BIOMETRIC DEVICE WITH CRYPTOGRAPHIC CIRCUITRY

Abstract

A biometric device comprising: biometric sensing circuitry; cryptographic circuitry; a device key area in the biometric device for storing a cryptographic device key unique to the biometric device; and a test key area in the biometric device, for storing a cryptographic test key. The biometric device is controllable between: a test state in which the test key area is connected to the cryptographic circuitry to provide the test key to the cryptographic circuitry, and the cryptographic circuitry is prevented from performing cryptographic operations on data provided by the biometric sensing circuitry; and a functional state in which the device key area is connected to the cryptographic circuitry to provide the device key to the cryptographic circuitry, and the cryptographic circuitry is connected to the biometric sensing circuitry to receive and perform cryptographic operations on data from the biometric sensing circuitry using the device key.

Claims

1. A biometric device, comprising: biometric sensing circuitry for acquiring biometric information; cryptographic circuitry coupled to the biometric sensing circuitry for performing cryptographic operations on data provided by the biometric sensing circuitry; a device key area in the biometric device for storing a cryptographic device key unique to the biometric device; and a test key area in the biometric device, for storing a cryptographic test key, wherein the biometric device is controllable between: a test state in which the test key area is connected to the cryptographic circuitry to provide the test key to the cryptographic circuitry, and the cryptographic circuitry is disconnected from the biometric sensing circuitry so that the cryptographic circuitry is prevented from performing cryptographic operations on data provided by the biometric sensing circuitry; and a functional state in which the device key area is connected to the cryptographic circuitry to provide the device key to the cryptographic circuitry, and the cryptographic circuitry is connected to the biometric sensing circuitry to receive and perform cryptographic operations on data from the biometric sensing circuitry using the device key.

2. The biometric device according to claim 1, wherein: in the test state, the device key area is disconnected from the cryptographic circuitry to prevent the cryptographic circuitry from performing cryptographic operations using the device key; and in the functional state, the test key area is disconnected from the cryptographic circuitry to prevent the cryptographic circuitry from performing cryptographic operations using the test key.

3. The biometric device according to claim 1, wherein: in the test state, the cryptographic circuitry is configured to receive test data and to perform cryptographic operations on the test data using the test key; and in the functional state, the cryptographic circuitry is prevented from performing cryptographic operations on test data.

4. The biometric device according to claim 3, wherein: in the test state, the biometric device is controllable to bypass the cryptographic circuitry, to enable readout of the test data from the biometric device without cryptographic operations having been performed on the test data.

5. The biometric device according to claim 3, wherein: in the test state, the cryptographic circuitry is connectable to a test data source for receiving the test data; and in the functional state, the cryptographic circuitry is prevented from being connected to the test data source.

6. The biometric device according to claim 5, wherein the biometric device further comprises a test input for receiving the test data from the test data source.

7. The biometric device according to claim 5, wherein: in the test state, the cryptographic circuitry is connected to the test data source to allow the cryptographic circuitry to receive the test data and to perform cryptographic operations on the test data using the test key; and in the functional state, the cryptographic circuitry is disconnected from the test data source to prevent the cryptographic circuitry from receiving the test data and from performing cryptographic operations on the test data using the device key.

8. The biometric device according to claim 1, wherein: the biometric device comprises routing circuitry coupled to the biometric sensing circuitry, the cryptographic circuitry, the device key area, and the test key area; and the routing circuitry is controllable to transition the biometric device between the test state and the functional state.

9. The biometric device according to claim 8, wherein the routing circuitry comprises: first switching circuitry controllable to selectively connect the test key area or the device key area to the cryptographic circuitry; and second switching circuitry controllable to selectively connect the biometric sensing circuitry or a test data source to the cryptographic circuitry.

10. The biometric device according to claim 9, wherein the routing circuitry further comprises third switching circuitry controllable to selectively connect an output of the second switching circuitry or the cryptographic circuitry to an output of the biometric device.

