A device includes a root of trust and a controller to perform a device function of the device using the root of trust. The root of trust is designed to control and/or observe the controller at least partially for the performance of the device function.

This disclosure relates to systems and methods for enabling the use of secret digital or electronic information without exposing the sensitive information to unsecured applications. In certain embodiments, the methods may include invoking, by a client application executing in an open processing domain, a secure abstraction layer configured to interface with secret data protected by a secure processing domain. Secure operations may be securely performed on the secret data by the secure abstraction layer in the secure processing domain based on an invocation from a client application running in the open processing domain.

A method including determining, by a first device, unavailability of a first biometric unit associated with the first device for verification of first biometric information; selecting, by the first device based on determining unavailability of the first biometric unit, a second biometric unit associated with a second device for verification of second biometric information; receiving, by the first device from the second device based on a first verification of the second biometric information, a first factor associated with authentication of the first device by a service provider; receiving, by the first device from the second device based on successful authentication of the first factor and on a second verification of the second biometric information, a second factor associated with authentication of the first device by the service provider; and receiving, by the first device from the service provider, a service based on successful authentication of the second factor.

According to certain general aspects, the present embodiments relate generally to securing communication between ECUs. Example implementations can include a method of securely transmitting Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol frames via a CAN controller.

Examples disclosed herein include are computing device hardware components, computing devices, systems, machine-readable mediums, and interconnect protocols that provide for code object measurement of a peripheral device and a method for accessing the measurements to verify integrity across a computing interconnect (e.g., Peripheral Component Interconnect Express—PCIe). For example, a cryptographic processor of a PCIe endpoint (such as a peripheral) may take a measurement (e.g., computing a hash value) of a code object on the device prior to executing the code object. This measurement may be placed in a register that is accessible to another component, such as a host operating system across a PCIe bus for interrogation. The host operating system may utilize an interconnect protocol, such as a PCIe protocol to access the measurement. These measurements may be consumed by a Trusted Platform Manager or other components of a host system that may verify the measurements.

An active attestation apparatus verifies at runtime the integrity of untrusted machine code of an embedded system residing in a memory device while it is being run/used with while slowing the processing time less than other methods. The apparatus uses an integrated circuit chip containing a microcontroller and a reprogrammable logic device, such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA), to implement software attestation at runtime and in less time than is typically possible with comparable attestation approaches, while not requiring any halt of the processor in the microcontroller. The reprogrammable logic device includes functionality to load an encrypted version of its configuration and operating code, perform a checksum computation, and communicate with a verifier. The checksum algorithm is preferably time optimized to execute computations in the reprogrammable logic device in the minimum possible time.

Today an individual attending an event must undertake a second registration and purchasing sequence in order to attend a subsequent occurrence of the event. However, by the time they remember to re-register their interest may have waned or the event is sold out. In other instances, they forget even though the event does not sell out. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to provide registrants of an event with a means to re-register for the next occurrence of the event in a manner that was quick, simple, independent of execution of the registration/purchase steps with a service provider, and independent of completion of service provider support for the next event. Further, it would be beneficial to leverage the credential provided to the registrant for the current event in progress or just completed in the re-registration of the registrant for the next event. It would be further beneficial for said method to leverage the technology and devices of portable electronic devices associated with the registrant.

Techniques are disclosed relating to securely communicating traffic. In some embodiments, an apparatus includes a secure circuit storing keys usable to encrypt data communications between devices over a network. The secure circuit is configured to store information that defines a set of usage criteria for the keys. The set of usage criteria specifies that a first key is dedicated to encrypting data being communicated from a first device to a second device. The secure circuit is configured to receive a request to encrypt a portion of a message with the first key, the request indicating that the message is being sent from the first device to the second device, and to encrypt the portion of the message with the first key in response to determining that the set of usage criteria permits encryption with the first key for a message being sent from the first device to the second device.

Aspects of the disclosure provide various methods relating to enclaves. For instance, a method of authentication for an enclave entity with a second entity may include receiving, by one or more processors of a host computing device of the enclave entity, a request and an assertion of identity for the second entity, the assertion including identity information for the second identity; using an assertion verifier of the enclave entity to determine whether the assertion is valid; when the assertion is valid, extracting the identity information; authenticating the second entity using an access control list for the enclave entity to determine whether the identity information meets expectations of the access control list; when the identity information meets the expectations of the access control list, completing the request.

A method for secure key exchange. The method comprises receiving a request to certify a key from a communication partner at an interface between an access and tamper resistant circuit block and exposed circuitry. Within the access and tamper resistant circuit block, a first random private key is generated. A corresponding public key of the first random private key is derived, and a cryptographic digest of the public key and attributes associated with the first random private key is generated. The generated cryptographic digest is signed using a second random private key that has been designated for signing by one or more associated attributes. The public key and the signature are then sent to the communication partner via the interface.