Method for securing a level crossing, and stationary control device for a train control system

Abstract

A method for securing a level crossing permits timely securing of the level crossing and is particularly effective and reliable. The method proceeds in such a way that vehicle data are received from a track-bound vehicle approaching the level crossing by a stationary control device of a train control system. The vehicle data include at least the current position and the current speed of the track-bound vehicle. A strike-in point is determined on the basis of the received vehicle data and route data including at least the location of the level crossing. Securing of the level crossing is triggered when the strike-in point is reached. A stationary control device for a train control system and an arrangement having such a stationary control device are also provided.

Claims

1. A method for securing a level crossing, the method comprising the following steps: using a stationary control device of a train control system for: receiving vehicle data from a track-bound vehicle approaching the level crossing and including at least a current position and a current speed of the track-bound vehicle in the vehicle data; determining a strike-in point by taking the received vehicle data and route data including at least a location of the level crossing into account; and initiating a securing of the level crossing upon reaching the strike-in point.

2. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using the stationary control device for: determining a track waypoint as the strike-in point; and initiating the securing of the level crossing if, according to the received vehicle data, the track-bound vehicle has reached the track waypoint.

3. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using the stationary control device for: determining a point in time as the strike-in point; and initiating the securing of the level crossing at the point in time.

4. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises: initiating the securing of the level crossing by transmitting a request to secure the level crossing from the stationary control device to an interlocking system connected for communication to the level crossing; then transmitting a securing signal from the interlocking system to a local control component of the level crossing; and initiating the securing of the level crossing by the local control component in response to receiving the securing signal.

5. The method according to claim 4, which further comprises following a successful securing of the level crossing: transmitting a confirmation signal from the local control component to the interlocking system; and then transmitting a confirmation relating to the successful securing of the level crossing from the interlocking system to the stationary control device.

6. The method according to claim 5, which further comprises following a reception of the confirmation, using the stationary control device to determine a movement authority extending beyond the level crossing and transmitting the movement authority to the track-bound vehicle as a replacement for a previous movement authority ending ahead of the level crossing.

7. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using the stationary control device to determine the strike-in point while additionally taking a possible speed profile for a further approach of the track-bound vehicle to the level crossing into account.

8. The method according to claim 7, which further comprises using the stationary control device to determine the possible speed profile for the further approach of the track-bound vehicle to the level crossing based on acceleration curves taking the received vehicle data into account.

9. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using the stationary control device to determine the strike-in point while taking a delay time in the securing of the level crossing into account.

10. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises receiving the vehicle data and determining the strike-in point on a continuous basis.

11. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using a communication channel of the train control system for transmitting the vehicle data from the track-bound vehicle to the stationary control device.

12. The method according to claim 1, which further comprises using the stationary control device to check the strike-in point for validity based on sensor data acquired by at least one trackside sensor device.

13. A stationary control device for a train control system, the stationary control device being configured: to receive vehicle data from a track-bound vehicle approaching a level crossing, the vehicle data including at least a current position and a current speed of the track-bound vehicle; to determine a strike-in point for the level crossing taking into account the received vehicle data and route data including at least a location of the level crossing; and to initiate a securing of the level crossing upon reaching the strike-in point.

14. The stationary control device according to claim 13, wherein the stationary control device is configured: to determine a track waypoint as the strike-in point; and to initiate the securing of the level crossing if, according to the received vehicle data, the track-bound vehicle has reached the track waypoint.

15. The stationary control device according to claim 14, wherein the train control system conforms to one of the ETCS (European Train Control System), CTCS (Chinese Train Control System) or PTC (Positive Train Control) standards.

16. The stationary control device according to claim 13, wherein the stationary control device is part of a train control system maintaining continuous communication between the track-bound vehicle and the stationary control device.

17. An arrangement, comprising: a stationary control device according to claim 13; a local control component of a level crossing; and an interlocking system connected for communication to the stationary control device and to the local control component of the level crossing.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWING

(1) The invention is explained in more detail below with reference to exemplary embodiments and the attached drawings, in which:

(2) FIG. 1 shows a first exemplary embodiment of an inventive arrangement in a first schematic diagram intended to explain a first exemplary embodiment of the inventive method, and

(3) FIG. 2 shows a second exemplary embodiment of an inventive arrangement in a second schematic diagram intended to explain a second exemplary embodiment of the inventive method.

DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

(4) For clarity of illustration reasons, like or like-acting components are labeled with the same reference signs in the figures.

(5) FIG. 1 shows a first exemplary embodiment of an inventive arrangement 100 in a first schematic diagram intended to explain a first exemplary embodiment of the inventive method. In detail, there is indicated therein a level crossing 10 which is approached by a track-bound vehicle 20 coming from the left. The distance between the track-bound vehicle 20 and the level crossing 10 at the point in time illustrated is equal to d.

