In some embodiments, identifying a replay attack in an industrial control system of an industrial asset includes receiving a first set of time series data associated with an ambient condition of one or more first monitoring nodes at a first location of the industrial control system. An actual system feature value for the industrial asset is determined based upon the first set of time series data. A second set of time series data indicative of the ambient condition at a second location is received, and a nominal system feature value is determined based upon the second set of time series data. A correlation between the actual feature value and the nominal system feature value is analyzed to determine a correlation result. A request received by the industrial control system is selectively categorized as a replay attack based upon the correlation result.

The described techniques enable a skid communicator tool to quickly change network settings to those required by a particular skid or network in a process control environment with which a user of the tool wishes to establish communication. These techniques are helpful because skids and networks in process control environments often require different network settings for any device attempting to communicate with the skids or network, and a user often must manually load these network settings every time she wants to communicate with a different network or skid. By contrast, the techniques enable the skid communicator tool to seamlessly connect to, disconnect from, and reconnect to any of the skids or other networks requiring different network settings with minimal input from the user, thus enabling a user to easily move through and interact with different areas, units, or equipment of the process control environment.

An abnormality analysis device including: an overall information obtainer that obtains overall information indicating an overall feature amount of a manufacturing system; an overall abnormal degree calculator that calculates an overall abnormal degree that is an abnormal degree of a whole of the manufacturing system by statistically processing the overall information; an individual information obtainer that obtains individual information indicating a feature amount of each of the plurality of constituent elements; an individual abnormal degree calculator that calculates an individual abnormal degree that is an abnormal degree of each of the plurality of constituent elements by statistically processing the individual information; and a determiner that determines whether or not the overall abnormal degree exceeds a threshold value, wherein the individual abnormal degree calculator calculates the individual abnormal degree when the determiner determines that the overall abnormal degree exceeds the threshold value.

The described techniques enable a skid communicator tool to quickly change network settings to those required by a particular skid or network in a process control environment with which a user of the tool wishes to establish communication. These techniques are helpful because skids and networks in process control environments often require different network settings for any device attempting to communicate with the skids or network, and a user often must manually load these network settings every time she wants to communicate with a different network or skid. By contrast, the techniques enable the skid communicator tool to seamlessly connect to, disconnect from, and reconnect to any of the skids or other networks requiring different network settings with minimal input from the user, thus enabling a user to easily move through and interact with different areas, units, or equipment of the process control environment.

To identify manipulations of cyber-physical-systems in real-time to avoid or prevent damages to the cyber-physical systems, it is proposed with regard to (i) a cyber-physical-system with an embedded, distributed and complex system structure and providing sensor/actor-signal-information depicting a behavior of the cyber-physical-system during operation or commissioning, and (ii) a Digital-Twin-Unit, which in the course of Model-based Digital-Twin-Representation of the cyber-physical-system creates and executes a digital twin replicating the behavior of the cyber-physical-system and consequently producing replicated sensor/actor-signal-information by simulating the cyber-physical-system, and when the cyber-physical-system and the Digital-Twin-Unit are run in parallel, to detect cyclically a deviation in the behavior of the cyber-physical-system by comparing information by information the sensor/actor-signal-information with the replicated sensor/actor-signal-information, to identify a manipulation of the cyber-physical-system if for each detection cycle the sensor/actor-signal-information and the replicated sensor/actor-signal-information are different and consequently the deviation is detected, and the detected deviation exceeds a threshold or tolerance value.

Example systems and methods may allow for closed-loop control of robotic operation. One example method includes receiving input data that identifies data sources to monitor and indicates adjustments to make in response to deviations by at least one of the data sources from at least one predicted state during subsequent execution of sequences of operations by robotic devices, receiving data streams from the data sources during execution of the sequences of operations by the robotic devices, identifying a deviation by one of the data sources from a predicted state for which the received input data indicates adjustments to the sequences of operations for the robotic devices, providing instructions to the robotic devices to execute the adjusted sequences of operations, and providing instructions to a second computing device to update a visual simulation of the robotic devices based on the adjusted sequences of operations.

A numerical controller includes a numerical control unit, a DNC operation management unit, and first and second communication units. The first and second communication units receive the same NC program from a host through corresponding communication paths. The DNC operation management unit acquires the NC program from a reception data buffer included in one of the communication units to transfer the NC program to the numerical control unit, and when a failure occurs in the communication path used by the communication unit, an acquisition destination of the NC program is switched to a reception data buffer of the other communication unit.