11. The biometric device according to claim 10, wherein the routing circuitry further comprises control circuitry configured to prevent the third switching circuitry from being controlled to switch from connecting the cryptographic circuitry to the output of the biometric device to connecting the output of the second switching circuitry to the output of the biometric device when the biometric device is in the functional state.

12. The biometric device according to claim 9, wherein the first switching circuitry and the second switching circuitry are configured to be controlled by a common control signal in such a way that: a first value of the common control signal causes the first switching circuitry to connect the test key area to the cryptographic circuitry and the second switching circuitry to connect the test data source to the cryptographic circuitry, to allow the cryptographic circuitry to perform cryptographic operations on test data provided from the test data source using the test key; and a second value of the common control signal causes the first switching circuitry to connect the device key area to the cryptographic circuitry and the second switching circuitry to connect the biometric sensing circuitry to the cryptographic circuitry, to allow the cryptographic circuitry to perform cryptographic operations on data provided by the biometric sensing circuitry using the device key.

13. The biometric device according to claim 9, wherein the first switching circuitry is a first multiplexer, and the second switching circuitry is a second multiplexer.

14. The biometric device according to claim 1, wherein the biometric sensing circuitry comprises at least one of capacitive fingerprint sensing circuitry, optical fingerprint sensing circuitry, ultrasonic fingerprint sensing circuitry, optical iris sensing circuitry, and optical face feature sensing circuitry.

15. An electronic device comprising: the biometric device according to claim 1; and processing circuitry connected to the biometric device and configured to control operation of the biometric device.

Description

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] These and other aspects of the present invention will now be described in more detail, with reference to the appended drawings showing an example embodiment of the invention, wherein:

[0019] FIG. 1A is an illustration of an exemplary electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, in the form of a so-called contactless smart card;

[0020] FIG. 1B is a schematic view of the smart card in FIG. 1a, when delaminated to reveal the functional parts of the smart card;

[0021] FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of a biometric device according to a first embodiment of the present invention;

[0022] FIG. 3A schematically shows allowed signal paths in the test state;

[0023] FIG. 3B schematically shows allowed signal paths in the functional state; and

[0024] FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of a biometric device according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXAMPLE EMBODIMENTS

[0025] In the present detailed description, various embodiments of the biometric device according to the present invention are mainly described with reference to a biometric device comprising biometric sensing circuitry in the form of fingerprint sensing circuitry. The biometric device is also mainly described as being integrated in a smart card.

[0026] It should be noted that this description is not intended to limit the scope of protection as defined by the claims, and that the biometric sensing circuitry may just as well be provided in the form of sensing circuitry for sensing another biometric, such as a face, or an eye pattern, such as an iris pattern. Furthermore, it should be understood that the smart card described herein is only one example of an electronic device in which the biometric device according to embodiments of the present invention may be integrated. Other electronic devices that may benefit from integrating the biometric device according to various embodiments of the present invention include, for example, mobile communication devices, consumer electronics, access control devices, and vehicles, etc.

[0027] FIG. 1A schematically illustrates a first example embodiment of an electronic device according to the present invention, in the form of a so-called contactless smart card 1 including a biometric device, in the form of biometric module 3. The biometric module 3 may be provided in the form of a single semiconductor chip, or as a multichip module. In the latter case, a fingerprint sensor chip may be provided on a first side of a carrier, and other circuitry needed for operation of the biometric module 3 may be provided as one or more semiconductor chips on the second side of the carrier, opposite the fingerprint sensor chip. Other configurations are possible and feasible.

[0028] As is schematically shown in FIG. 1B, the smart card 1 additionally comprises an antenna 5, and a secure element 7. The antenna 5 is used for harvesting electrical power from a time-varying electrical field, and for wirelessly communicating with a remote device, such as a card reader (not shown), typically through load modulation. The secure element 7 may, for example, contain information for authorizing a transaction, and is connected to the biometric module 3. When the user is authenticated by the biometric module 3 (or by the biometric module 3 in co-operation with the secure element 7), the information contained in the secure element 7 may be unlocked and allowed to be wirelessly communicated to the card reader via the antenna 5. In embodiments, the secure element 7 may be integrated in the biometric module 3.

