METHOD FOR MONITORING THE POSITION OF A PARKED RAIL VEHICLE, AND COMPUTER PROGRAM, IN PARTICULAR FOR A TRAIN SAFETY SYSTEM

Abstract

The position of a rail vehicle that is parked on a track is monitored in a cold movement detection. A vehicle-side device of an automatic train safety system is deactivated when the vehicle is parked. Prior to the deactivation, a first positional value is determined by the automatic train safety system, and independently, a second positional value is determined by another localization system. With the vehicle-side device deactivated, the actual position of the vehicle is monitored by the other localization system. The additional positional values and/or a deviation of the actual position from a target position is transmitted to a track-side device of the train safety system. When the vehicle-side device is activated, the track-side device transmits the actual position of the vehicle to the vehicle-side device. If the vehicle has not moved, the automatic train guidance system can immediately assume the monitoring process starting from the first position

Claims

1-15. (canceled)

16. A method for monitoring a position of a vehicle parked on a track, the method which comprises: providing the vehicle with a vehicle-side device of an automatic train safety system, and deactivating the vehicle-side device when the vehicle is parked; prior to deactivating the vehicle-side device, determining a first positional value from the position of the vehicle by the automatic train safety system and, independently thereof, determining a second positional value by a further localization system; assigning the second positional value to the vehicle; in a deactivated state of the vehicle-side device, monitoring an actual position of the vehicle by the further localization system and determining further positional values, thereby using the second positional value as a target position of the vehicle; transmitting at least one of the further positional values or a deviation of the actual position from the target position to a trackside device of the train safety system; and following an activation of the vehicle-side device, transmitting the positional value representing the actual position of the vehicle from the trackside device to the vehicle-side device.

17. The method according to claim 16, which comprises specifying a tolerance range for the deviation of the actual position from the target position, and ruling out a movement of the vehicle by the train safety system as an evaluation result while the actual position lies within the tolerance range.

18. The method according to claim 16, wherein the target position is a parking position for the vehicle.

19. The method according to claim 17, wherein the tolerance range allows a deviation from the target position by less than 100 cm.

20. The method according to claim 19, wherein the tolerance range allows a deviation from the target position by less than 50 cm.

21. The method according to claim 17, wherein the tolerance range allows a deviation from the target position by less than 20 cm.

22. The method according to claim 16, wherein the train safety system refuses control for a departure of the vehicle when a comparison of the actual position with the target position reveals that the vehicle has moved during the deactivated state of the vehicle-side device.

23. The method according to claim 22, which comprises releasing the vehicle by the train safety system for a manual supervision run, and taking over a control of the vehicle as soon as a localization has been completed by the train safety system.

24. The method according to claim 23, wherein the train safety system is configured to take over control only when a manual release has been completed first, wherein the train safety system waits for a release signal signifying the manual release.

25. The method according to claim 16, which comprises taking over control for a departure of the vehicle by the train safety system in a secure mode when a result of a comparison of the actual position with the target position reveals that the vehicle has moved during the deactivated state of the vehicle-side device, wherein the control is based on the actual position being the positional value.

26. The method according to claim 25, which comprises accepting a current positional value by the train safety system as soon as the current positional value has been determined by a passing of a trackside locating device of the train safety system, and subsequently terminating the secure mode by the train safety system.

27. The method according to claim 16, which comprises, following an activation of the vehicle-side device, displaying the actual position of the vehicle or the deviation of the actual position from the target position of the vehicle on a display device in the vehicle.

28. The method according to claim 16, which comprises, following an activation of the vehicle-side device, displaying the actual position of the vehicle or a proposal for a calculated position of the vehicle, and providing an input device to enable entering a confirmation verifying that the actual position or the proposal of the calculated position coincides with a true position of the vehicle.

29. The method according to claim 16, wherein the further localization system is a system selected from the group consisting of a satellite-based navigation system and a local tracking system installed at the location where the vehicle is powered down.

30. A computer program product, comprising program commands in non-transitory form for performing the method according to claim 16.

