Motor Vehicle Entry and/or Starting System

Abstract

Some embodiments may include an apparatus comprising: a first universal key for unlocking, locking, and/or starting a motor vehicle; a server; and a mobile radio terminal. The first universal key is trained to a particular motor vehicle using a first secret. The server stores a further secret for unlocking, locking, and/or starting the motor vehicle. The server is configured to transmit the further secret to a universal key using two interfaces and the mobile radio terminal.

Claims

1. An apparatus comprising: a first universal key for unlocking, locking, and/or starting a motor vehicle; a server; and a mobile radio terminal; wherein the first universal key is trained to a particular motor vehicle using a first secret; the server stores a further secret for unlocking, locking, and/or starting the motor vehicle; and the server is configured to transmit the further secret to a universal key using two interfaces and the mobile radio terminal.

2. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a controller for checking the further secret received from any universal key against a further secret stored in the motor vehicle; wherein the control device is programmed, only if the two further secrets match, to allow and/or prompt unlocking, locking, and/or starting the motor vehicle.

3. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first universal key comprises a respective radio interface to communicate with the mobile radio terminal and/or with the motor vehicle.

4. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, wherein the universal key includes a timer to monitor a temporal validity, predefined for said timer, of a further secret communicated to said timer, for opening, or closing, or starting the motor vehicle.

5. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, further comprising more than one universal key.

6. A method comprising: receiving a first secret from a server at a universal key; transmitting a further secret for unlocking, locking, and/or starting (a motor vehicle from the motor vehicle to the universal key; transmitting the further secret from the universal key to the server; and storing the further secret in the server.

7. The method as claimed in claim 6, further comprising: transmitting the first secret from a server to the universal key; and thereafter transmitting a further secret from the motor vehicle to a server using the universal key and an associated mobile radio terminal.

8. The method as claimed in claim 6, wherein the server uses three interfaces and the universal key to transmit the first secret to the motor vehicle; the motor vehicle uses three interfaces and the universal key to transmit the further secret to the server; and the three interfaces comprise radio interfaces.

9. A method as claimed in claim 6, further comprising transmitting a further secret from a server to the universal key using two interfaces comprising radio interfaces.

10. The method as claimed in claim 9, wherein at least one of the two interfaces comprises a mobile radio interface or at least one of the two interfaces comprises a Bluetooth radio interface.

11. The method as claimed in claim 9, wherein multiple further secrets are each usable for opening, closing, and/or starting a respective motor vehicle; further comprising transmitting the multiple further secrets to the universal key.

12. The method as claimed in claim 9, further comprising transmitting a further secret usable for only some of the functions to the universal key.

13. The method as claimed in claim 9, further comprising storing multiple protocols or multiple further secrets in the universal key for one or more motor vehicles at the same time.

14. The method as claimed in claim 9, further comprising training multiple universal keys for the motor vehicle at the same time to allow multiple users to operate, enter, and/or close at the same time.

15. The method as claimed in claim 9, further comprising training more than one universal key.

16. The apparatus as claimed in claim 1, further comprising more than one first secrets and/or further secrets.

17. The method as claimed in claim 9, further comprising using more than one first secrets and/or further secrets.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Further features and advantages of some embodiments of the teachings herein emerge from the following description of examples with reference to the drawing, in which, to illustrate some possible configurations of the invention, in each case in simplified schematic form, by way of example,

[0019] FIG. 1 shows an overview of a communication between server, mobile radio terminal, motor vehicle key, and motor vehicle controller, specifically e.g. by mobile radio, Bluetooth and if need be further interface(s), when training a universal key to a motor vehicle using a first secret, to generate a virtual (motor vehicle) key in the form of a further secret in the motor vehicle and server,

[0020] FIG. 2 shows an overview of a communication between server, mobile radio terminal, motor vehicle key, motor vehicle controller, door opener, engine, by mobile radio, Bluetooth and if need be further interface(s), when using a virtual key in the form of a further secret in a universal key for starting or opening or closing, etc., a motor vehicle.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0021] Various configurations of the teachings herein allow safe, universal implementation of at least one virtual key in a respective universal key for an engine start and/or vehicle entry system for motor vehicles that is suitable in particular for a plurality of virtual keys (in the form of (further) secrets) and/or universal keys and/or vehicles and/or users, such as e.g. in a vehicle fleet or rental car fleet. Some embodiments may be implemented as an apparatus in an engine start and/or vehicle entry system of a motor vehicle and/or (for e.g. transmitters/receivers) in particular in a motor vehicle key configured as a universal key (e.g. in the form of a mechanical key or radio key or a card, etc.) and/or a mobile radio terminal and/or a server and/or a controller of a respective motor vehicle.

