Provided is a rack, comprising: a plurality of rack units; and a plurality of lockers each housing a different respective subset of the rack units, wherein respective lockers among the plurality comprise: a first respective barrier disposed between a respective pair of the rack units; a second respective barrier disposed between another respective pair of the rack units; a third respective barrier that is orthogonal to the first barrier and the second barrier, the third respective barrier being moveably or removeably coupled to the rack; a respective volume configured to receive one or more computing devices; and a respective lock configured to secure the third respective barrier to the rack in the closed position when in a locked state.

Circuits are protected from timing attacks by adding a random delay to mask any relation between contents of processed information packages and the processing time required between in- and output signals of protected circuits. This random delay has to be performed preferably inside the protected volume and can be realized by one or more random delay buffers that are realized by means of e.g. random shift-registers. Further protection may be provided by situating the circuits in a single chip housing, such that the signals thereof interfere with each other and it is difficult to obtain information therefrom. A physical barrier may be provided in order to prevent or at least limit physical access to for example at least one TPM chip arranged inside of the barrier. The physical barrier comprises an impedance, i.e. in form of a capacitor with capacity C and or resistor R and or inductivity L, for example formed by two of the reflector layers of the barrier with an absorbing material in between. Any impedance (i.e. capacity C and/or resistance R and/or inductivity L) change can be detected and any impedance (i.e. capacity and/or resistance and/or inductivity L) change beyond a chosen threshold is indicative of an attempt to physically destruct or enter the barrier. Upon detecting an impedance (i.e. capacity C and/or resistance R and/or inductivity L) change beyond the threshold, any suitable action may be performed, such as deleting all information from the chip, destroying the chip or providing wrong information. The barrier may also act as a reflector for reflecting the desired signal of the at least one chip, such that the desired signal and the reflected signals interfere with each other and it is difficult to obtain information therefrom.

Disclosed herein is a method for determining the arrangement of wave energy converters in a wave power park in a seabed or lake area including the steps of: measuring wavelength and wave direction over a period of time, collecting all values measured for the wavelength and the wave direction in a matrix, statistically determining, from the matrix, a predominant wavelength and a predominant wave direction, and arranging an amount X of wave energy converters at regular intervals over a distance that corresponds to half of the length of the predominant wavelength or a multiple thereof, where the distance is measured in a direction at least more or less parallel to the predominant wave direction.

In an embodiment, a method comprises intercepting, from a first computer, a first set of instructions that define one or more original operations, which are configured to cause one or more requests to be sent if executed by a client computer; modifying the first set of instructions to produce a modified set of instructions, which are configured to cause a credential to be included in the one or more requests sent if executed by the client computer; rendering a second set of instructions comprising the modified set of instructions and one or more credential-morphing-instructions, wherein the one or more credential-morphing-instructions define one or more credential-morphing operations, which are configured to cause the client computer to update the credential over time if executed; sending the second set of instructions to a second computer.

A method for evaluating data is based on a computational model, the computational model comprising model data, a training function and a prediction function. The method includes training the computational model by: receiving training data and training result data for training the computational model, and computing the model data from the training data and the training result data with the training function. The method includes predicting result data by: receiving field data for predicting result data; and computing the result data from the field data and the model data with the prediction function. The training data may be plaintext and the training result data may be encrypted with a homomorphic encryption algorithm, wherein the model data may be computed in encrypted form from the training data and the encrypted training result data with the training function. The field data may be plaintext, wherein the result data may be computed in encrypted form from the field data and the encrypted model data with the prediction function.

Disclosed herein are systems and methods to perform hybridized transmission switching of an electric power system to avoid exceeding line ratings and minimize load shedding.

To ensure safety of people needing to service a low-voltage network of an electric power distribution system, dwellings being connected to this network may include autonomous units for producing electricity, thus generating voltage and endangering the people servicing the work. Data are obtained from consumption records from the meter of each dwelling, in regular time intervals, and meteorological data are also obtained in the geographical area of these dwellings, in order to identify at least some weather conditions conducive to the production of energy by autonomous units. A model is then applied for detecting, based on the first and second data, a coincidence between periods of lower consumption measured by a meter and weather conditions conducive to electricity production by autonomous units during these periods. Therefore, information on the presence of autonomous units in the dwelling can be deduced and given to people before their servicing.

A Multi-Phase Simulation Environment (“MPSE”) is provided which simulates the conductor current and voltage or electric field of multiple phases of an electrical power distribution network to one or more sensing or measuring devices and includes independent control of wireless network connectivity for each sensing or measuring device, independent control of GPS RF to each device, and interface to a back-end analytics and management system.

A system for preventing unauthorized access to a network can include a secure container having an access portal for controlling access to contents of the secure container and a security checkpoint configured to determine a state of the access portal and to receive an authorization code for opening the access portal. The security checkpoint can also include a logical lock module that switches to a breach mode of operation in response to a signal from the security checkpoint indicating that the access portal has been opened without receipt of the authorization code within a predetermined amount of time. The system can also include a network switch disposed within the secure container. The network switch is configured to communicate on a network and disable outgoing network communications to the network in response to a breach signal indicating that the logical lock module has switched to the breach mode.

An apparatus and system for remote attestation of a power delivery network is disclosed. Embodiments of the disclosure enable remote attestation of the power delivery network by storing a trusted golden reference waveform in secure memory. The trusted golden reference waveform characterizes a power delivery network in response to a load generated on the power delivery network. A remote cloud server generates a server-generated remote attestation of the power delivery network by receiving an attestation packet from the power delivery network and verifying whether the attestation packet is consistent with an expected power delivery network identity.