METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR THE AUTOMATED DETERMINATION OF THE TRAIN INTEGRITY OF A TRAIN

Abstract

A method for automated determination of train integrity of a train includes determining the rear car of the train, transmitting data of the rear car to a first central control unit of the train during train movement, the data being transmitted continuously over the entire movement, the data being transmitted such that the data can be associated with the rear car, and information based on the data of the rear car is generated. If correct data of the rear car are received by the first central control unit, status information indicating correct train integrity is generated and, if correct data of the rear car are not received by the first central control unit within a predefined time period, status information indicating loss of train integrity is generated. The status information is output. A corresponding system, train, computer program product and computer-readable storage medium are also provided.

Claims

1-15. (canceled)

16. A method for the automated determination of train integrity of a train, the method comprising: determining a rear car of the train; transmitting data of the rear car to a first central control unit of the train during a movement of the train, the data being transmitted continuously throughout the movement and the transmission of the data being configured to permit the data to be assigned to the rear car; generating status information based on the data of the rear car, status information indicating correct train integrity being generated upon the first central control unit receiving correct data from the rear car, and status information indicating loss of train integrity being generated upon the first central control unit not receiving correct data from the rear car within a predetermined period of time; and outputting the status information.

17. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises determining the rear car by determining which car of the train is not coupled at one of its two couplings and whether the car which is not coupled at one of its two couplings is occupied by a driver and, in an event that a car does not have one of its two couplings coupled and the car which does not have one of its two couplings coupled is not occupied, the car which does not have one of its two couplings coupled is determined to be the rear car.

18. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises transmitting the data transmitted by the rear car via a communication channel being at least one of configured to be assigned to the rear car or including identification information configured to be assigned to the rear car.

19. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises determining the rear car and the first central control unit, after a coupling operation in which a plurality of cars have been uncoupled from the train or a plurality of cars have been coupled to the train.

20. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises forming the train with a plurality of multiple units, each multiple unit including at least one central control unit and selecting the central control unit of the multiple unit or end car having an occupied driver's cab during the train movement as the first central control unit.

21. The method according to claim 20, which further comprises transmitting the data from the rear car from a central control unit of the multiple unit including the rear car to the first central control unit of another multiple unit.

22. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises at least one of transmitting at least the data of the rear car from a car hierarchy to a train hierarchy using a data transmission protocol or outputting the status information from a train hierarchy to a car hierarchy using a data transmission protocol.

23. The method according to claim 22, which further comprises using a multiple unit hierarchy as the car hierarchy, using a multiple unit hierarchy as the train hierarchy, verifying the data of the rear car or the status information by checksums, and transmitting the data of the rear car or the status information using architecture patterns having been defined for a specific safety integrity level SIL 2.

24. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises entirely carrying out the generation of the status information and the outputting of the status information in less than one second.

25. The method according to claim 24, which further comprises setting time intervals separating a transmission of successive sets of data of the rear car to be shorter than 1 second, and setting the predetermined time period after which status information indicating loss of train integrity is generated if no data from the rear car is received by the first central control unit to be longer than a time required for transmission of consecutive sets of data of the rear car.

26. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises outputting the status information to a European Vital Computer control unit.

27. The method according to claim 16, which further comprises carrying out the generation of the status information by additionally checking an emergency brake loop assigned to the rear car.

28. The method according to claim 27, which further comprises upon the emergency brake loop being open or defective, generating status information indicating loss of train integrity and, upon the emergency brake loop being intact, again implementing a predefined wait time for data from the rear car.

29. A system for the automated determination of train integrity of a train, the system comprising: a determination unit configured to determine a rear car of the train; a data transmission unit configured to transmit data of the rear car to a first central control unit of the train during a movement of the train, the data being transmitted continuously throughout the movement and the transmission of the data being configured to permit the data to be assigned to the rear car; the first central control unit configured to generate status information based on the data of the rear car, status information indicating correct train integrity being generated upon the first central control unit receiving correct data from the rear car, and status information indicating loss of train integrity being generated upon the first central control unit not receiving correct data from the rear car within a predetermined period of time; and a data interface configured to output the status information.