[0022] In some embodiments, a universal key can respectively manage multiple protocols and/or multiple virtual keys in the form of (further) secrets, etc., at the same time. In a further configuration, multiple universal keys per vehicle can be trained and managed at the same time, e.g. in order to allow multiple users to operate and/or enter at the same time. In a further configuration, a universal key can manage limited rights, such as e.g. only vehicle entry, only entry without trunk entry, only trunk entry, etc. In a further configuration, a virtual key is trained directly to vehicles or other entry authorisations on a server and an ordinary training process is dispensed with.

[0023] By also providing a user with a universal key that can connect both to (most) vehicles and, using his mobile radio terminal such as e.g. a smartphone (or directly), to a server Serv and that moreover can simulate virtual keys and can assign them an expiry time, it may be possible for some or multiple or all further additional electronics of a motor vehicle to be dispensed with that would also for the most part still be implemented specifically for vehicle series. Various embodiments allow a motor vehicle not to be changed or to be changed little, or the security mechanisms of a motor vehicle to be made unbypassable or difficult to bypass. In the broadest sense, convenience functions for vehicle entry and starting can be retained (e.g. entry by radio, passive entry, etc.). It is also possible for universal keys and/or virtual keys (in the form of secrets) having a limited scope of functions (e.g. only opening and closing) to be issued.

[0024] FIG. 1 shows, for an exemplary embodiment, an overview of some components of a motor vehicle entry and/or starting system Kfz-Zug and a multipartite (1a-1g) communication (in the case of key training) between a server Serv, a mobile radio terminal MS1 (of a user Ben1), one of multiple vehicle keys in the form of universal keys Univ-key1, Univ-key2 for (in each case at least) one motor vehicle Kfz1 or Kfz2 and a motor vehicle controller KfzContr of a motor vehicle Kfz1, specifically in this case a respective communication via radio links by, in particular, mobile radio Mob and/or Bluetooth link(s) Bluet, Bluet-MS1<->UnivKey1, BluetUnivKey1<->Kfz1 and/or further vehicle-internal (radio/line, etc.) interface(s) such as e.g. a wired vehicle bus CAN.

[0025] FIG. 1 shows (if need be even more than two or more than ten or more than one hundred) virtual vehicle keys (each in the form of a further secret such as Geheim-anlern-Kfz-1) that are generated (e.g. as a one-off) and are stored in an indicated memory Spei-Serv of a server Serv, two (of if need be multiple, if need be even more than two or more than ten or more than one hundred) vehicle keys in the form of universal keys UnivKey1, UnivKey2, and a motor vehicle Kfz1, one of the universal keys UnivKey1 being trained (1a-1g) to at least one (e.g. any) respective motor vehicle Kfz1, and from then being able to be authorized (2a-2d) for the latter (Kfz1) for opening (Trff) and/or closing (Trff) and/or starting (MotStart), e.g. for a vehicle fleet such as e.g. a rental car fleet, etc.

[0026] A universal key UnivKey1 and/or UnivKey2 in this case has a respective radio interface BluetUK1 (e.g. a Bluetooth interface having e.g. a Bluetooth antenna) by means of which it can communicate e.g. with a radio interface (e.g. likewise a Bluetooth interface having e.g. a Bluetooth antenna) BluetMS1 of a mobile radio terminal MS1, and by means of which it can communicate e.g. with a radio interface (e.g. likewise a Bluetooth interface having e.g. a Bluetooth antenna) BluetKfz (e.g. likewise a Bluetooth interface) of a motor vehicle Kfz1.