(6) Also identifiable in the diagram shown in FIG. 1 is a stationary control device 30 of a train control system. Let it be assumed within the scope of the described exemplary embodiment in this case that the stationary control device 30 is a central track control unit in the form of a radio block center (RBC) of a train control system conforming to the ETCS (European Train Control System) Level 2 standard. Also indicated in the diagram shown in FIG. 1 are an interlocking 40 and a local control component 50 of the level crossing 10. The interlocking 40 is connected for communication purposes to the stationary control device 30 on the one hand via a bidirectional communications link 41. On the other hand, the interlocking 40 is also connected for communication or signaling purposes to the local control component 50 of the level crossing 10 via a bidirectional communications link 51.

(7) According to the diagram shown in FIG. 1, a bidirectional communications link also exists between an onboard antenna 25 of the track-bound vehicle 20 and a stationary antenna 35 of the stationary control device 30. Said bidirectional communications link, which may also be referred to as a communication channel, is indicated in the exemplary embodiment shown in FIG. 1 as a wireless, mobile communications link and within the scope of the described exemplary embodiment should be realized by way of the railroad-specific mobile communications network GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communications-Railway). For this purpose, the indicated mobile communications network labeled with the reference sign 70 has a base station 60 via which bidirectional communication between the track-bound vehicle 20 and the stationary control device 30 is possible by means of hops or communication link sections 61 and 62. In order to avoid misunderstandings it should be pointed out at this juncture that the corresponding communications link may of course also be implemented at least in part as a wired connection. Thus, it is conceivable for example that the stationary control device 30 is connected to the mobile communications network 70 or to the base station 60 of the same in a wired manner, i.e. via a copper or fiber optic cable, for example.

(8) The arrangement shown in FIG. 1 may now be used for example for securing the level crossing 10 in such a way that vehicle data are received by the stationary control device 30 of the train control system from the track-bound vehicle 20 approaching the level crossing 10, which vehicle data comprise at least the current position and the current speed of the track-bound vehicle 20. Taking into account the received vehicle data and route data comprising at least the location of the level crossing 10, it is then possible for the stationary control device 30 to determine a strike-in point. It shall be assumed within the scope of the described exemplary embodiment in this case that the strike-in point is a track waypoint P. Alternatively or, where appropriate, in addition hereto, a point in time could also be used as a strike-in point.

(9) The described method runs on a continuous or permanent basis, with the result that the vehicle data are received by the stationary control device 30 at short time intervals. The strike-in point in the form of the track waypoint P is hereupon determined or recalculated in correspondingly continuous form by the stationary control device 30. As soon as the track-bound vehicle 20 has reached the track waypoint P according to the vehicle data received by the stationary control device, a securing of the level crossing 10 is initiated by the stationary control device 30. It shall be assumed within the scope of the described exemplary embodiment that this happens in that a request to secure the level crossing 10 is transmitted by the stationary control device 30 to the interlocking 40 connected for communication purposes to the level crossing 10 and a securing signal is hereupon transmitted by the interlocking 40 to the local control component 50 of the level crossing 10. The securing of the level crossing 10 is initiated by the local control component 50 in response to the reception of the securing signal. In this case the securing may be accomplished for example in that firstly a visual and/or audible warning signal is issued and thereupon one or more barriers of the level crossing 10 are closed.

(10) Following successful securing of the level crossing 10, i.e. after the barriers have been closed for example without malfunction or fault message and where applicable—provided a corresponding monitoring component is present—it has been checked that the danger zone in the region of the level crossing is clear, a confirmation signal is transmitted by the local control component 50 to the interlocking 40. The latter for its part hereupon transmits a confirmation relating to the successful securing of the level crossing 10 to the stationary control device 30 of the train control system. A reliable acknowledgement is thus available to the stationary control device 30 to the effect that the securing of the level crossing 10 initiated by it has been successfully concluded.

(11) Based on said acknowledgement, the stationary control device 30 now determines a movement authority extending beyond the level crossing 10 and transmits the same to the track-bound vehicle 20 as replacement for a previous movement authority ending ahead of the level crossing 10. This happens once again via the bidirectional communications link 61, 62, with the base station 60 of the mobile communications network 70 being interposed therebetween. A correspondingly upgraded movement authority therefore advantageously avoids the necessity for the track-bound vehicle 20 to be brought a stop or at least to be braked ahead of the level crossing 10 for safety reasons.

(12) Preferably, the communications link 61, 62 between the stationary control device 30 and the track-bound vehicle 20 is monitored on a permanent basis. In the event of a malfunction, the track-bound vehicle 20 in this case assumes a safe state to the effect that it brakes automatically if for example the communications link 61, 62 to the stationary control device 30 goes down or no movement authority arrives within an expected period of time.

(13) According to the aforementioned statements, the described method makes use of the existing safety structure between the interlocking 40 and the level crossing 10 or the local control component 50 of the same. In this case the stationary control device 30 communicates with the interlocking 40 in order to ensure a shortest possible closure time of the level crossing 10 in terms of a “constant warning time” while simultaneously excluding potential hazards. In the process the strike-in point in the form of the track waypoint P is taken into account by the stationary control device 30 preferably while factoring in a (maximum) delay time occurring during the securing of the level crossing 10, which delay time includes for example a barrier operating time, a pre-warning time/crossing clearing time, times required for the communication between components involved, and activation times.

