidate samples for interference.

A system for measuring temperature in a sterilization autoclave, including a temperature transducer positionable inside a sterilization chamber of the autoclave and a receiver positionable outside the sterilization chamber. The receiver includes a reception antenna and a receiving electronic circuit connectable with a process controller of the autoclave. The receiving electronic circuit is configured to receive a temperature signal through the reception antenna, provide a control signal as a function of the temperature signal, and transmit the control signal to the process controller. The temperature transducer includes a hermetically closable transducer housing, temperature probes, a transmission antenna, an electronic transduction circuit, and a primary battery. The reception antenna of the receiving device is configured to transmit signals at two or more different frequencies.

A method for utilizing a jamming-resistant receiver (JrRx) device includes receiving, by a BJM engine, a plurality of individual subcarrier signals that comprises separate signal portions of a combined signal stream, wherein the combined signal stream is a combination formed by a source signal stream from a sender device and one or more interfering jamming signals from a plurality of unknown jammer devices and computing, by the BJM engine, a respective plurality of BJM filters for the plurality of individual subcarrier signals in the absence of channel information corresponding to the interfering jamming signals. The method further includes applying, by the BJM engine, the plurality of BJM filters to the respective plurality of individual subcarrier signals to decode data packets of the plurality of individual subcarrier signals in order to produce a plurality of source signal stream portions as decoded output, and recovering, by the BJM engine, the source signal stream by combining the decoded output from each of the plurality of BJM filters.

A secure wireless transceiver, such as a link 16 transceiver, receives signals using an antenna array having an SOC associated with each antenna element in the array. The SOC's digitize and channelize received data for transmission to a message nulling system that mitigates jamming. The antenna array can be conformal, and can replace an existing Link 16 blade. The disclosed transceiver can be a modified CMN-4 transceiver with digitizing and channelizing moved to the SoC's, and replaced by the nulling system. The transceiver uses applicable TRANSEC information to assign received data to the logical Link 16 channels before nulling, and embodiments apply nulling only to channels of interest, thereby improving the nulling and reducing side lobes. Embodiments distinguish between desired and unwanted signals based on known Link 16 signal features and/or situational awareness, rather than signal amplitudes, thereby enabling nulling of even weak jamming signals.

Techniques for determining whether data associated with an autonomous/non-autonomous operation of a manned/unmanned vehicle may be trusted. For example, a first set of data may be provided from a source external to a manned/unmanned vehicle. A second set of data may be accessed. This second set may be provided from a source internal or external to the manned/unmanned vehicle and may be associated with the same autonomous/non-autonomous operation. The two sets may be compared to determine whether the first set of data may be trusted or not. If untrusted, a corrective action may be performed.

Systems and methods for GNSS anti-jamming using interference cancellation are described herein. In certain embodiments, a system includes an antenna that receives signals, wherein the signals comprise a weak portion associated with one or more GNSS satellites and a strong interference portion from an interfering signal source. The system also includes a GNSS anti-jammer. The GNSS anti-jammer includes an interference isolator that receives the received signals and provides an estimated strong interference portion as an output. The GNSS anti-jammer also includes a summer that subtracts the estimated strong interference portion from the received signals to create a summed signal. Further, the GNSS anti-jammer includes a local noise remover that removes noise generated by the interference isolator from the summed signal, wherein the local noise remover is a processor that digitally removes the noise. Further, the system includes a GNSS receiver coupled to receive the summed signal from the processor.

A securing interface apparatus to be inserted between a GNSS antenna and a first, unsecured, GNSS receiver fed by the antenna, for providing immunity against spoofing or jamming or interrupting of the timing provided by the first unsecured GNSS receiver. The securing interface apparatus comprises (a) a second GNSS receiver, fed by the antenna and including a local oscillator and being immune against spoofing or jamming of timing, for outputting trusted timing and the last GNSS data, the second GNSS receiver including a detection module which is adapted to analyze raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites and verify the signals integrity and authenticity (b) a GNSS Simulator, fed by the trusted timing and GNSS data, the GNSS Simulator is adapted to: as long as the received GNSS data is found authentic, allowing the received GNSS data to reach the input of the first, unsecured, GNSS receiver; upon detecting that the received GNSS data is not authentic, produce, using the output of the local oscillator and at least a portion of the last GNSS data, redundant simulated RF GNSS signals mimicking raw RF signals received from GNSS satellites; and transmit the redundant simulated RF GNSS to the input of the first unsecured GNSS receiver.

A deceiving signal detection system includes a first antenna, a second antenna, and a signal processor. The first antenna is configured to receive four or more multiple navigation signals. Each of the multiple navigation signals indicates a transmitting position and a transmitting time of the each navigation signal. The second antenna is configured to receive the multiple navigation signals. The signal processor is configured to determine whether four or more multiple radio wave signals that are received by the first antenna and the second antenna and each signal indicate a transmitting position and a transmitting time of the signal are the multiple navigation signals or deceiving signals.

Systems and methods for operating an antenna assembly. The methods comprise: receiving, at the first circularly polarized antenna, a first signal comprising a desired signal emitted from a first signal source located at a first altitude higher than a second altitude of the antenna assembly and an interfering signal emitted from a second signal source located at a third altitude lower than the second altitude; receiving the interfering signal at the second circularly polarized antenna (where the first and second circularly polarized antennas are disposed on opposite sides of an antenna reflector and having opposite circular polarizations); generating a second signal by shifting a phase of the interfering signal which was received at the second circularly polarized antenna by an amount to cause the second signal to be out-of-phase with the first signal; and providing an antenna pattern with a null at or below a horizon by destructively combining the second signal with the first signal.