[0027] A mobile radio terminal MS1 (from if need be multiple mobile radio terminals) in this case has a radio interface BluetMS1, indicated in the drawing, by means of which it can communicate e.g. with a radio interface BluetUK1 (e.g. a Bluetooth interface) of a universal key Univkey1, and a mobile radio interface Mobi (such as e.g. for a 2G/3G/3.5 G and/or 4G mobile radio network/WLAN, etc.) by means of which it can communicate with a server Serv (using e.g. a mobile radio network connection indicated by two arrows) via (at least) a mobile radio network Mobi.

[0028] In FIG. 1 a mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. a cell phone, tablet, computer, etc.) uses a mobile radio interface Mobi (such as e.g. 2G, 3G, 3.5 G, 4G, WLAN, etc.) to transmit, e.g. under the control of a piece of software or an application app, as first step 1a in this case, e.g. a statement MS1-ID identifying the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an MSISDN or other identifier, etc.) and/or e.g. a statement PIN1 identifying the user Ben1 of the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an input previously entered by the user Ben1 on the mobile radio terminal by keypad/voice, etc.) and/or a request Anf-Anlern (request for a training protocol Anlernprot and/or for a training secret Geheimn-anlern-serv-1) to a server Serv connected to the mobile radio network Mobi, which (Serv) stores e.g. in this case the statement MS1-ID identifying the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an MSISDN, etc.) and/or the statement PIN1 identifying the user Ben1 of the mobile radio terminal MS1 (e.g. in association with one another/linked to one another) in an indicated memory Spei-Serv.

[0029] In step 1b in FIG. 1, the server Serv transmits a first secret (in this case a training secret used for training) Geheimn-anlern-serv1 and possibly also a training protocol Anlernprot to the mobile radio terminal MS1 via the network Mobi (and stores, e.g. in said mobile radio terminal, that this Geheimn-anlern-serv1 is now part of and/or associated with the statement MS1-ID identifying a mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or the statement PIN1 identifying the user Ben1 of the mobile radio terminal MS1).

[0030] In step 1c in FIG. 1, the mobile radio terminal MS1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-MS1<->UnivKey1 to transmit to the universal key UnivKey1 the first secret (training secret) Geheimn-anlern-serv1 and possibly also a training protocol Anlernprot, which the universal key UnivKey1 stores in an indicated memory Spei-UnivKey1.

[0031] In step 1d in FIG. 1, the universal key UnivKey1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-UnivKey1<->Kfz1 to transmit to a radio interface BluetKfz1 of the motor vehicle Kfz1 the first secret (training secret) Geheimn-anlern-serv1 and possibly if need be also the training protocol Anlernprot, which the motor vehicle Kfz1 stores in an indicated memory Spei-Kfz1. For (Bluetooth, etc.) authentication on a (radio) interface BluetUnivKey1<->Kfz, e.g. a secret (such as e.g. in this case Geheimn-anlern-serv1 or another) known to the motor vehicle Kfz1 and to the universal key UnivKey1 can be used.

[0032] In step 1e in FIG. 1, the motor vehicle Kfz1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-UnivKey1<->Kfz1 to transmit to the universal key UnivKey1 a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 (generated and/or stored in the Kfz1), which the universal key UnivKey1 stores (in this case only temporarily) in an indicated memory Spei-UnivKey1, and that can be used e.g. in future as a virtual key for a universal key (e.g. UnivKey1) to open/close/start, etc., the motor vehicle Kfz1.

[0033] In step 1f in FIG. 1, the universal key UnivKey1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-MS1<->UnivKey1 to transmit to the mobile radio terminal MS1 the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, which the mobile radio terminal MS1 stores in an indicated memory Spei-MS1. (If need be, the universal key UnivKey1 then possibly erases the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1.)

