Embodiments of a method, an IC device, and a circuit board are disclosed. In an embodiment, the method involves at an IC device of the system, monitoring activity on a bus interface of the IC device, wherein the bus interface is connected to a bus on the system that communicatively couples the IC device to at least one other IC device on the system, applying machine learning to data corresponding to the monitored activity to generate an activity profile, monitoring subsequent activity on the bus interface of the IC device, comparing data corresponding to the to subsequently monitored activity to the machine learning generated activity profile to determine if a system-level Trojan is detected, and generating a notification when it is determined from the comparison that a system-level Trojan has been detected.

A semiconductor integrated circuit to receive a test scan input, a test clock, and a test mode signal and output a secure scan output signal, the integrated circuit including: a secure key circuit to generate delay input signals, which are differently delayed from the test scan input, and to generate an input key signal by capturing the delay input signals in response to the test clock; a key comparator to generate a verification result indicating whether an input key of the input key signal is identical with a preset reference key; a chip to generate a scan output signal based on the test scan input; a scan output remapper to obfuscate the scan output signal according to the verification result and to output the obfuscated scan output signal as the secure scan output signal; and a secure scan controller to control the secure key circuit, key comparator, chip, and remapper.

One aspect provides an FPGA chip mounted on a printed circuit board (PCB). The FPGA chip can include a joint test action group (JTAG) interface comprising a number of input/output pins and an enablement pin, and a control logic block coupled to the enablement pin of the JTAG interface. The control logic block can receive a control signal from an off-chip control unit and control a logical value of the enablement pin based on the received control signal, thereby facilitating the off-chip control unit to lock or unlock the JTAG interface. The FPGA chip can further include a detection logic block to detect an unauthorized access to the FPGA chip. An input to the detection logic is coupled to the enablement pin, and a conductive trace coupling the input of the detection logic block and the enablement pin is situated on an inner layer of the PCB.

Methods, systems and techniques are provided to authenticate a device under test (DUT)/system under test (SUT) comprising an electronic component(s). A profile is defined by injecting a signal to elicit an output that is responsive a physical characteristic of the type of DUT/SUT. In respective embodiments the injected signal is defined to elicit an output for time-domain or frequency-domain evaluation. An injected signal may comprise combinations of (non-destructive/non-activating) signals applied to multiple access points for measurement at arbitrary access points of the DUT/SUT. In an embodiment, measurements of multiple DUT/SUTs of a same type are used to define a common profile. In an embodiment, the profile is built using machine learning to define a classifier. In other embodiments, statistical profiles are defined. During use, output is generated for a target DUT/SUT for evaluation relative to the profile. Counterfeit/alternate designs, altered designs, and implants are detectable.

An apparatus includes a database with device profiles, and a device programmer. The device programmer includes instructions. The instructions, when read and executed by a processor, cause the device programmer to identify a device identifier of an electronic device. The device programmer is further caused to, based upon the device identifier, access device data from the database. The device programmer is further caused to, based upon the device data, determine an area of memory of the electronic device that can be written. The device programmer is further caused to, based on the determination of the area of memory of the electronic device that can be written, write data to the area of memory.

A System-on-Chip (SoC) includes first and second voltage supply pins configured to receive first and second supply voltages, respectively, a first supply path beginning at the first supply pin, and a supply proportion checker. The first supply path includes a first plurality of voltage supply nodes and a supply switch coupled between adjacent voltage supply nodes, wherein each node is configured to provide a corresponding internal voltage supply to a corresponding portion of the SoC. The supply proportion checker is coupled to receive the corresponding internal voltage supply from each voltage supply node, and configured to determine whether a first internal voltage supply supplied by a first supply node of the first plurality of nodes has a legitimate proportion to a second internal voltage supply supplied by a second supply node of the first plurality of nodes, wherein the legitimacy is checked using only resistors which do not require trimming.

An example method for restricting read access to content in the component circuitry and securing data in the supply item is disclosed. The method identifies the status of a read command, and depending upon whether the status disabled or enabled, either blocks the accessing of encrypted data stored in the supply chip, or allows the accessing of the encrypted data stored in the supply chip.

In an embodiment a method for debugging a processing device includes generating, by a monotonic counter of the processing device, a first count value, transmitting, by the monotonic counter, the first count value to a debug access control circuit, comparing, by the debug access control circuit of the processing device, the first count value with one or more reference values and authorizing or preventing debug access, by the debug access control circuit, based on the comparison.

A system on chip includes a one-time programmable (OTP) memory configured to store secure data, an OTP controller including at least one shadow register configured to read the secure data from the OTP memory and to store the secure data, a power management unit configured to receive an operation mode signal from an external device and to output test mode information indicating whether an operation mode is a test mode according to the operation mode signal and a test valid signal corresponding to the secure data, and a test circuit configured to receive the test mode information from the power management unit, to receive test data from the external device, and to output a scan mode signal and a test mode signal according to the test data and a test deactivation signal, wherein the test deactivation signal corresponds to development state data indicating a chip development state in the secure data.

Methods and systems for authenticating electronic devices via multi tone analysis. A method for authenticating a device under test (DUT) of a type of DUT includes imparting voltage tones to the DUT. The voltage tones are proximate a frequency of interest that is associated with the type of DUT. Using a measurement response of the DUT to the voltage tones, an electronic signature of the DUT is determined. The DUT is determined to be authentic when the electronic signature of the DUT substantially matches an electronic signature of an authority DUT of the type of DUT.