Electronically controllable and testable turbine trip system and method with redundant bleed manifolds
09903221 ยท 2018-02-27
Assignee
Inventors
- Jay Michael Jacobs (Pittsburgh, PA, US)
- Thomas Sweeney (Sarver, PA, US)
- Daniel Philip Berkepile (North Huntington, PA, US)
- Adam Gregory Redling (Aspinwall, PA, US)
- Michael Henry Winwood (Gibsonia, PA, US)
Cpc classification
Y10T137/86493
GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
Y10T137/0324
GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
F01D21/16
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
International classification
F01D21/16
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
F01D21/18
MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
Abstract
A trip control system for use with, for example, turbines, includes a porting manifold that supports and provides fluid to two or more trip manifolds, each of which includes a bleed circuit having two or more bleed valves connected in parallel between a trip header line and a return or dump line to bleed the hydraulic fluid pressure from the trip header line to thereby cause a trip. The trip control system includes redundant trip manifolds operating in parallel, wherein each trip manifold is able to independently engage a trip of the turbine and each of the trip manifolds includes redundant sets of valves and other trip components that enable the trip manifold to operate to engage a trip of the turbine in the presence of a failure of one of the sets of components on a trip manifold, or while various components of the trip manifold are being tested.
Claims
1. A method of operating a controlled device using a trip manifold to deliver control pressure from a system pressure source to an input of a controlled device, the method comprising: receiving a trip signal from a controller; executing a tripping action of the trip manifold in response to receiving the trip signal from the controller, the tripping action including: de-energizing an actuator valve of a first control valve system to couple a control input of a control valve of the first control valve system to a drain line, wherein the control valve closes a first fluid path between the system pressure line and a control pressure line; de-energizing an actuator valve of a second control valve system to couple a control input of a control valve of the second control valve system to the drain line, wherein the control valve closes a second fluid path between the system pressure line and the control pressure line; and de-energizing an actuator valve of a third control valve system to couple a control input of a control valve of the third control valve system to the drain line, wherein the control valve closes a third fluid path between the system pressure line and the control pressure line, wherein the control pressure line is fully sealed from the system pressure line by the control valves of the first, second and third control valve systems.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the de-energized actuator valve of the first control valve system further causing a first trip valve of the first control valve system to be coupled to the drain line and a control input of a second trip valve of the first control valve system to be coupled to the drain line; the de-energized actuator valve of the second control valve system further causing a first trip valve of the second control valve system to be coupled to the drain line and a control input of a second trip valve of the second control valve system to be coupled to the drain line; and the de-energized actuator valve of the third control valve system further causing a first trip valve of the third control valve system to be coupled to the drain line and a control input of a second trip valve of the third control valve system to be coupled to the drain line; wherein a first bleed path between the control pressure line and the drain line is created through the first trip valve of the first control valve system and the second trip valve of the second control valve system; a second bleed path between the control pressure line and the drain line is created through the first trip valve of the second control valve system and the second trip valve of the third control valve system; and a third bleed path between the control pressure line and the drain line is created through the first trip valve of the third control valve system and the second trip valve of the first control valve system.
3. A method of testing the operation of a redundant trip manifold system delivering control pressure to an input of a controlled device from a system pressure source in a manner that enables one of a plurality of control valve systems to be tested without preventing a tripping action, the method comprising: de-energizing an actuator valve of a first control valve system to couple a control input of a control valve of the first control valve system to a drain line, wherein the control valve closes to fully seal a fluid path between the system pressure line and a control pressure line, the de-energized actuator valve of the first control valve system further causing a first trip valve of the first control valve system to be coupled to the drain line and a control input of a second trip valve of the first control valve system to be coupled to the drain line; monitoring pressure at an output of the first trip valve of the first control valve system; monitoring pressure at an input of the second trip valve of the first control valve system; comparing the monitored pressure at the output of the first trip valve of the first control valve system to a first redundant trip valve outlet pressure level; comparing the monitored pressure at the input of the second trip valve of the first control valve system to a second redundant trip valve inlet pressure level; executing a first command indicating an operating condition of the first trip valve of the first control valve system based on the comparison of the monitored pressure at the output of the first trip valve of the first control valve system to the first redundant trip valve outlet pressure level; and executing a second command indicating an operating condition of the second trip valve of the first control valve system based on the comparison of the monitored pressure at the inlet of the second trip valve of the first control valve system to the first redundant trip valve inlet pressure level.
