A provisioning control apparatus configured to be coupled to a provisioning equipment server electrically connectable with one or more electronic devices for provisioning the electronic devices with security sensitive provisioning data. The provisioning control apparatus includes a processor configured to generate a group context for sharing the group context with a first further provisioning control apparatus for creating a group of provisioning control apparatuses. The processor is configured to assign an identity to the first further provisioning control apparatus. The identity of the first further provisioning control apparatus is indicative of the provisioning control apparatus and the first further provisioning control apparatus. The processor is configured to generate the security sensitive provisioning data based on the group context. The provisioning control apparatus includes a communication interface configured to provide the security sensitive provisioning data to the provisioning equipment server.

A tamper detecting component for a quantum communication system is a trusted node, configurable as a first endpoint trusted node, a middle-trusted node and a second endpoint trusted node. The trusted node has a tamper detection module and a secure memory. The tamper detection module deletes critical system parameters responsive to detecting physical tampering. The trusted node, as the first endpoint trusted node, exchanges a quantum key, encrypts data and transmits encrypted data. The trusted node as the middle-trusted node exchanges a quantum key, exchanges another quantum key, decrypts and re-encrypts data and transmits encrypted data. The trusted node as the second endpoint trusted node exchanges a quantum key, and decrypts data.

The invention provides a method for transmission of sensitive information via an untrusted party. The sensitive information is held by a trusted computer and is transmitted via an untrusted computer to a recipient computer. Before transmission, the trusted computer encrypts the sensitive information using an encryption key that is associated with the recipient computer. The untrusted computer does not have access to a corresponding decryption key and is therefore unable to decrypt the sensitive information. The recipient computer is able to decrypt the encrypted sensitive information using a decryption key that it has access to and is thus able to gain access to the sensitive information without further communication with the trusted computer. This method has utility in payment transactions, particularly e-commerce transactions.

A first network device may install a receiving key for decrypting traffic on protocol hardware associated with a data plane of the first network device. The first network device may receive, from the data plane, a first notification indicating that the receiving key is installed on the protocol hardware and may provide, to a second network device, a first message identifying the receiving key. The first network device may receive, from the second network device, an acknowledgment message indicating that the receiving key is installed on the second network device and may install a transmission key for encrypting traffic on the protocol hardware. The first network device may receive, from the data plane, a second notification indicating that the transmission key is installed on the protocol hardware and may provide, to the second network device, a second message identifying the transmission key.

An example operation includes one or more of receiving, via a first communication channel between a sending device and a recipient device, a first partial encryption key from the receiving device, receiving, via a second communication channel between the sending device and the recipient device, a second partial encryption key from the receiving device, wherein the second communication channel comprises a different communication medium than the first communication channel, generating a transport key based on the first partial encryption key and the second partial encryption key received via the first and second channels, and encrypting data based on the generated transport key and transmitting the encrypted data to the receiving device.

In a blockchain network, a “cold wallet” allows users to securely create and store their private key and sign their transaction data only when the wallet is completely offline. When a user requests a transaction, a user key tag that identifies the user's key is determined. The transaction data and the user's key tag are transmitted to a cold wallet that includes an HSM Trusted Client and an HSM over a first one-way communication channel during a window in a first sequence of connection windows. Inside the cold wallet, the HSM Trusted Client uses the user key tag to determine an encrypted version of the user's signing key. During a processing window, the transaction data and encrypted signing key are transmitted to the HSM, where a cleartext key is recovered and used to sign the transaction, and the signed transaction is transmitted back to the HSM Trusted Client. During a second connection window, the signed transaction is transmitted from the HSM Trusted Client for transmission to the blockchain network. The processing and connection windows do not overlap. The one-way communication paths combined with the non-overlapping connection and processing prevent unauthorized access to the signing keys.

A system protects personally identifiable information (PII) by implementing an unconventional key management scheme. In this scheme, the system uses a set of keys rather than an individual key for encrypting PII. Different portions of the PII are encrypted using different keys from the set of keys. In this manner, even if a malicious user were to access a key, that key would not give the malicious user the ability to decrypt all of the PII. Additionally, the system generates a new set of keys periodically (e.g., once a month). The system also deletes sets of keys that are too old (e.g., six months old). As a result, even if a malicious user were to access a key, the usefulness of that key would be time limited.

Systems and methods for securing encrypted data wherein a sending computer encrypts data to be transmitted with an encryption key. The encryption key itself is not sent, but can be derived from a second key and third key. The second key is modified such that an incomplete portion of the second key is sent along with the message to a recipient computer. The third key is sent separately to the recipient computer. The recipient computer obtains the remainder of the second key, reconstructs the complete second key and then uses it with the third key to derive a decryption key to decrypt the message.

An inter-node privacy communication method, including a network node processing a data packet according to the role of the network node in a communication path of privacy communication; if the node is a communication source node, acquiring, according to node identities in an identity quadruple, a key for encryption, and encrypting and sending the data packet; if the node is the first switch device or the last switch device, and an end-to-end privacy communication policy is valid, directly forwarding the data packet, and if the policy is invalid, acquiring a key for decryption, and receiving and decrypting the data packet, and acquiring, a key for encryption, and encrypting and sending the data packet; if the node is a middle switch device directly forwarding the data packet; and if the node is a communication destination node, acquiring a key for decryption, and receiving and decrypting the data packet.

A method includes sending, to a compute device and via a private channel, a public key for asymmetric encryption. The method also includes concurrently authenticating the compute device and generating a traffic key for symmetric encryption, based at least in part on the public key. The method further includes sending a message to the compute device, the message being encrypted using the traffic key via the symmetric encryption.