H04L9/0841

METHODS FOR SECURE CRYPTOGRAM GENERATION

A computer-implemented method performed by a user device is provided. The computer-implemented method includes receiving a message including an encrypted credential from a server computer; determining a response shared secret using a private key and a server public key; decrypting the encrypted credential using the response shared secret to determine a credential; obtaining a key derivation parameter from the credential; determining a first cryptogram key using the key derivation parameter; generating a first cryptogram using the first cryptogram key; and sending the first cryptogram to a second computer.

ECDHE Key Exchange for Mutual Authentication Using a Key Server
20230231702 · 2023-07-20 · ·

A server can record a device static public key (Sd) and a server static private key (ss). The server can receive a message with (i) a device ephemeral public key (Ed) and (ii) a ciphertext encrypted with key K1. The server can (i) conduct an EC point addition operation on Sd and Ed and (ii) send the resulting point/secret X0 to a key server. The key server can (i) perform a first elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange using X0 and a network static private key to derive a point/secret X1, and (ii) send X1 to the server. The server can conduct a second ECDH key exchange using the server static private key and point X0 to derive point X2. The server can conduct an EC point addition on X1 and X2 to derive X3. The server can derive K1 using X3 and decrypt the ciphertext.

Systems for providing secure communications using a protocol engine

Systems and methods for implementing confidential communications between nodes of a network provide reduced power consumption, require less memory, and provide improved security, relative to previously-known systems and method. Preferred embodiments implement protocol functions in hardware, as opposed to software, to yield some or all of the foregoing improvements. Some embodiments use a hashing circuit for multiple purposes, while maintaining its ability to compute successive intermediate hash values. Some embodiments improve security of systems using circuits configured to leverage a favorable data format.

Systems And Methods For Encrypted Content Management
20230231709 · 2023-07-20 · ·

Systems and methods for encrypted content management are provided and include generating a user private key, a user public key, and a symmetric encryption key. A group private key, a group public key, and a group symmetric encryption key are generated and the group private key is encrypted with the group symmetric encryption key. A first shared-secret key is generated based on the user public key and the group private key using a diffie-hellman exchange algorithm. The group symmetric encryption key is encrypted using the first shared-secret key to generate an escrow key. Plaintext data is encrypted using a content symmetric key. A second shared-secret key is generated based on an ephemeral private key and the group public key using a diffie-hellman exchange algorithm. The content symmetric key is encrypted using the second shared-secret key.

Computational operations in enclave computing environments
11704416 · 2023-07-18 · ·

Methods and systems for performing a computational operation on a server host are provided. Exemplary methods include: receiving an encrypted service request from a client host, the client host encrypting a service request to produce the encrypted service request using a shared secret, the service request specifying the computational operation; decrypting, in a secure enclave, the encrypted service request using the shared secret to produce a decrypted service request, the secure enclave preventing other software running on the server host from accessing the shared secret and other data stored in a memory space; performing the computational operation, in the secure enclave, using the decrypted service request to generate a service result; encrypting, in the secure enclave, the service result using the shared secret to create an encrypted service result; and providing the encrypted service result to the client host, the client host decrypting the encrypted service result.

Secure firmware transfer for an integrated universal integrated circuit card (iUICC)
11706025 · 2023-07-18 · ·

A device can (i) operate a primary platform (PP) within a tamper resistant element (TRE) and (ii) receive encrypted firmware images for operating within the primary platform. The TRE can store in nonvolatile memory of the TRE (i) a PP static private key (SK-static.PP), (ii) a server public key (PK.IDS1), and (iii) a set of cryptographic parameters. The TRE can generate a one-time PKI key pair of SK-OT1.PP and PK-OT1.PP and send the public key PK-OT1.PP to a server. The TRE can receive a one-time public key from the server comprising PK-OT1.IDS1. The TRE can derive a ciphering key using an elliptic curve Diffie Hellman key exchange and the SK-static.PP, SK-OT1.PP, PK.IDS1, and PK-OT1.IDS1 keys. The TRE can decrypt the encrypted firmware using the derived ciphering key. The primary platform can comprise a smart secure platform (SSP) and the decrypted firmware can comprise a virtualized image for the primary platform.

Hybrid network communication method, device, and system
11706324 · 2023-07-18 · ·

A hybrid network communication method is disclosed. A gateway device receives a first association request of a multimode device through a first physical interface, where the first association request includes a MAC address of a second physical interface of the multimode device. The gateway device receives a second association request of the multimode device through a third physical interface, where the second association request includes a MAC address of a fourth physical interface of the multimode device. The gateway device obtains an IPv6 address of the multimode device, and records a first correspondence and a second correspondence. The first correspondence includes the IPv6 address of the multimode device, the MAC address of the second physical interface, and the first physical interface. The second correspondence includes the IPv6 address of the multimode device, the MAC address of the fourth physical interface, and the third physical interface.

Apparatus and locale-based method for thwarting deceptions and/or denial of services

Technical problems and their solution are disclosed regarding the location of mobile devices requesting services near a site from a server. Embodiments adapt and/or configure the transmitting device near the site, the mobile device communicating with the transmitting device using a short haul wireless communications protocol to deliver a token based upon a key shared with the server but invisible to the mobile device. The server can determine the proximity of the mobile device to the site to control actuation of the requested service or disable the service request, and possibly flushing the service request from the server. Solutions are disclosed for traffic intersections involving one or more traffic lights, elevators in buildings, fire alarms in buildings and valet parking facilities.

SECURE SESSION CAPABILITY USING PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE PRIVATE KEY

A server establishes a secure session with a client device where a private key used in the handshake is stored in a different server. An encrypted connection is established between the first server and the second server. A message is received from the client device that initiates a procedure to establish the secure session between the client device and the first server. As part of this procedure, the first server transmits over the encrypted connection a request to the second server to use the private key. The first server receives, over the encrypted connection, a response to the request that includes a result of the use of the private key. The first server uses the result during the procedure to establish the secure session.

DYNAMIC TOKENIZATION TABLE EXCHANGE
20230019728 · 2023-01-19 · ·

A first network device nonce is computed. The first network device nonce is based on a first network device secret. A Change Token Table message (CTTM) is sent to a second network device. The CTTM comprises the first network device nonce. A Change Token Table Ack Message (CTTAM) with a second network device nonce is received from the second network device. A new token for a tokenization table is computed based on the first network device secret, the second network device nonce, a prime number, and a key derivation function. The new token for the tokenization table is also computed by the second network device based on a second network device secret, the first network device nonce, the prime number, and the key derivation function.