Description
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
(8) Referring to
(9) Generally speaking, the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30 include redundant blocking and redundant bleed functionality that enables the components of the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30 to be tested and replaced while the turbine 11 is online and operating and in a manner that does not prevent a tripping action during the testing or replacement of any of the components of the block circuit 20 or the bleed circuit 30. Furthermore, the block circuit 20 and/or the bleed circuit 30 can be integrated into a small, single package that can be easily fit onto existing turbine trip control systems to enable such existing systems to be retrofit with the enhanced redundant, testable and replaceable bleed functionality described herein.
(10) As will be understood from
(11) As illustrated in
(12) It should be understood that the controller 75 may be remote from or local to the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30. Furthermore, the controller 75 may include a single control unit that operates and tests the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30 or multiple control units, such as distributed control units, which are each configured to operate different ones of the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30. Generally speaking, the structure and configuration of the controller 75 are conventional and, therefore, are not discussed further herein.
(13) During normal operation of the turbine 11, which may be configured to drive a generator, for example, hydraulic fluid under pressure (e.g., operating oil) is supplied from a hydraulic fluid source (e.g., a pump) to the block circuit 20 and the bleed circuit 30 via the line 50, and to the steam valve 40 via the hydraulic fluid path made up of the trip header line or lines 52 which are coupled to the line 50 as described in more detail herein. The hydraulic fluid may include any suitable type of hydraulic material that is capable of flowing along the hydraulic fluid paths 50 and 52 as well as the return path 60 and drain line 70. As noted above, when the pressure in the fluid line(s) 52 at the trip input to the steam valve 40 is at a predetermined system pressure, the steam valve 40 allows or enables the flow of steam to the turbine 11. However, when the pressure in the fluid line(s) 52 at the trip input of the steam valve 40 drops to a predetermined amount or a significant amount below system pressure or trip header pressure (which is typically slightly less than system pressure), the steam valve 40 closes or trips, which causes a shutdown of the turbine 11.
(14) Generally speaking, to cause a trip of the turbine 11, the controller 75 first operates the bleed circuit 30 to bleed fluid from one or more of the trip header line(s) 52 at the trip input of the steam valve 40 to the return line 60 and then to the tank 62 to thereby remove the system pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 40 and cause a trip of the turbine 11. Once a trip of the turbine 11 has occurred, the block circuit 20 automatically operates due to the loss of trip pressure in the line 52 to block the flow of hydraulic fluid within the line(s) 52 to prevent continuous supply of hydraulic fluid from the supply line 50 to the line(s) 52 while the turbine 11 is in a trip state. Additionally, as will be discussed in more detail, the controller 75 may control various components of the bleed circuit 30 and the block circuit 20 during normal operation of the turbine 11 to test those components without causing a trip of the turbine 11. This testing functionality enables the components of the trip system 10 to be periodically tested, and replaced if necessary, during operation of the turbine 11 without requiring the turbine 11 to be shut down or taken off line either during the testing activities or the repair and replacement activities. This testing functionality also enables failed components of the block and bleed circuits 20 and 30 to be detected and replaced or repaired prior to the actual operation of a trip, thereby helping to assure reliable trip operation when needed. As will also be described in more detail, the bleed circuit 30 is configured to enable components of this circuit to be repaired or replaced during operation of the turbine without affecting the ability of the controller 75 to cause a trip of the turbine 11 via the steam valve 40.
(15) In one embodiment, the controller 75 operates the bleed circuit 30 to perform a trip of the turbine 11 in response to the detection of one or more abnormal conditions or malfunctions within the plant in which the turbine 11 is located. To help ensure that a trip operation is performed even if one or more components associated with the bleed circuit 30 fails to operate properly or while components of the bleed circuit 30 are being repaired or replaced, the bleed circuit 30 preferably includes a plurality, e.g., two, bleed systems that operate simultaneously and in parallel to one another.
