This document describes techniques and apparatuses for base station location authentication. In particular, a base-station-location server 264 provides protection against a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attack or a cellular-network spoofing attack by auditing processed locations 504 of base stations 120 within a cellular network. The base-station-location server 264 maintains a list of authenticated base stations, generates a security key 321 for a base station 120 that is authenticated, and sends the security key 321 to the base station 120 in an authentication message 522. The authenticated base station 120 uses the security key 321 to generate an encrypted positioning reference signal that protects timing information and/or a location 504 of the base station 120. The encrypted positioning reference signal also enables a user equipment (UE) to determine that the base station 120 is authenticated by the base-station-location server 264.

A system and method for discriminating and mitigating spoofing signals incoming to a satellite navigation system. Beam steering techniques are used to steer a null toward a legitimate satellite signal that is being spoofed. The spoofing signal is then tracked and its angle of arrival measured. A null is steered toward the measured angle of arrival of the spoofing signal, and the spoofing signal is confirmed by determining if there is a signal remaining with nulls on both the legitimate satellite signal and the spoofing signal. The null toward the legitimate satellite signal is then replaced with unity gain.

A defense system that receives information regarding an incoming object(s), then automatically coordinates spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signals potentially used by the incoming object(s) while also informing friendly systems of the spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signal.

A modular underwater vehicle includes a hull having a series of modular sections, defining an interior housing, a propulsor coupled to a stern of the hull, a series of control surfaces coupled to the propulsor or the stern of the hull, and a power supply, a processor, and a nonvolatile memory device in the interior housing. The nonvolatile memory device has instructions stored therein which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to supply power from the power supply to drive the propulsor and to actuate the plurality of control surfaces. At least one modular section of the series of modular sections is detachable.

A method for providing localized jamming effects includes using a processor onboard a vehicle to perform the steps of: receiving a jamming command to simulate a jamming effect on a particular sensor onboard the vehicle; and generating a jamming effect in a model of the particular sensor in response to the jamming command. The jamming effect in the model of the particular sensor simulates the jamming effect on the particular sensor being generated by an entity other than the vehicle.

Methods and apparatus for generating a test signal for a PNT configuration, and for testing a PNT configuration are disclosed. One such method comprises the steps of using one or more GNSS jamming signal detectors (100) to detect at least three different types of threat signal, each being an RF-based man-made GNSS jamming signal, and recording, to a database, information for the threat signals; receiving, from the database, information for at least one of the threat signals; generating a corresponding threat signal from the received information; and combining the corresponding threat signal with a PNT signal via a signal combiner to generate the test signal.

A system and method for discriminating and mitigating spoofing signals incoming to a satellite navigation system. Beam steering techniques are used to steer a null toward a legitimate satellite signal that is being spoofed. The spoofing signal is then tracked and its angle of arrival measured. A null is steered toward the measured angle of arrival of the spoofing signal, and the spoofing signal is confirmed by determining if there is a signal remaining with nulls on both the legitimate satellite signal and the spoofing signal. The null toward the legitimate satellite signal is then replaced with unity gain.

Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for adapting to malware activity on a compromised computer system by detecting timing anomalies between timing signals. An embodiment operates by analyzing first timing data accessed from a validated source and second timing data accessed from an unvalidated receiver source in order to compute a threat detection value, which is utilized to determine if there is a discrepancy or anomaly in the timing or frequency of either the validated and unvalidated sources.

A defense system that receives information regarding an incoming object(s), then automatically coordinates spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signals potentially used by the incoming object(s) while also informing friendly systems of the spoofing or jamming of SATNAV signal.

A system and method for testing the integrity of signals incoming to a satellite navigation system. The method is implemented with an array of antenna elements, and a receiver connected to each antenna element. The receivers simultaneously and continuously make measurements on all tracked signals. Each receiver measures the carrier phase of an incoming signal. Based on the carrier phase differences between antenna elements and the distance between them, the azimuth and elevation of the signal source can be calculated. This measured angle of arrival can then be compared to an expected angle of arrival to determine if the signal source is legitimate. The system and method can be also applied to determining the angle of arrival of sources of interference, and to mitigating the effects of both illegitimate and interfering signals.