Patent classifications
H04L61/2539
INFRASTRUCTURE DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION
A method of providing infrastructure protection for a server of a network organization, the method including announcing an IP address range associated with the network organization using a border gateway protocol on an edge router of a scrubbing center associated with the network organization. The method further including receiving an incoming network packet intended for a server of the network organization identified using a public IP address within the IP address range, the public IP address serving as a first anycast address for a plurality of scrubbing centers in a distributed network of scrubbing servers, the plurality of scrubbing centers including the scrubbing center. The method further including determining, by the scrubbing center, whether the incoming network packet is legitimate. The method further including, responsive to determining that the incoming network packet is legitimate, routing, by a processor, the incoming network packet to the server at a private IP address.
Automatic integrity checking of content delivery network files
Techniques for automatically generating an integrity check hash value for a content asset served by a third-party server when the content asset is added to a template in a user interface. The techniques include displaying, by the user interface, a visual layout of web content, the UI configured to receive modifications to a component of the web content. The component comprising a template for generating hypertext markup language (HTML) embodying the component. The techniques further include receiving a modification to the component of the web content, wherein the modification includes instructions to include a content asset in the component of the web content and detecting that the content asset is hosted on a third-party server. Additionally, the techniques include generating HTML for the web content, the HTML including an integrity hash value for the content asset based on the template.
INFRASTRUCTURE DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE PROTECTION
A method of providing infrastructure protection for a network that includes IP addresses as low as a single IP address. An end user sends traffic to an IP address of a projected server publicly available as an anycast address, and sends traffic to the protected network. The traffic is routed via one of several scrubbing centers using the public IP address as anycast address, and the scrubbing center provides infrastructure protection by scanning and filtering the incoming traffic for illegitimate data. After filtering, the legitimate traffic is encapsulated, e.g., via including virtual GRE tunnel information that includes a secret IP address known only to the scrubbing center and the protected server that receives the network traffic. The protected server decapsulates the network packet and responds back to the end user via the scrubbing network.
Method for virtual machine to access physical server in cloud computing system, apparatus, and system
A method for a virtual machine to access a physical server in a cloud computing system is disclosed. A cloud platform allocates, to the service deployed on the physical server, a publishing IP address and a publishing port and sends a NAT rule to an access network element of the virtual machine. When receiving a service access request for accessing the service, the access network element modifies, according to the NAT rule, a destination address of the service access request into the IP address and the port that are of the physical server, and routes the modified service access request to the physical server, so that the virtual machine can access the service on the physical server without knowing a real IP address and port of the physical server.
Protecting communications between a content delivery network and an origin server
A privatized link between an origin server and a content delivery network is provided. A privatized link can be direct connection that does not route over the internet. Another privatized link is one that rotates IP addresses. An origin server may be assigned to use a set of multiple IP addresses for communication with the content delivery network. However, at any given time, the origin server is only using a small number of IP addresses. When one of the IP addresses being used to communicate with the content delivery network comes under attack, the origin server switches to another IP address in the set in order to continue serving content to the content delivery network via an IP address that is not under attack.
MAPPING A SERVICE INTO A VIRTUAL NETWORK USING SOURCE NETWORK ADDRESS TRANSLATION
The techniques described herein enable a private connectivity solution between a virtual network of a service consumer and a virtual network of a service provider in a cloud-based platform. The techniques map a service (e.g., one or more workloads or containers) executing in the virtual network of the service provider into the virtual network of the service consumer. The mapping uses network address translation (NAT) that is performed by the cloud-based infrastructure. As a result of the techniques described herein, a public Internet Protocol (IP) address does not need to be used to establish a connection thereby alleviating privacy and/or security concerns for the virtual networks of the service provider and/or the service consumer that are hosted by the cloud-based platform.
Network topology-preserving internet protocol address anonymization
Anonymization of IP addresses of a network while preserving a topology of the network is provided. Information is received regarding a network topology. The information is analyzed to generate a first model of the network topology. The first model is converted into a second model preserving the network topology and obfuscating a mapping of the IP addresses. The second model is utilized to simulate processing of network packets consistent with actual processing of the network packets in the network topology.
Systems and methods for access network selection and traffic routing
Methods, systems, and devices for network selection and traffic routing are disclosed herein. User equipment (UE) is configured to store an access network selection and detection function (ANDSF) management object (MO). The ANDSF MO may include network selection rules indicating relative priority based on a specific radio access technology (RAT) types of different access networks. The UE is configured to identify one or more available access networks. The UE is configured to establish a connection with an access network of the one or more available access networks. The UE establishes the connection with an access network having a RAT with a highest relative priority of the one or more available access networks based on the network selection rules.
Infrastructure distributed denial of service (DDoS) protection
A method of providing infrastructure protection for a network that includes IP addresses as low as a single IP address. An end user sends traffic to an IP address of a projected server publicly available as an anycast address, and sends traffic to the protected network. The traffic is routed via one of several scrubbing centers using the public IP address as anycast address, and the scrubbing center provides infrastructure protection by scanning and filtering the incoming traffic for illegitimate data. After filtering, the legitimate traffic is encapsulated, e.g., via including virtual GRE tunnel information that includes a secret IP address known only to the scrubbing center and the protected server that receives the network traffic. The protected server decapsulates the network packet and responds back to the end user via the scrubbing network.
Shadow Protocol Enabling Communications Through Remote Account Login
Embodiments of the present disclosure provide apparatuses, systems, methods, and computer program products for creating, managing, and utilizing shadow addresses. Shadow addresses may be generated based on a based address element associated with a client device, and an address construction element set received from the client device. The base address element may be authenticated as associated with the client device to confirm the user's identity, for example through a header enrichment process or other verification process. Shadow addresses may be used to transmit and receive communications for various purposes, including messaging, service login, and facilitating transactions. An example apparatus may be provided, the apparatus configured to receive, from a client device, an address construction element set; identify a base address element associated with the client device; and generate a shadow address by applying the base address element and the address construction element set to a one-way transformation function.