31. A non-transitory computer program carrier containing a computer program with computer code for performing the method according to claim 16.

32. An automatic train control system, comprising: a computer program product with computer code for performing the method according to claim 16; said computer code being stored in a trackside device of the automatic train control system; or both in the trackside device of the automatic train control system and in a vehicle-side device mounted in a train vehicle.

Description

[0064] In the figures:

[0065] FIG. 1 shows in the form of a schematic drawing an exemplary embodiment of the automatic train safety system (trackside device) according to the invention at the time an exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention is performed,

[0066] FIG. 2 shows an exemplary embodiment of the method according to the invention as a flowchart.

[0067] FIG. 1 shows a track GL on which there stands a vehicle FZ. This is parked in a target position SPOS in a depot DP. The vehicle also comprises a vehicle-side device FE of an automatic train safety system (for example CBTC). This is able to communicate with a trackside device SE of the automatic train safety system when the vehicle FZ is in operation. The trackside device SE of the automatic train safety system is represented by a control center LZ and a trackside locating device in the form of a balise BL.

[0068] In the position shown, a parking position, the vehicle FZ is monitored by a further localization system LS1, which is housed locally in the depot DP, and/or by a further localization system LS2, which is formed by a satellite representing a satellite-based navigation system.

[0069] All the cited functional units according to FIG. 1 communicate with a cloud CLD (an exception is the further localization system LS2 in the form of a satellite, which is used solely for the satellite-based localization of the vehicle FZ). Thus, the inventive method according to FIG. 1 is supported by a cloud computing system. However, this is only one possible variant. The functional units can equally communicate with one another directly in a manner not shown by means of wired interfaces or radio interfaces.

[0070] A “cloud” (computer cloud or data cloud) is to be understood as a “cloud computing” environment. What is meant is an IT infrastructure which is made available via a network such as the internet. It usually includes storage space, computing power or application software as a service, without this having to be installed on the local computer using the cloud. These services are provided and used in this case exclusively by means of technical interfaces and protocols, for instance by means of a web browser. The range of services offered within the scope of cloud computing covers the entire spectrum of information technology and includes among other things infrastructure, platforms and software.

[0071] According to FIG. 1, the inventive method can be performed in the following sequence. When the vehicle FZ enters via the track GL, it passes over the trackside locating device BL, as a result of which a positional value POS0 is determined as a reference. The vehicle FZ then heads to its target position SPOS in the depot DP. Based on the positional value POS0, the automatic train safety system is able to determine the first positional value POS1. This is calculated with a precision that is dictated by the technical requirements of the automatic train safety system.

[0072] At the same time, at least one of the further localization systems LS1, LS2 can determine a second positional value POS2, where both the first positional value POS1 and the second positional value POS2 represent the target position SPOS of the vehicle FZ but may diverge from one another due to potential measurement errors. Regardless of deviations, the second positional value POS2 is assigned to the vehicle FZ.

[0073] The vehicle FZ is then powered down, with the result that the vehicle-side device FE can no longer be used and so a localization by the trackside device SE of the automatic train safety system is no longer possible. Instead, the further localization system LS1, LS2 takes over the tracking of the vehicle FZ. The monitoring serves to detect whether said vehicle FZ leaves the designated target position SPOS and consequently is in reality located at an actual position IPOS.

[0074] As long as the determined actual position IPOS lies within a tolerance range TB, it is assumed that the vehicle FZ has not moved (deviations of the further positional values POSN are then based on measurement inaccuracies) or that the vehicle has moved so little that this poses no risk for a startup by means of the automatic train safety system. However, if the measured actual position IPOS lies outside the tolerance range TB, it is assumed that the vehicle FZ has moved. The measured positions POS1, POS2, POSN or their deviations from the second position POS2 are also transmitted to the control center LZ by the further localization system LS1, LS2, with the result that the automatic train safety system can register a leaving of the target position SPOS at least on the track side.