[0034] In step 1g in FIG. 1, the mobile radio terminal MS1 uses an (e.g. mobile radio) interface Mobi to transmit to the server Serv the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, which the server Serv stores in an indicated memory Spei-Serv. If need be, an identity statement ID-Kfz1 relating to the motor vehicle Kfz1 can also be transmitted with a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 from the Kfz1 to the universal key UnivKey1 and/or to the mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or to the server Serv and/or stored (in the universal key UnivKey1 and/or mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or server Serv), so that later, in the event of a request (2a) (if need be inter alia) providing an identity statement ID-Kfz1 for a Kfz1 in the universal key UnivKey1 and/or mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or, in particular, server Serv, a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 stored therein for this identity statement ID-Kfz1 for a Kfz1 can be identified and transmitted (to a universal key UnivKey1 and/or mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or motor vehicle Kfz1 for motor vehicle opening and/or closure and/or starting, etc.).

[0035] In the universal key UnivKey1 and/or mobile radio terminal MS1, it is possible e.g. for the stored further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 (obtained there during training and/or later) to be erased automatically e.g. immediately or after a prescribed time (e.g. controlled using a timer TimUK1 in the universal key UnivKey 1 and/or a timer in the mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or Kfz1 and/or server Serv, etc.). Such a training process for training the universal key UnivKey1 to the motor vehicle Kfz1 can take place using this same (UnivKey1) or a (or multiple) different (UnivKey2) universal key for multiple motor vehicles (not depicted) Kfz2, etc., for example, e.g. even for a vehicle fleet. Thus, one or more motor vehicles Kfz1, Kfz2, etc., is or are (after erasure in the universal key used for training 1a-1f) (now only) trained to one server Serv, that is to say startable and/or openable and/or closable and/or closable only at the trunk, etc., using a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 stored (e.g. only) there (Serv).

[0036] It is now thus possible, as FIG. 2 shows, for any of the universal keys Univkey1, UnivKey2 to be authorized (e.g. also by any user Ben1, Ben2) by the server Serv (by means of e.g. (radio) transmission of a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, respectively stored for a motor vehicle Kfz1 (e.g. with the identity ID-Kfz1 thereof) and/or mobile radio terminal and/or user Ben1 and/or code Pin1, to the universal key) to start and/or open and/or close and/or close only at the trunk, etc., one (Kfz1) or more of the motor vehicles using a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1.

[0037] FIG. 2 shows authorization of a universal key UnivKey1 by a server Serv to allow this universal key UnivKey1, following this authorization, to start and/or open and/or close and/or close only at the trunk, etc., a motor vehicle Kfz1 using a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, which is stored in the server Serv (and e.g. findable for said motor vehicle in the form of the identity ID-Kfz-1 thereof, etc.).

[0038] In FIG. 2 a mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. a cell phone, tablet, computer, etc.) uses a mobile radio interface Mobi (such as e.g. 2G, 3G, 3.5 G, 4G, etc.) to transmit, e.g. under the control of a piece of software or an application app, as first step 2a in this case, a statement MS1-ID identifying the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an MSISDN, etc.) and/or a statement PIN1 identifying the user Ben1 of the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an input previously entered by the user Ben1 on the mobile radio terminal by keypad/voice, etc.) and/or a statement ID-Kfz-1 identifying the motor vehicle Kfz1 and/or a request Anf-Key (for a further secret Geheimn-anlern-serv-1 as a virtual key for opening/closing/starting/etc. a particular motor vehicle Kfz1) to a server Serv connected to the mobile radio network Mobi.

[0039] The server Serv if need be checks the statement MS1-ID identifying the mobile radio terminal MS1 (such as e.g. an MSISDN, etc.) and/or the statement PIN1 identifying the user Ben1 of the mobile radio terminal MS1 and/or the statement ID-Kfz-1 identifying the motor vehicle Kfz1 on the basis of values stored in an indicated memory Spei-Serv and/or identifies, e.g. after a successful check (e.g. on the basis of the obtained MS1-ID and/or Ben1 and/or ID-Kfz-1), the further secret Geheimn-anlern-serv-1 for opening/closing/starting, etc., a particular motor vehicle Kfz1 in its memory Spei-Serv.