[0029] FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of a biometric device 3 according to a first embodiment of the present invention. Referring to FIG. 2, the biometric device 3 comprises biometric sensing circuitry 9, cryptographic circuitry 11, a device key area 13, a test key area 15, routing circuitry 17, an optional test pattern generator 19, and a communication and control interface 21 for the biometric device 3.

[0030] As is schematically indicated in FIG. 2, the biometric sensing device 9, the cryptographic circuitry 11, the device key area 13, the test key area 15, and the communication and control interface 21 are all connected to the routing circuitry 17. In embodiments where the biometric device 3 comprises an internal test pattern generator 19, this may also be connected to the routing circuitry 17.

[0031] In the embodiment of the biometric device 3 shown in FIG. 2, the biometric device 3 can be controlled to be in a test state or a functional state through control of the routing circuitry 17. Such control of the routing circuitry 17 may take place via the communication and control interface 21, or by means of an optional dedicated control input 23 indicated by the dashed arrow in FIG. 2.

[0032] In the following, the test state of the biometric device 3 in FIG. 2 will be described with reference to FIG. 3A, and the functional state will be described with reference to FIG. 3B.

[0033] Turning first to FIG. 3A, this figure schematically illustrates allowed signal paths for the biometric device 3 in the test state. As is indicated by the arrows in FIG. 3A, the routing circuitry 17 connects the test key area 15, the test pattern generator 19, and the communication and control interface 21 to the cryptographic circuitry 11. Through this configuration, the routing circuitry 17 allows input of the cryptographic test key and the test data to the cryptographic circuitry 11, and allows output from the biometric device 3 of cryptographically processed test data, via the communication and control interface 21.

[0034] When the biometric device 3 is in the test state as is indicated in FIG. 3A, the interaction with the cryptographic functionalities of the biometric device can conveniently be tested and debugged. The cryptographic test key in the test key area 15 is known to the developers (the test key may, for example, be the same for all biometric devices 3 in the same batch), and the test data generated by the test pattern generator 19 may be a known fixed pattern, such as a ramp or a Fibonacci sequence. It should be noted that a memory holding known test data may replace or complement the test pattern generator 19 described herein.

[0035] It should be noted that, when the biometric device 3 is in its test state, other signal paths than those indicated in FIG. 3A may be prevented. In particular, biometric data from the biometric sensing circuitry 9 cannot reach the cryptographic circuitry 11, and the cryptographic device key (which is unique to the individual biometric device 3) cannot be provided from the device key area 13 to the cryptographic circuitry 11. Hereby, it is ensured that the device key cannot be accessed or deduced by setting the biometric device 3 in the test state. Furthermore, it is ensured that the electronic device 1 in which the biometric device 3 is integrated is not—intentionally or by mistake—released to consumers with the biometric device using the test key for cryptographic operations on biometric data.

[0036] In the example configuration of FIG. 3A, the routing circuitry 17 has been controlled by a control signal value T on the control input 23, and test data is provided by the internal test pattern generator 19. It should be noted that this is one example configuration only, and that the control signal to the routing circuitry 17 and/or the test data may alternatively be provided from outside the biometric device 3, for example via the communication and control interface 21.

[0037] Referring now to FIG. 3B, this figure schematically illustrates allowed signal paths for the biometric device 3 in the functional state. As is indicated by the arrows in FIG. 3B, the routing circuitry 17 connects the device key area 13, the biometric sensing circuitry 9, and the communication and control interface 21 to the cryptographic circuitry 11. Through this configuration, the routing circuitry 17 allows input of the cryptographic device key, and biometric data from the biometric sensing circuitry 9 to the cryptographic circuitry 11, and allows output from the biometric device 3 of cryptographically processed biometric data, via the communication and control interface 21.

[0038] When the biometric device 3 is in the functional state as is indicated in FIG. 3B, the cryptographic circuitry 11 is operational to perform cryptographic operations on the biometric data from the biometric sensing circuitry 9, using the cryptographic device key that is unique to the individual biometric sensing circuitry 3. For instance, the cryptographic circuitry 11 may encrypt biometric data, such as a fingerprint representation before allowing external access to the biometric data via the communication and command interface 21.