[0075] If the vehicle FZ is powered up again, the actuation of the vehicle FZ by the trackside device SE of the automatic train safety system is dependent on the result of the monitoring by the further localization system LS1, LS2. If no movement of the vehicle FZ could be detected, automatic control by means of the automatic train safety system can begin immediately starting from the first position POS1. If, on the other hand, a movement of the vehicle FZ was detected, a further positional value POSN representing the actual position IPOS is taken as a basis in order to move the vehicle FZ either in a secure mode by means of the train safety system or manually by the train personnel.

[0076] As soon as the vehicle FZ passes over the trackside locating device BL, an accurate current positional value POSA is generated in any case as a reference, with which the automatic train safety system will work henceforth. Normal service can be resumed as a result.

[0077] FIG. 2 reveals the following method steps for the processing sequence of the method. Dash-dotted lines serve to indicate in which functional units according to FIG. 1 the different method steps can preferably be executed. The numbering of the following steps is also illustrated in FIG. 2.

[0078] 1) Entry into the depot DP. The trackside device SE of the train safety system determines the first position POS1 and the local localization system LS1, LS2 starts the tracking process by determining the second positional value POS2.

[0079] 2) Train comes to a stop: Mapping of the two known positional values POS1, POS2 by means of the trackside device SE of the train safety system. In other words, the second positional value POS2 is assigned to the first positional value POS1 and thereby to the vehicle FZ.

[0080] 3) Vehicle is powered down (OFF in FIG. 2). The train safety system no longer receives its own onboard position reports, but instead constantly checks the further positional values POSN received from the further localization system LS1, LS2. The further positional values POSN are thereupon checked to confirm whether they lie within the tolerance range POS2(TB) predefined by means of the second positional value. If yes, an output value MOVE of the vehicle FZ indicating a movement is set to positive.

[0081] 4) The vehicle FZ is powered up once more and the vehicle-side device FE of the train safety system registers with the trackside device SE. A query whether the vehicle FZ has been powered up thus no longer leads (as previously) to a repetition of the determining of further positional values POSN (N=N+1 in FIG. 2), but instead the method is continued.

[0082] 5) If the output value MOVE is negative, the trackside device SE transmits the first positional value POS1 as the original vehicle position to the vehicle-side device of the train safety system. If the output value MOVE is positive, the current position POSN is transmitted.

[0083] If desired or necessary for safety experts, the driver, if present, could confirm a proposed location presented in the driver display by means of an acknowledgement pushbutton (not shown).

[0084] 6) The vehicle-side device FE puts the vehicle FZ into the most convenient operating mode. This is automatic mode CRL MOD of the train control system if the output value MOVE is negative, and a secure mode SEC MOD is set only if the output value MOVE is positive.

[0085] 7) If desired or necessary for safety experts, the vehicle, upon passing the first regular balise (trackside locating device), will synchronize the tracking information, i.e. the current positional value POSA, from the balise with the previously received and further-computed position. By pressing (optional) the ATO start button (manual confirmation step CONF) or by means of a command from the control center LZ, the vehicle FZ is thereupon set in motion and can then be operated in the automatic mode CRL MOD.

LIST OF REFERENCE SIGNS

[0086] GL Track [0087] BL Trackside locating device (balise) [0088] DP Depot [0089] LZ Control center [0090] FZ Vehicle [0091] FE Vehicle-side device of the automatic train safety system [0092] AV Display device [0093] EV Input device [0094] SE Trackside device of the automatic train safety system [0095] LS1 Further localization system (local) [0096] LS2 Further localization system (satellite-based) [0097] TB Tolerance range [0098] SPOS Target position [0099] IPOS Actual position [0100] POS1 First positional value [0101] POS2 Second positional value [0102] POSN Further positional value [0103] POSA Current positional value [0104] OFF Power-down step [0105] ON Power-up step [0106] SEC MOD Secure mode of the train safety system [0107] CRL MOD Automatic mode of the train safety system [0108] CONF Manual confirmation step (optional)