(16) Moreover, each of the bleed systems within the bleed circuit 30 preferably includes a plurality of redundant valve systems that create redundant bleed fluid paths connected in parallel between the trip header line(s) 52 and the return line 60, wherein operation of any one of the parallel bleed fluid paths is sufficient to remove trip header pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 40 and thereby cause a trip of the turbine 11. In one embodiment, each bleed system of the bleed circuit 30 may include three such valve systems, and each of the valve systems may include an actuator valve that controls two trip valves and a supply pressure cutoff valve. In this case, as will be described in more detail, operation of two or more of the valve systems of either of the bleed systems causes at least one bleed fluid path to be created between one of the lines 52 and the return line 60, while operation of only one of the valve systems of either of the bleed systems does not create a bleed path between the lines 52 and the return path 60. This configuration is known as a two out of three voting system, and assures that a malfunction of a single one of the valve systems of either of the bleed systems cannot cause a trip when the controller 75 is not trying to initiate a trip, while also assuring that a malfunction of a single one of the valve systems in each of the bleed systems will not prevent a trip from occurring when the controller 75 is trying to initiate a trip.
(17)
(18) As illustrated in
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22) As can be seen from
(23) As illustrated in
(24) As is evident in
(25) Still further, the third trip branch 220 includes the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 coupled between the hydraulic fluid path 52 and the return path 60. Specifically, port A of the third trip valve (C1) 250 is hydraulically coupled to the hydraulic fluid path 52 via a hydraulic conduit 288, port B of the third trip valve (C1) 250 is hydraulically coupled to port A of the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 via a hydraulic conduit 289, and port B of the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 is hydraulically coupled to the return path 60 via a hydraulic conduit 290.
(26) For the sake of illustration, the control valves that make up the control valve systems 232, 234 and 236 which operate to control the operation of the trip valves 230-280 are not depicted in
(27) As will be described in more detail with respect to
(28)
(29) Again, as illustrated in
(30) As will be understood, each of the first, second, and third actuators 232b, 234b, 236b is operatively coupled to the controller 75, which is configured to energize and de-energize each of the first, second, and third actuators 232,b, 234b, 236b either separately or simultaneously. In one embodiment, each of the first, second, and third actuators 232b, 234b, 236b, when energized by the controller 75, supplies control pressure from the system pressure line 50 to the control port of the associated trip valves 230-280 to lock the associated trip valves 230-280 in their closed position. Likewise, when de-energized by the controller 75, the first, second and third actuators 232b, 234b, 236b connect the control port of the associated trip valves 230-280 to the drain line 70.
(31) As depicted in
(32) To ensure that all of the components work properly to perform a trip operation when required or desired, the components associated with the bleed circuit 30 may be tested while the turbine 11 is operating online without interrupting operation of the turbine 11. For testing purposes, the bleed circuit 30 includes first, second, and third pressure transmitters (PT1-PT3) 300-320 configured to sense the pressure between the trip valves in the first, second, and third trip branches 200-220, respectively, and, in particular, to sense the fluid pressure in the conduits 283, 286 and 289, respectively. Additionally, as illustrated best in
(33) In any event, as illustrated in
(34) During normal operating conditions (i.e., when the turbine 11 is not tripped), the controller 75 is configured to simultaneously energize each of the first, second, and third solenoid actuators 232b, 234b, 236b to activate the first-sixth trip valves 230-280. When the first, second, and third solenoid actuators 232b, 234b, 236b are energized, control pressure is supplied at the control port of each of the first-sixth trip valves 230-280, thereby causing the first-sixth trip valves 230-280 to be locked in the closed position. At this time, hydraulic fluid is blocked or prevented from flowing between the operational ports of those valves and, as a result, no direct path exists between the hydraulic fluid path 52 and the return path 60. This configuration maintains sufficient hydraulic pressure within the hydraulic fluid path 52 at the trip input of the steam valve 40 to hold the steam valve 40 in the open position. When the steam valve 40 is held in the open position, steam is delivered to the turbine 11 and the turbine 11 operates normally.
(35) During abnormal conditions or malfunctions, it may be desirable to stop operation of the turbine 11 to prevent damage to the turbine 11 and/or to prevent other catastrophes. To do so, the controller 75 creates a bleed fluid path between the hydraulic fluid path 52 and the return path 60 to thereby remove hydraulic pressure from the hydraulic fluid path 52. The bleeding of pressure from the fluid path 52 causes the trip input of the steam valve 40 to become depressurized, thereby moving the steam valve 40 to the closed position and preventing the delivery of steam to the turbine 11. This action causes and is referred to as a tripping or halting of the turbine 11.
