Technologies for securely providing one or more remote accelerators hosted on edge resources to a client compute device includes a device that further includes an accelerator and one or more processors. The one or more processors are to determine whether to enable acceleration of an encrypted workload, receive, via an edge network, encrypted data from a client compute device, and transfer the encrypted data to the accelerator without exposing content of the encrypted data to the one or more processors. The accelerator is to receive, in response to a determination to enable the acceleration of the encrypted workload, an accelerator key from a secure server via a secured channel, and process, in response to a transfer of the encrypted data from the one or more processors, the encrypted data using the accelerator key.

A first device obtains a public key of a first home device and a first message leaving key that is used to encrypt an offline message between the first device and the first home device; obtains a public key of a second device and a second message leaving key that is used to encrypt an offline message between the first device and the second device; obtains a third message leaving key used to encrypt an offline message between the second device and the first home device; encrypts the public key of the second device and the third message leaving key by using the first message leaving key, to obtain first encrypted information, and requests a server to push the first encrypted information to the first home device; and encrypts the public key of the first home device and the third message leaving key by using the second message leaving key.

Multiple systems, methods, and computer program product embodiments for password-less authentication using key agreement and multi-party computation (MPC). In one or more embodiments, following an authentication request received by a host computing device, the host computing device and a user computing device generate a shared key using a key agreement algorithm. Then, the host computing device generates a challenge that is encrypted using the shared key and transmitted to the user computing device. The user computing device decrypts the challenge after regenerating the shared key and sends the decrypted result to the host computing device as the challenge response. The authentication request is granted by the host computing device if the challenge and the challenge response match. New keys and a new challenge are generated for each authentication request. This process relies on public key cryptography eliminating the needs for passwords.

A method is provided for quantum-resistant secure key distribution between a peer and an extendible authentication protocol (EAP) authenticator by using an authentication server. The method may include receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a McEliece public key from a peer and an EAP authenticator by an authentication server using an EAP method, encrypting the COMMON-SEED using the McEliece public key of the peer and the McEliece public key of the EAP authenticator by the authentication server, and sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED from the authentication server to the peer along with a request for a PPK_ID from the peer using the EAP method to complete authentication of the peer. The method may also include receiving the PPK_ID from the peer using the EAP method, where the PPK_ID is from a key pair consisting of PPK_ID and PPK obtained from a first SKS server in electrical communication with the peer based upon the encrypted COMMON-SEED. The method may also include sending the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK_ID from the authentication server to the EAP authenticator, and establishing a quantum-resistant secure channel between the peer and the EAP authenticator, where a message of EAP success is delivered from the EAP authenticator to the peer when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

Trusted nodes in a network perform secure out-of-band symmetric encryption key delivery to user devices. A first trusted node receives a request from a first user device to deliver symmetric encryption keys to the first user device and a second user device, as a pair of user devices. The first trusted node delivers a second symmetric encryption key to the second user device, via trusted nodes. The first trusted node receives confirmation of delivery of the second symmetric encryption key. Responsive to the confirmation of delivery, the first trusted node delivers the first symmetric encryption key to the first user device.

Customers of a software platform, such as a unified communications as a service platform, are enabled to control their own encryption keys used to encrypt and decrypt data from various communication services in the software platform. A key broker server is employed to map encryption and decryption requests from servers in the platform to key management servers of customers based on user identifiers. Examples of data encrypted may includes conference recordings, webinar recordings, phone call recordings, voicemails, emails, and calendar tokens.

Techniques for exporting remote cryptographic keys are provided. In one technique, a proxy server receives, from a secure enclave of a client device, a request for a cryptographic key. The request includes a key name for the cryptographic key. In response to receiving the request, the proxy server sends the request to a cryptographic device that stores the cryptographic key. The cryptographic device encrypts the cryptographic key based on an encryption key to generate a wrapped key. The proxy server receives the wrapped key from the cryptographic device and sends the wrapped key to the secure enclave of the client device.

Systems and methods are provided for quantum-resistant secure key distribution between a peer and an EAP authenticator by using an authentication server. The systems and methods include receiving requests for a COMMON-SEED and a quantum-safe public key from a peer and an EAP authenticator. The COMMON-SEED is encrypted using the quantum-safe public key of the peer and the quantum-safe public key of the EAP authenticator, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED is sent to the peer along with a request for a PPK_ID from the peer to complete authentication of the peer. The PPK_ID is received from the peer, and the encrypted COMMON-SEED and PPK_ID is sent to the EAP authenticator. A quantum-resistant secure channel is established between the peer and the EAP authenticator when the peer and the EAP authenticator share the same COMMON-SEED and the same PPK-ID.

Techniques are disclosed for inline security key exchanges between network devices. An example network device includes one or more processors and memory coupled to the one or more processors. The memory stores instructions that, upon execution, cause one or more processors to obtain a first payload key and obtain a path key. The instructions cause the one or more processors to encrypt a first payload of a first packet using the first payload key and insert the first payload key into first metadata of the first packet. The instructions cause the one or more processors to encrypt the first metadata using the path key and send the first packet to another network device.

Disclosed herein are methods, devices, and apparatuses, including computer programs stored on computer-readable media, for managing a cryptographic key. One of the methods includes: receiving a request for a signature on transaction data; allocating a key manager corresponding to the request; and obtaining, by the key manager, the signature on the transaction data and the cryptographic key, wherein the cryptographic key is a public key, and the signature on the transaction data is obtained based on a private key corresponding to the public key.