Actuator system in an aircraft for monitoring a no-back brake
11225314 · 2022-01-18
Assignee
Inventors
- Christian Trenkle (Weiler, DE)
- Bernd Schievelbusch (Lindenberg, DE)
- Stefan Hoechstoetter (Roethenbach, DE)
Cpc classification
B64C3/38
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
B64C5/08
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
B64D41/00
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
B64D45/0005
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
International classification
B64C3/38
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
B64C5/08
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
B64D41/00
PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
Abstract
The present invention relates to an actuator system in an aircraft for monitoring a no-back brake, which system comprises an actuator for actuating a flap of a flight control system of the aircraft, a first torque sensor for detecting a torque on the drive side of the actuator, and a second torque sensor for detecting a torque on the output side of the actuator, wherein the actuator is provided with an auto-switching no-back brake to hold the flap actuated by the actuator in position. The actuator system further has a monitoring unit, which is connected to the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor and is designed to detect an acute or imminent fault condition of the no-back brake depending on an actuator state and the detected torque values of the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor.
Claims
1. Actuator system in an aircraft for monitoring a no-back brake, comprising: an actuator for actuating a flap of a flight control system of the aircraft, a first torque sensor for detecting a torque on the drive side of the actuator, and a second torque sensor for detecting a torque on the output side of the actuator, wherein the actuator is provided with an auto-switching no-back brake in order to hold a flap actuated by the actuator in position, wherein a monitoring unit, which is connected to the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor and is designed to detect an acute or imminent fault condition of the no-back brake depending on an actuator state and the detected torque values of the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor.
2. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring unit is further designed to deduce a functioning no-back brake if no torque is present at the first torque sensor when the actuator is not in operation, and to deduce a faulty no-back brake if a torque is present both at the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor when the actuator is not in operation.
3. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring unit is further designed to deduce a functioning no-back brake if a torque, which is below a predetermined first torque threshold value and/or exceeds a predetermined second torque threshold value, is present at the first torque sensor when the actuator is operating with a sequential load, and to deduce a faulty no-back brake if a torque proportional to the sequential load is present at the first torque sensor when the actuator is operating with a sequential load.
4. Actuator system according to claim 3, wherein the first torque threshold value is greater than the second torque threshold value and a torque value attributable to a drag brake built into the no-back brake is preferably located between the two torque threshold values.
5. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring unit is further designed to store torque values at characteristic operating states for each operating cycle of the aircraft and to undertake analysis of these torque values collected over several operating cycles, preferably in order to determine a prognosis of an imminent fault condition of the no-back brake on the basis of a trend.
6. Actuator system according to claim 5, wherein the characteristic operating states comprise at least one of the following operating states: a) Extension of a flap with the actuator before take-off of the aircraft with a low counter load, b) Retraction of a flap with the actuator following take-off of the aircraft with a sequential load, c) Extension of a flap with the actuator before landing of the aircraft with a counter load, and d) Retraction of a flap with the actuator following landing of the aircraft with a low sequential load.
7. Actuator system according to claim 5, wherein the monitoring unit is designed to average the torque values of the first torque sensor determined in a characteristic operating state and to use the averaged value for the analysis over several operating cycles.
8. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the monitoring unit is designed, in the case of an averaged torque value of the first torque sensor decreasing over several operating cycles in the operating state a), to detect a fault condition, in particular to detect a fault condition that indicates a deterioration in the braking capacity of a drag brake in the no-back brake.
9. Actuator system according to claim 7, wherein the monitoring unit is designed, in the case of an averaged torque value of the first torque sensor decreasing over several operating cycles in the operating state b), to detect a fault condition, in particular to detect a fault condition that indicates a deterioration in the braking capacity of the overall no-back brake.
10. Actuator system according to claim 5, wherein the monitoring unit is designed to produce a prognosis on the basis of the detected torque values of when deterioration of the no-back brake passes a critical threshold value.
11. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the flight control system of the aircraft is a high-lift system, a tail plane trim system and/or a thrust reversal system.
12. Actuator system according to claim 1, wherein the aircraft is a plane.
13. Method for monitoring a no-back brake of an actuator system in an aircraft according to claim 1.
14. Method according to claim 13, wherein the data of the torque values of the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor are stored by the monitoring unit, and are only read on completion of the operating cycle, preferably as part of ground servicing.
Description
(1) Further details, features and advantages are apparent from the following description of the figures. These show:
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8) In
(9) In a state in which the flap 4 is not actively moved, virtually no load is present between the central drive 7 and the respective no-back brakes 2. In
(10)
(11)
(12) It is usual in the prior art to determine this failure by a twist in the flap 4.
(13)
(14)
(15) It is thereby possible with the aid of a monitoring unit to detect a non-functioning no-back brake more reliably than in the prior art.
(16)
(17) It is checked at the beginning whether the high-lift system (abbreviation: HL) is extended or not. If this should not be the case, the check is continued until the high-lift system is in an extended state.
(18) If the high-lift system is extended, on the other hand, it is checked whether the at least one drive unit is in operation or not. If the at least one drive unit is in operation, the preceding interrogations are performed again.
(19) If the drive unit is not in operation, however, the next steps of the static monitoring can be performed. The torque values of the first torque sensor and the second torque sensor are then read in and checked for whether a load is present at the input sensor (first torque sensor) and at the output sensor (second torque sensor). If no load is detected here from both sensors, it is deduced that there are no irregularities in the no-back brake and the check comes to an end.
(20) Otherwise, thus if a load is present both at the input sensor (first torque sensor) and at the output sensor (second torque sensor), or a torque above a certain threshold value is detectable, a fault in the no-back brake is deduced, so that a servicing message or other message is output before the test ends.
(21)
(22) It is examined initially whether the aircraft or plane is on the ground or in the air.
(23) If it is on the ground and if the actuator system is extended, then the torque values are read in and checked for whether these lie within predetermined limits. If this is not the case, a fault in the no-back brake is deduced, so that a servicing message or another message can be output before the test ends.
(24) Extension before take-off, thus when the aircraft is on the ground, generates a small counter load in the actuator. An approximately constant torque is present, which is composed of the friction torques of the flap mechanism and the torque of the “drag brake” built into the no-back brake.
(25) If the torque expected due to this is not measured, a faulty no-back brake is deduced.
(26) If the aircraft is in the air, however, the torque values on retraction of the flap are checked for whether these lie within predetermined limits that differ from the limit values used when checking the aircraft on the ground. If this is not the case, and the torque values detected thus lie outside the acceptable range, a fault in the no-back brake is deduced, so that a servicing message or other message is output before the check ends.
(27) Retraction of the flap following take-off takes place in the actuator with sequential load. In this case, thus on retraction of the flap in the air, this leads to an approximately constant torque, which is generated by the “drag brake” built into the no-back brake. Depending on the structural implementation of the no-back brake, air load components may be included.
(28) It can accordingly be checked even during operation of the actuator, therefore, whether the no-back brake is functioning or not.
(29) Moreover it is also possible to perform one or more of the test steps presented above over a longer operating period of the actuator or of the aircraft that has the actuator, in order to carry out so-called trend monitoring. The torques are thus measured at typically recurring characteristic operating states of the aircraft and evaluated over a plurality of operating cycles, which each have a sequence of characteristic operating states.
(30) By comparing the values obtained over time, a prognosis can be produced that predicts a time of departure from a permitted tolerance range, so that a servicing signal can be output already in advance thereof, for example.