A deployable active radar countermeasure or smart chaff device includes a flexible battery or length of reflective material for passive reflection of a surveillance radar signal. Metallized antenna elements printed onto the material receive the surveillance radar signals, and RF integrated circuitry bonded to the material generates active RF echo signals based on the frequency of the surveillance signal and the length of the material. Wirebond receiving paths include reconfigurable gain amplifiers and filters for adjusting the phase and amplitude of the echo signal, and transmit paths return the echo signal to the radar source via the antenna elements. Echo signals may combine with those of other such devices, having various lengths and associated frequencies, to simulate a false return associated with a particular aircraft or moving target (e.g., simulation of Doppler shift via offset echo frequencies).

A deployable active radar countermeasure or smart chaff device includes a flexible battery or length of reflective material for passive reflection of a surveillance radar signal. Metallized antenna elements printed onto the material receive the surveillance radar signals, and RF integrated circuitry bonded to the material generates active RF echo signals based on the frequency of the surveillance signal and the length of the material. Wirebond receiving paths include reconfigurable gain amplifiers and filters for adjusting the phase and amplitude of the echo signal, and transmit paths return the echo signal to the radar source via the antenna elements. Echo signals may combine with those of other such devices, having various lengths and associated frequencies, to simulate a false return associated with a particular aircraft or moving target (e.g., simulation of Doppler shift via offset echo frequencies).

A defense system that receives information regarding an incoming object(s), then automatically coordinates spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signals potentially used by the incoming object(s) while also informing friendly systems of the spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signal.

A defense system that receives information regarding an incoming object(s), then automatically coordinates spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signals potentially used by the incoming object(s) while also informing friendly systems of the spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signal.

Systems and methods are presented for allocating resources. In particular, the systems and methods may receive and process a requested SP state to identify for first SP channel information regarding (i) signal processing resources required and (ii) state priority, based on a first state table defining for each of a plurality of states for the first SP channel information regarding signal processing resources required and state priority information; and based on the identified information, arbitrating as between a current state and a requested state. Systems and methods are also provided for fast blanking override of a requested signal processing (SP) state. In particular, the systems and methods may receive a blanking input and automatically override a requested SP state for a first SP channel based on using a first state table to determine blank susceptibility information for the requested SP state.

A synchronous side lobe jamming method for an electronic attack is disclosed. The method includes receiving a radar signal from an external radar; determining the number of synchronous jamming signals based on pulse repetition interval (PRI) characteristic of the received radar signal; generating a synchronous side lobe jamming signal by calculating a generation angle and a generation distance of each of the synchronous jamming signals; and transmitting the generated synchronous side lobe jamming signal to the radar at a predetermined delay time after a jammer receives a side lobe signal.

A synchronous side lobe jamming method for an electronic attack is disclosed. The method includes receiving a radar signal from an external radar; determining the number of synchronous jamming signals based on pulse repetition interval (PRI) characteristic of the received radar signal; generating a synchronous side lobe jamming signal by calculating a generation angle and a generation distance of each of the synchronous jamming signals; and transmitting the generated synchronous side lobe jamming signal to the radar at a predetermined delay time after a jammer receives a side lobe signal.

A method for confusing the electronic signature of a signal transmitted by a radar, includes the generation by the radar of at least one pulse, wherein the method comprises a step of modulation, in the pulse, of the polarization of the transmitted signal, according to two orthogonal or opposite polarizations, the modulation of the polarization being performed according to a predetermined modulation code.

A method for confusing the electronic signature of a signal transmitted by a radar, includes the generation by the radar of at least one pulse, wherein the method comprises a step of modulation, in the pulse, of the polarization of the transmitted signal, according to two orthogonal or opposite polarizations, the modulation of the polarization being performed according to a predetermined modulation code.

A system for providing integrated detection and deterrence against an unmanned vehicle including but not limited to aerial technology unmanned systems using a detection element, a tracking element, an identification element and an interdiction or deterrent element. Elements contain sensors that observe real time quantifiable data regarding the object of interest to create an assessment of risk or threat to a protected area of interest. This assessment may be based e.g., on data mining of internal and external data sources. The deterrent element selects from a variable menu of possible deterrent actions. Though designed for autonomous action, a Human in the Loop may override the automated system solutions.