30. A train, comprising a plurality of multiple units, and the system according to claim 29.

31. The train according to claim 30, wherein each multiple unit includes a respective central control unit configured to receive status information based on the data of the rear car, in an event that data from the rear car is received by the first central control unit, status information is generated indicating correct train integrity, and in the event that no data from the rear car is received by the first central control unit, status information is generated indicating loss of train integrity.

32. The train according to claim 30, wherein each end car of a multiple unit is configured to determine the status of its couplings and the occupancy status of a driver's cab and to transmit data to a central control unit.

33. A non-transitory computer program product, comprising instructions which, upon the program being executed by a computer, cause the computer to carry out the method according to claim 16.

34. A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, comprising instructions which, upon the program being executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the method according to claim 16.

Description

[0047] The invention will now be explained in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings using exemplary embodiments. Identical components are provided with the same reference characters in the various figures. The figures are generally not to scale. In the drawings,

[0048] FIG. 1 shows an example of a train with two multiple units according to the invention,

[0049] FIG. 2 shows an example of a system according to the invention,

[0050] FIG. 3 shows a block diagram for an example of a method according to the invention,

[0051] FIG. 4 shows a flowchart for carrying out a preferred method.

[0052] FIG. 1 shows an example of a train 1 with two multiple units 2 according to the invention. The train 1 is traveling from left to right, as indicated by the driver F schematically illustrated in the right-hand end car E of the right-hand multiple unit 2. The train 1 has a system 4 according to the invention, as shown in more detail in FIG. 2, for example. FIG. 1 shows the central control units 3 in the end cars E, of which the central control unit in the end car E with the driver F is regarded as the first central control unit 3a. Each end car E of a multiple unit 2 is designed here to determine the status of its couplings and the occupancy status of a driver's cab and to transmit data to a central control unit 3.

[0053] FIG. 2 shows an example of a system 4 according to the invention for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train 1, as shown, for example, in FIG. 1. The system 4 comprises the following components:

[0054] A determination unit 6 designed to determine the rear car S of the train 1. In this example, the determination unit sends an identification number of the determined rear car S to the first central control unit 3a, as indicated by an arrow. A determination unit 6 can actually be a central control unit 3 of an end car E or all the central control units 3 of the end cars E as shown in FIG. 1.

[0055] A data transmission unit 7 designed for the transmission (arrow) of data D from the rear car S to the first central control unit 3a of the train 1 during the movement of the train 1, wherein this data D is transmitted continuously throughout said movement and the transmission of the data D is designed such that it can be assigned to the rear car S.

[0056] Said first central control unit 3a designed to generate status information St based on the data D of the rear car S, wherein in the event that correct data D is received from the rear car S by the first central control unit 3a, status information St is generated which indicates correct train integrity, and in the event that no correct data D is received from the rear car S by the first central control unit 3a within a predetermined period of time, status information St indicating loss of train integrity is generated.

[0057] A data interface 5 designed to output the status information St.

[0058] FIG. 3 shows a block diagram for an example of a method according to the invention for the automated determination of the train integrity of a train 1.

[0059] In step I, composition data about the make-up of the train is provided which comprises at least information about the cars from which the train is composed. The data is provided to the first central control unit of the train (see e.g. FIG. 2). Although this step is essentially optional, it is extremely advantageous.

[0060] In step II, the rear car S of the train 1 is determined. For this purpose, it is preferably determined which car of the train 1 is not coupled to one of its two couplings and whether that car is occupied by a driver F. In the event that one of the two couplings of a car is not coupled and the car is not occupied by a driver, that car is identified as the rear car S. In FIG. 1, for example, the end car E on the far right is the rear car S, as indicated.

[0061] It is preferred that after a coupling operation in which a number of cars have been uncoupled from the train 1 or a number of cars have been coupled to the train 1, the rear car S and the first central control unit 3a are re-determined. It is also preferred to provide or update the composition data again.