(14) The described method advantageously integrates itself seamlessly into the standard mode of operation of the train control system. Thus, movement authorities are typically determined on the part of the stationary control device 30 on the basis of dynamic and static track-related data. Should the track-bound vehicle 20 need to modify its operating profile due to track conditions, e.g. due to weather, technical problems, track-related problems e.g. in the form of obstacles or persons in the track area, this is registered by the stationary control device 30 as a result of the continuous communication and if necessary an updated movement authority is hereupon generated by the stationary control device 30 and transmitted to the track-bound vehicle 20. Thus, the method for optimizing the protection of the level crossing 10 advantageously uses data which are already used at least in part in connection with the determining of movement authorities in the train control system and consequently ensures a best possible optimization of the closure time of the level crossing 10 for virtually all cases of train movements. For this purpose, the strike-in point P is advantageously calculated dynamically, this therefore being a “virtual” strike-in point that is not at a fixed location, but is adapted to the particular circumstances. Said virtual strike-in point is therefore the track waypoint P, the securing or activation or closure of the level crossing 10 being initiated for the respective track-bound vehicle 20 when said track waypoint P is reached. In this case the movement information received by the stationary control device 30 is used in order to determine exactly at each point in time, while taking into account the current speed profile of the track-bound vehicle 20 and the speed profile possible for its continued movement, the distance of the track-bound vehicle from the level crossing 10 or, as the case may be, the time still remaining until the level crossing 10 is reached and, based thereon, the point in time for initiating the securing of the level crossing 10. Preferably, the strike-in point in the form of the track waypoint P or in the form of the point in time is determined in this case by the stationary control device 30 while additionally taking into account a speed profile possible for a further approaching of the track-bound vehicle 20 to the level crossing 10. In this case the speed profile possible for the further approaching of the track-bound vehicle to the level crossing 10 can be determined by the stationary control device 30 based on acceleration curves which take into account the received vehicle data.

(15) FIG. 2 shows a second exemplary embodiment of an inventive arrangement 110 in a second schematic diagram intended to explain a second exemplary embodiment of the inventive method.

(16) The arrangement shown in FIG. 2 substantially corresponds to that shown in FIG. 1. Additionally identifiable in FIG. 2, however, is a trackside sensor device 80 which, within the scope of the illustrated exemplary embodiment, is a radio-operated approach annunciator arranged at a distance s ahead of the level crossing 10. The trackside sensor device 80 comprises a wheel sensor 81 and a radio module 82 via which the trackside sensor device 80 is able to set up a communications link 83 to the stationary control device 30 by way of the mobile communications network 70 or the base station 60 of the same (or, as the case may be, a different base station of the mobile communications network 70) and also transfer data to said stationary control device 30. In the exemplary embodiment of FIG. 2, the communications link 83 is realized as a unidirectional connection; alternatively hereto, this could of course likewise be a bidirectional communications link.

(17) Preferably, the trackside sensor device 80 in the form of the radio-operated approach annunciator or the wheel sensor 81 of the same determines the speed of the track-bound vehicle 20 and transmits this to the stationary control device 30 together with the information that the track-bound vehicle 20 (or a track-bound vehicle generally) has been detected and is therefore positioned precisely at the location of the radio-operated approach annunciator 80.

(18) This advantageously makes it possible for the stationary control device 30 to check the validity of the determined strike-in point in the form of the track waypoint P based on the sensor data acquired by the trackside sensor device 80 in the form of the radio-operated approach annunciator, i.e. for example to conduct a check on the vehicle data received from the track-bound vehicle 20, in particular the current position and the current speed. If this results in discrepancies or if errors are detected, the possibility advantageously exists on the part of the stationary control device 30 to initiate a braking action of the track-bound vehicle 20, e.g. by transmission of a correspondingly restricted movement authority. Furthermore, the trackside sensor device 80 in the form of the radio-operated approach annunciator may advantageously also be used for such track-bound vehicles that are not able to communicate bidirectionally with the stationary control device 30 of the train control system. In this way a kind of “mixed mode operation” is therefore also made possible between such track-bound vehicles 20, which for example comprise a corresponding ETCS onboard device, and other vehicles, e.g. in the form of maintenance vehicles.

(19) According to the aforementioned statements in connection with the described exemplary embodiments of the inventive method, the inventive stationary control device and the inventive arrangement, these possess in particular the advantage that they enable the level crossing 10 to be secured in a particularly effective and reliable way. In the process, by taking into account in particular the current position and the current speed of the track-bound vehicle 20, it is possible to avoid an unnecessarily long closure time of the level crossing 10 and to achieve a substantially consistent closure time. At the same time, potential risks due to a securing of the level crossing 10 being initiated too late or due to a malfunction during the execution of the same are reliably excluded in particular as a result of the continuous communication between the stationary control device 30 and the track-bound vehicle 20. During this operation, furthermore, use is advantageously made of a communication channel of the train control system which the latter possesses in any case and which enables a continuous communication between the track-bound vehicle 20 and the stationary control device 30. Accordingly, the described approach is advantageous in particular in connection with the train control systems ETCS Level 2 and 3, CTCS Level 3 and 4, and PTC.