[0039] When the biometric device 3 is in its functional state, other signal paths than those indicated in FIG. 3B may be prevented. In particular, the cryptographic circuitry 11 cannot perform cryptographic operations on the biometric data from the biometric sensing circuitry 9 using the cryptographic test key, and the cryptographic circuitry cannot perform cryptographic operations on the known test data from the test pattern generator 19 using the cryptographic device key.

[0040] In the example configuration of FIG. 3B, the routing circuitry 17 has been controlled by a control signal value ‘F’ on the control input 23. It should be noted that this is one example configuration only, and that the control signal to the routing circuitry 17 may alternatively be provided from outside the biometric device 3, for example via the communication and control interface 21.

[0041] A biometric device according to a second example embodiment of the present invention will now be described with reference to FIG. 4. As is schematically indicated in FIG. 4, the routing circuitry 17 comprises first switching circuitry 25, here in the form of a first multiplexer, second switching circuitry 27, here in the form of a second multiplexer, and third switching circuitry 29, here in the form of a third multiplexer. The routing circuitry 17 further comprises control circuitry to implement routing rules for the routing circuitry. In this particular example, the control circuitry is embodied by first 31, second 33 and third 35 logic gates. The first switching circuitry 25 is controllable to selectively connect the device key area 13 or the test key area 15 to the cryptographic circuitry 11, the second switching circuitry 27 is controllable to selectively connect the biometric sensing circuitry 9 or a test data source (not shown in FIG. 4), in this case via the communication and control interface 21, to the cryptographic circuitry 11, and the third switching circuitry 29 is controllable to selectively connect an output of the second switching circuitry or an output of the cryptographic circuitry 11 to the communication and control interface 21.

[0042] As can be seen in FIG. 4, the first switching circuitry 25 and the second switching circuitry 27 are controlled by a common control signal output by the first logic gate 31, in such a way that a first value of the common control signal causes the first switching circuitry 25 to connect the test key area 15 to the cryptographic circuitry 11 and the second switching circuitry 27 to connect the external test data source via the communication and control interface 21 to the cryptographic circuitry 11, and a second value of the common control signal causes the first switching circuitry 25 to connect the device key area 13 to the cryptographic circuitry 11 and the second switching circuitry 27 to connect the biometric sensing circuitry 9 to the cryptographic circuitry 11.

[0043] In this example embodiment, the first logic gate 31 is configured to receive a ‘non-secured test mode’ control signal S1, and a ‘security test mode’ control signal S2. The second logic gate 33 is configured to receive the ‘non-secured test mode’ control signal S1, and a ‘security mode locked’ control signal S3. The third logic gate 35 is configured to receive an output from the second logic gate 33, and the ‘security test mode’ control signal S2.

[0044] The ‘security mode locked’ control signal S3 is irreversible, which can be achieved in various ways known to one of ordinary skill in the art, to prevent bypass of the cryptographic circuitry 11 when the biometric device 3 is in the functional state.

[0045] Through the configuration of the control circuitry in FIG. 4, the third switching circuitry 29 cannot be switched to allow output of biometric information that has not been cryptographically processed, once the ‘security mode locked’ control signal S3 has been set high. However, the switching circuitry 29 can be switched to allow output of test data that has not been cryptographically processed, once the ‘security mode locked’ control signal S3 has been set high, by appropriate values of the ‘non-secured test mode’ control signal S1 and the ‘security test mode’ control signal S2.

[0046] It should be noted that the configuration of the control circuitry in FIG. 4 is only an illustrative example, and that there are many ways in which one of ordinary skill in the art can implement the same or similar functionality.

[0047] In the claims, the word “comprising” does not exclude other elements or steps, and the indefinite article “a” or “an” does not exclude a plurality. The mere fact that certain measures are recited in mutually different dependent claims does not indicate that a combination of these measured cannot be used to advantage.