(36) To determine if a trip is needed, the controller 75 may monitor turbine parameters such as, for example, turbine speed, turbine load, vacuum pressure, bearing oil pressure, thrust oil pressure, and the like using various sensors (not shown). As will be understood, the controller 75 may be configured to receive information from these sensors during operation of the turbine 11 to monitor operating conditions of the turbine 11, to thereby detect abnormal operating conditions and problems associated with the turbine 11 that may require that the turbine 11 be shut down. In response to information received from the operational sensors such as, for example, the detection of an overspeed condition, the controller 75 may cause a trip operation to be performed. To actually effectuate such a trip, the components associated with only two of the redundant valve systems or branches 200-220 of the bleed circuit 30 need to operate properly. However, to cause a trip, the controller 75 will generally operate (actually deactivate) each of the actuators 232b, 234b, 236b to thereby attempt to open each of the trip valves 230-280 and create three parallel bleed fluid paths between the hydraulic fluid line 52 and the return path 60. In this manner, the trip control system helps to assure that a trip will be performed even if one of the components of the bleed circuit 30 fails to operate properly because, in that case, at least one bleed fluid path will still be created or opened between the hydraulic fluid path 52 and the return path 60, thus causing a trip.
(37) More particularly, during a trip operation, the controller 75 may be configured to simultaneously de-energize each of the first, second, and third actuators 232b, 234b, 236b, so that hydraulic fluid is permitted to flow through each of the first trip branch 200, the second trip branch 210, and the third trip branch 220, thereby dumping pressure off the trip input of the steam valve 40 to stop operation of the turbine 11. Additionally, the control valves 232a, 234a, 236a will close due to loss of pressure at their control inputs and disconnect the system pressure line 50 from the trip header line 52. As will be understood from
(38) Similarly, when the controller 75 de-energizes the second actuator 234b, the control ports of both the second trip valve (B1) 240 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 are coupled through the actuator 234b to the drain 70. As a result, control or system pressure from the line 50 is released or removed at each of the control ports of the second trip valve (B1) 240 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280, and the pressure within the control line for these valves is immediately diverted or bled to the drain 70. At this time, both of the second trip valve (B1) 240 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 move from the closed position to the open position which enables hydraulic fluid to flow through the operational ports of the second trip valve (B1) 240 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280.
(39) Likewise, when the controller 75 de-energizes the third actuator 236b, the control ports of both the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 are coupled through the actuator 236b to the drain 70. As a result, control or system pressure is released or removed from each of the control ports of the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260, and the pressure within the control line for these valves is immediately diverted or bled to the drain 70. At this time, both of the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 move from the closed position to the open position which permits hydraulic fluid to flow through the operational ports of the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260.
(40) As will be understood, to effectuate a trip operation, hydraulic fluid in the fluid path 52 need only flow to the return path 60 via one of the first, second, or third trip branches 200-220 to, thereby depressurize the trip input of the steam valve 40 and stop operation of the turbine 11. As a result, the components associated with only two of the redundant valve systems A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 or C1, C2, C3 need to operate properly to perform a trip operation. In other words, if all of the components associated with the first valve system (e.g., the first actuator 232b, the first trip valve (A1) 230, the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 and the control valve (A3) 232a) operate properly, and if all of the components associated with the second valve system (e.g., the second actuator 234b, the second trip valve (B1) 240, and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 and the control valve (B3) 234a) operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 52 to the return path 60 via the first trip branch 200, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 40 and stopping operation of the turbine 11. Similarly, if all of the components associated with the second valve system operate properly, and if all of the components associated with the third valve system (e.g., the third actuator 236b, the third trip valve (C1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 and the control valve (C3) 236a) operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 52 to the return path 60 via the second trip branch 210, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 40 and stopping operation of the turbine 11. Still further, if all of the components associated with the third and first valve systems operate properly, then hydraulic fluid may flow from the hydraulic fluid path 52 to the return path 60 via the third trip branch 220, thereby dumping trip pressure off the steam valve 40 and stopping operation of the turbine 11. In this manner, redundancy is achieved by requiring that the components associated with only two of the three valve systems operate properly to perform a trip operation. In other words, the failure of one or more components associated with one of the branches 200-220 will not prevent the controller 75 from performing a trip operation to stop the turbine 11.