[0040] In step 2b in FIG. 2, the server Serv transmits an identified (e.g. on the basis of the obtained MS1-ID and/or Ben1 and/or ID-Kfz-1) further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz-1 for opening, etc., a particular motor vehicle Kfz1 to the mobile radio terminal MS1 (requesting it), e.g. via a mobile radio interface Mobi. In step 2c in FIG. 2, the mobile radio terminal MS1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-MS1<->UnivKey1 to transmit to the universal key UnivKey1 (e.g. currently connected to the mobile radio terminal by Bluetooth) the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 (for the Kfz1), which the universal key UnivKey1 stores in an indicated memory Spei-UnivKey1 (e.g. only for a time t1 prescribed therefor).

[0041] In step 2d in FIG. 2, the universal key UnivKey1 uses an (e.g. Bluetooth) interface Bluet-UnivKey1<->Kfz1 to transmit (e.g. for the purpose of opening or closing or starting, etc.) to a radio interface BluetKfz of the motor vehicle Kfz1 the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, which the motor vehicle Kfz1 compares and/or checks if need be e.g. on the basis of a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 stored in an indicated memory Spei-Kfz1, whereupon a door opener Turoff or starter MotStart, etc., of the motor vehicle Kfz1 is then operated (to open or close or start, etc.) by a motor vehicle controller KfzContr (depending on what the universal key calls for, such as e.g. Door open to open) via an (CAN, etc.) interface CAN e.g. in the event of a match. The further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 can thus be used (in each case) as a virtual key for (e.g. just precisely) one motor vehicle Kfz1.

[0042] The length of time for which a further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 is supposed to authorize (e.g. precisely) one universal key UnivKey1 to use e.g. an interface Bluet-UnivKey1<->Kfz1 (e.g. Bluetooth or other radio interface such as e.g. PACE, RKE etc.) to prompt a motor vehicle Kfz1 to open or close or start, etc., may be limited, e.g. by virtue of (e.g. in step 2b and/or 2c) a time statement t1 being sent to a universal key UnivKey1 with the further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1, said time statement being e.g. continually compared, e.g. in the universal key UnivKey1 and/or motor vehicle Kfz1, with a timer TimrUK1, the universal key UnivKey1 being prepared to prompt a motor vehicle Kfz1 to open or close or start, etc., only up to expiry of the time, and then no longer. The further secret Geheimn-anlern-Kfz1 can be erased automatically in the universal key e.g. in the event of a detected manipulation attempt such as stopping the timer TimerUK1 (e.g. even if said timer is monitored by means of the server and/or mobile radio terminal).

[0043] One or more or all transmissions (e.g. 1a-1g, 2a-2d, etc.) of data can take place in particular in cryptographically protected fashion. In some embodiments, a universal key UnivKey1 can respectively manage multiple protocols Anlernprot and/or (further) secrets Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-1, Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-2 etc. at the same time. In a further configuration, multiple universal keys UnivKey1, UnivKey2 per vehicle can be trained and managed at the same time, e.g. in order to allow multiple users Ben1, Ben2 to operate and/or enter at the same time. In a further configuration, a universal key can manage limited rights, such as e.g. only vehicle entry, only entry without trunk entry, only trunk entry, etc. In a further configuration, a virtual key such as Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-1, Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-2 is trained directly to vehicles or other entry authorizations on the server Serv and the ordinary training process can be dispensed with.

[0044] By letting a user Ben1 have a universal key UnivKey1 that can connect both to (most) vehicles Kfz1, Kfz2 and, using his mobile radio terminal such as e.g. a smartphone (or directly), to a server Serv and that moreover can simulate virtual keys (such as Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-1, Geheimn-Anlern-Kfz-2) and can assign them an expiry time (t1), it may be possible for some or multiple or all further additional electronics to be dispensed with that would also for the most part otherwise still be implemented specifically for vehicle series.

[0045] Some embodiments allow a vehicle not to be changed or to be changed little, or security mechanisms of a vehicle to be made unbypassable or difficult to bypass. In the broadest sense, convenience functions for vehicle entry and/or starting can be retained (e.g. entry by radio, passive entry and passive go). It is also possible for universal keys and/or further secrets having a limited scope of functions (e.g. only opening and/or closing) to be issued.