[0062] In step III, data D of the rear car S is transmitted to the first central control unit 3a of the train 1 during movement of the train 1. This data D is transmitted continuously throughout the train movement and the transmission of the data D is designed such that it can be assigned to the rear car S.

[0063] The data D transmitted by the rear car S can be transmitted via a communication channel that can be assigned to the rear car S and/or comprise identification information that can be assigned to the rear car S.

[0064] In step IV, status information St is generated based on the data D of the rear car S. In the event that correct data D from the rear car S is received by the first central control unit 3a, status information St is generated indicating correct train integrity. In the event that no correct data D is received from the rear car S by the first central control unit 3a within a predetermined period of time, status information St indicating loss of train integrity is generated.

[0065] The thick arrow on the symbol of the status information St is intended to indicate that the status information St is then output.

[0066] FIG. 4 shows a flow chart for carrying out a preferred method. If a train 1 formed of a plurality of multiple units 2 as shown in FIG. 1 is considered, each multiple unit 2 generally comprises at least one central control unit 3a (in FIG. 1, each multiple unit 2 comprises two). Data originating from cars is often transmitted through a plurality of hierarchies until it arrives at the first central control unit 3a.

[0067] A table is shown, the columns of which symbolize different hierarchies from right to left (hereinafter referred to as levels). The hierarchy on the right is that of the European Vital Computer EVC, which is positioned here in an end car and is contacted by the car level. To the left of the EVC level is the car level followed by the multiple unit level and the level of the first central control unit 3a, which can also be the train level. The far left and far right show the origins of signals that are not assigned to a specific level here, but may well originate from the individual levels.

[0068] The process begins on the far right with two signals, one of which indicates the state where an end car E is occupied by a driver F (top) and one of which indicates the coupling state. The dashed coupling is intended to indicate that a search is carried out for the case where an end car E is coupled with only one coupling and the other coupling is free. It should be noted that in addition to the state of the coupling, the state of the coupling status contactor is often also measured. This indicates whether or not a coupling is meant to be coupled. The process of detecting the end car takes 8 ms, for example.

[0069] It is then determined at car level which car is the rear car S. This then sends its data D to the first central control unit 3a via the multiple unit level, e.g. by Flexi-com and/or using the SPCSsafe protocol. This process can take between 10 and 200 ms, and in this example takes 100 ms.

[0070] The first central control unit 3a evaluates all the signals from the end cars and recognizes the signal from the rear car S. In addition, as indicated from the left, information about a coupling operation (top) and the emergency brake loop (SBS, below) can also be made available to the first central control unit 3a.

[0071] The first central control unit 3a now generates status information St from the data D of the rear car S and here also using data about coupling operations and data from the SBS. For example, the status information St is OK if the rear car S sends correct data D, and Lost if no data or incorrect data D is received by the first central control unit 3a. Here it is also possible to determine whether the emergency brake loop SBS of the multiple unit 2 with the rear car is still intact. If it is broken, the status Lost is set in any case; if it is intact, the system again waits for data D from the rear car S as a precaution. In the case of a coupling operation, the status can be set to Unknown and a rear car S and a first central control unit 3a can be re-determined.

[0072] In this example, the status information St is then transmitted from the first central control unit 3a to the European Vital Computer EVC via the multiple unit level and the car level and used for the train movement. Secure data transmission takes between 10 and 200 ms for each level (e.g. 100 ms here) and can be carried out using Flexicom and the Profisafe protocol. A function that checks whether the EVC has contact with the first central control unit 3a and automatically sets the status Lost if contact is lost could be used as an additional safeguard.

[0073] Finally, it should be reiterated that the methods described in detail above and the system presented are merely exemplary embodiments which can be modified in various ways by a person skilled in the art without departing from the scope of the invention. In addition, the use of the indefinite articles a or an does not exclude the possibility that the features in question may be present more than once. Similarly, the terms unit and device do not preclude the components in question from comprising a plurality of interacting sub-components, which may also be spatially distributed. The term a number is to be understood as meaning at least one.