(41) Still further, it is desirable, from time to time, to test the components associated with the bleed circuit 30 while the turbine 11 is online and operating to ensure that all of these components work properly. However, it is desirable to test these components without interrupting the operation of the turbine 11, as stopping the turbine 11 for testing or maintenance is costly and undesirable. In the system illustrated in
(42) More specifically, to test the operation of the first actuator system 232 (including the control valve 232a and the solenoid valve 232b), the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 associated with the first valve system 232, the controller 75 de-energizes the solenoid valve 232b while keeping the solenoid valves 234b and 236b energized. When the controller 75 de-energizes the first solenoid valve 232b, the control ports of both the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 should be coupled to the drain 70 and thus control pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports of the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270. Additionally, the control valve 232a (which loses fluid pressure at the control port thereof), should close, thereby disconnecting the path from the system pressure line 50 to the trip header line 52. If all of these components are operating properly, when the first actuator 232b is de-energized, both of the first trip valve (A1) 230 and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 should thus move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring the pressure sensed by the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 at the hydraulic conduit 283, the pressure sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, and/or the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 75 can determine whether one or more of the first actuator 232b, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 are operating properly.
(43) In particular, if each of the first solenoid actuator 232b, the first trip valve (A1) 230, and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 is operating properly when the controller 75 de-energizes the first solenoid actuator 232b, the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 should sense system or trip header pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 (due to the opening of the first trip valve (A1) 230, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should sense a small or negligible pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 286 and the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense drain pressure at the hydraulic conduit 289 due to the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 opening to connect the conduit 289 to the return line 60.
(44) However, if the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses no or only a small pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 283 after the controller 75 de-energizes the first actuator 232b while sensing drain pressure at the transmitter (PT3) 320, the controller 75, to the extent it receives a measurement from the pressure transmitter 300, may determine that the first trip valve (A1) 230 is not working properly. On the other hand, if the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 senses trip header pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 after the controller 75 de-energizes the first actuator 232b while sensing no or little pressure change at the transmitter (PT3) 320, the controller 75 may determine that the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 is not working properly. In the case in which both the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 and the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 senses no or only a small pressure change at the hydraulic conduits 283 and 289 after the controller 75 de-energizes the first actuator 232b, the controller 75 may determine that the solenoid valve 232b is not working properly. In any of these cases, the controller 75 may generate a fault or alarm signal or take any other desired action to notify a user of the specific problem. Of course, the controller 75 may also sense a problem with the solenoid valve 232b if the controller senses changes to the pressures measured by the pressure transmitters PT1 and PT3 when the controller 75 is energizing the solenoid valve 232b, as this means that the solenoid valve 232b may have stopped functioning and closed in response to the bias on that valve.
(45) The second valve system 234, the second trip valve (B1) 250, and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 associated with the second valve system 234 may be tested in a manner similar to the manner described above with respect to the first valve system 232. Specifically, when the controller 75 de-energizes the second actuator 234b, while keeping the first solenoid actuator 223b and the third solenoid actuator 236b energized, the control ports of both the second trip valve (B1) 250 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 should be coupled through the actuator 234b to the drain 70 and thus control or system pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280. Thus, if the second valve system 234 is operating properly when the actuator 234b is de-energized, both of the third trip valve (B1) 250 and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 should move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring the pressure sensed by the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 at the hydraulic conduit 283, the pressure sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, and/or the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 75 may determine whether one or more of the second actuator 234b, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 are operating properly.
(46) In particular, if the second actuator 234b, the third trip valve (B1) 250, and the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 are operating properly when the controller 75 de-energizes the second actuator 234b, the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 should detect drain pressure at the hydraulic conduit 283 due to the opening of the trip valve 280 that couples the outlet of the first trip valve (A1) 230 to return line 60. Additionally, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should sense trip header pressure at the conduit 286 due to the opening of the valve 240 (B1) while the trip valve (C2) 260 remains closed. Moreover, the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense only a small or negligible pressure change in the hydraulic conduit 289 as operation of the trip valves 250 and 270 remain unaffected.
(47) However, if the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses no or only a small pressure change at the hydraulic conduit 286 after the controller 75 de-energizes the second actuator 234b while sensing drain pressure at the transmitter (PT1) 300, the controller 75 may determine that the second trip valve (B1) 240 is not working properly. On the other hand, if the first pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 senses trip header pressure at the hydraulic conduit 286 after the controller 75 de-energizes the first actuator 234b while sensing no or little pressure change at the pressure transmitter (PT1) 300, the controller 75 may determine that the sixth trip valve (B2) 280 is not working properly. In the case in which both the first pressure transmitter (PT1) 300 and the second pressure transmitter (PT3) 310 senses no or only a small pressure change at the hydraulic conduits 283 and 286 after the controller 75 de-energizes the second solenoid actuator 234b, the controller 75 may determine that the solenoid valve 234b is not working properly. In any of these cases, the controller 75 may generate a fault or alarm signal or take any other desired action to notify a user of the specific problem and the detected source or cause of the problem. Of course, the controller 75 may also sense a problem with the solenoid valve 234b if the controller 75 senses changes to the pressures measured by the pressure transmitter PT1 and PT2 when the controller 75 is energizing the solenoid valve 234b, as this situation means that the solenoid valve 234b may have stop functioning and closed in response to the bias on that valve without being instructed by the controller 75 to do so.
(48) The third actuator or valve system 236, the third trip valve (C1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 associated with the third valve system 236 may be tested in a similar manner as the first valve system and the second valve system. Specifically, when the controller 75 de-energizes the third solenoid actuator 236b, while keeping the first solenoid actuator 232b and the second solenoid actuator 234b energized, the control ports of both the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 should be coupled to the drain 70 and control pressure should be released or removed from each of the control ports of the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260. Moreover, if the third solenoid actuator 236b is operating properly when de-energized by the controller 75, both of the third trip valve (C1) 250 and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 should move from the closed position to the open position. By monitoring one or more of the pressures sensed by the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 at the hydraulic conduit 286, the pressure sensed by the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 330 at the hydraulic conduit 289, the controller 75 may determine whether one or more of the third actuator system 236, the third trip valve (C1) 250, and the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 are operating properly.
(49) In particular, if each of the third actuator 236b, the fourth trip valve (C1) 250, and the fifth trip valve (C2) 260 is operating properly when the controller 75 de-energizes the third actuator 236b while keeping the first actuator 232b and the second actuator 234b energized, the second pressure transmitter (PT2) 310 should drain pressure at the hydraulic conduit 286 that couples the second trip valve (B1) 240 to the fourth trip valve (C2) 260 due to the opening of the fourth trip valve (C2) 260. Additionally, the third pressure transmitter (PT3) 320 should sense trip header pressure at the hydraulic conduit 289 due to the third trip valve (C1) 250 being in the open position and the fifth trip valve (A2) 270 being in the closed position. The controller 75 may determine which components are faulty by monitoring the pressures at the pressure transmitters PT2 and PT3 in a manner similar to that described above with respect to the testing of the other fluid paths.
(50) Of course, if desired, the controller 75 may receive signals from other pressure sensors mounted at locations illustrated in
(51) As can be seen, the operation of a trip of the turbine 11 is not prevented during the testing of any one of the valve systems 232, 234, 236 associated with the trip valves 230-280 because, during a test, the controller 75 is essentially controlling one of the three valve systems to simulate a trip for that valve system. Thus, to actuate an actual trip during a test, the controller 75 need only send a trip signal to one or both of the other valve systems (not undergoing the test) by de-energizing one or both of the actuators 232b, 234b, 236b associated with the other valve systems.
(52) Moreover, as illustrated in
(53) As will be understood, the bleed circuit 30 described above is configured to electronically perform a trip operation from a remote location in response to abnormal conditions or malfunctions by bleeding the hydraulic fluid in the hydraulic fluid path 52 to the return path 60 using a two out of three voting scheme, thereby removing pressure from the trip input of the steam valve 40. In addition, because of the two out of three redundancy, the components of this bleed circuit 30 can be tested individually during operation of the turbine 11, but without preventing the controller 75 from effectuating an actual trip during the test. As a result, a human operator is not required to manually operate or test the components associated with the bleed circuit 30. Furthermore, the plurality of redundant valve systems associated with the bleed circuit 30 described above helps to ensure that a trip operation can be performed even if one of the components associated with the bleed circuit fails to operate. As a result, the bleed circuit 30 described herein provides greater reliability that a trip operation will be performed when desired or required.
(54) However, due to the operation of the porting manifold 84 and the needle valves 95 disposed thereon, and due to the inclusion of two trip manifolds 86a and 86b, each having an independent bleed circuit disposed thereon, components on one of the trip manifolds 86a or 86b can be repaired or replaced while the other trip manifold 86a or 86b continues to operate so as to enable tripping of turbine 11 if needed. In fact, one of the trip manifolds 86a or 86b can be isolated from and physically removed from the porting manifold 84 while the turbine 11 is on-line and running without affecting the ability of the other trip manifold to operate to cause a trip of the turbine 11 if needed. After being removed, the various components thereon can be repaired or replaced and the trip manifold can then be reconnected to the system while the turbine 11 is running. This bleed circuit configuration thus provides for the use of redundant trip manifolds in conjunction with the needle valves 95 (which are used to isolate one of the trip manifolds from the bleed circuit while the other trip manifold continues to operate) to enable components of the bleed circuit to be removed and repaired or replaced while the turbine and the trip system is operating on-line. This configuration thus provides a system that does not require an operator or other user to shut down the turbine 11 in order to fix problems or faulty components detected during the testing operations described above.
(55) More particularly, to isolate one of the trip manifolds during on-line operation of the turbine, an operator, maintenance person or other person may actuate the needle valves 95 associated with the trip manifold being removed (either of set A or B as illustrated in
(56) Still further, to make mounting of the trip manifolds 86a and 86b onto the porting manifold 84 easier, O-ring connections 360 are used at each of the ports between these two manifolds. Such O-ring connections 360 are illustrated in
(57) Moreover, because each of the bleed paths of the bleed circuits on the trip manifolds 86a, 86b has a control valve (i.e., one of the valves 232a, 234a, 236a) that opens in response to the operation or actuation of the associated solenoid valve 232b, 234b, 236b) to connect the system pressure line 50 to the trip header line 52, there is always, when a trip state is not initiated, one or more fully open fluid paths between the system pressure line 50 and the trip header line 52 so that full pressure can be supplied to the trip header line 52 during this time. Moreover, when the solenoid valves 232b, 234b, 236b are closed or are de-energized, e.g., during a trip state, the control valves 232a, 234a, 236a fully close to seal all of the connection between the system pressure line 50 and the trip header line 52. This operation eliminates the need for disposing small fluid ports between these lines, as has been done in the past, which ports needed to be sized in a manner that was a trade-off between best operation during a non-tripped state and best operation during a tripped state. The control valve systems described herein in the bleed circuit overcome this problem and operate automatically in conjunction with the control system.
(58) By way of example,
(59) Referring back to
(60) Preferably, the block circuit 20 includes redundancy to enable the block circuit 20 to work correctly in the presence of a failed component within the block circuit 20. Furthermore, the block circuit 20 is preferably remotely testable during operation of the turbine 11 in a manner that does not trip the turbine 11 but that enables the turbine 11 to be tripped, if necessary, during the testing of the block circuit 20. In one embodiment, the block circuit 20 may include a plurality of redundant blocking components connected in series within the hydraulic fluid line 50 and configured to block system pressure to the turbine trip header in a redundant manner after a trip has occurred. However, many different block circuits are known and can be used with the bleed circuit described herein. As a result, the specifics of the block circuit will not be described in detail herein. However, one such block circuit is described in U.S. Pat. No. 7,874,241, and the disclosure of this circuit is hereby expressly incorporated by reference herein.
(61) It should be understood that the trip control system 10, as described above, may be retrofitted with existing mechanical hydraulic control (MHC) turbines by, for example, removing the emergency trip valve, associated linkages and other components, and inserting the tripping control system 10 in the hydraulic fluid path 50. Still further, it will be understood that, while the valves, actuators and other components have been variously described as being electronically or hydraulically controlled components biased to particular normally open or closed positions, individual ones of these actuators and valves could be electronically or hydraulically controlled in a manner other than described herein and may be biased in other manners then those described herein. Still further, in some cases, various ones of the valves or actuator may be eliminated or the functionality may be combined into a single valve device. Still further, it will be understood that the controller 75 described herein includes one or more processors and a computer readable memory which stores one or more programs for performing the tripping, testing and monitoring functions described herein. When implemented, the programs may be stored in any computer readable memory such as on a magnetic disk, a laser disk, or other storage medium, in a RAM or ROM of a computer or processor, as part of an application specific integrated circuit, etc. Likewise, this software may be delivered to a user, a process plant, a controller, etc. using any known or desired delivery method including, for example, on a computer readable disk or other transportable computer storage mechanism or over a communication channel such as a telephone line, the Internet, the World Wide Web, any other local area network or wide area network, etc. (which delivery is viewed as being the same as or interchangeable with providing such software via a transportable storage medium). Furthermore, this software may be provided directly without modulation or encryption or may be modulated and/or encrypted using any suitable modulation carrier wave and/or encryption technique before being transmitted over a communication channel.
(62) While the present disclosure has been described with reference to specific examples, which are intended to be illustrative only and not to be limiting of the disclosure, it will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that changes, additions, or deletions may be made to the disclosed embodiments without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosure.