Patent classifications
G01S5/0215
GPS-attack prevention system and method for fine timing measurement (FTM) in 802.11AZ
Presented herein are techniques for GPS attack prevention in association with wireless communication devices. In at least one embodiment, a method may include receiving, at a mobile device from a first access point (AP), first location information and one or more of a first token or first neighbor information relating to neighboring APs. The mobile device may receive from a second AP, second location information and one or more of a second token or second neighbor information relating to neighboring APs. The first token may be compared to the second token to determine whether the first and second tokens are consistent, and/or the first neighbor information may be compared to the second neighbor information to determine whether the first and second neighbor information are consistent. It may be determined whether the first location information provided by the first AP and the second location information provided by the second AP are valid based on the comparison(s).
METHOD AND DEVICE FOR TRANSMITTING S-PRS IN NR V2X
A method for operation of a first device (100) in a wireless communication system is proposed. The method can comprise the steps of: determining a transmission parameter relating to a sidelink positioning reference signal (S-PRS) on the basis of information obtained by means of the first device (100); and transmitting the S-PRS on the basis of the transmission parameter.
METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR OBTAINING LOCATION INFORMATION BY TRANSITIONING BETWEEN MODES OF OPERATION
Aspects of the subject disclosure may include, for example, determining anchor pairs from among a group of anchors and a first mobile device that is operating in an anchor mode, where the determining the anchor pairs is based at least in part on anchor locations, and where the anchor locations are known by the server for the group of anchors and for the first mobile device; generating a schedule for communications between the anchor pairs and one or more second mobile devices; and providing the schedule to the anchor pairs, wherein the communications between the anchor pairs and the one or more second mobile devices enables each of the one or more second mobile devices to determine its respective device position. Other embodiments are disclosed.
Vehicular self-positioning
A method for vehicular self-positioning is executed by a positioning device in a vehicle. The positioning device computes a current estimated position of the vehicle as a function of local motion data obtained from a motion sensor in the vehicle, and operates an RF module in the vehicle to receive a reference signal from one or more base stations in an environment of the vehicle, the respective base station being configured for telecommunication and being part of a 3GPP infrastructure. The positioning device further processes the reference signal to determine measured values of at least one path parameter for a selected set of multipath components, and operates a positioning algorithm, e.g. SLAM, on at least the current estimated position and the measured values to calculate a current output position of the vehicle and position information for an origin of each of the multipath components.
User equipment positioning estimation in wireless networks with base stations that support multibeam operation
A method of operating a base station includes determining a schedule associated with transmission by the base station of a Positioning Reference Signal (PRS) on a plurality of directional beams, the plurality of directional beams having directions corresponding to at least a portion of a plurality of configurable beam directions, the schedule being based on a coordination of the PRS transmission by the base station with PRS transmission on directional beams from at least one other base station; and transmitting the PRS on each of the plurality of directional beams based on the determined schedule.
COLLABORATIVE SIGNAL JAMMING DETECTION
A method for detecting communication jamming attacks includes collecting, via a processor associated with a base station, local jamming information from a first vehicle and a second vehicle. The local jamming information having an attack time, an attack localization, and an attack frequency. The method further includes building a global jamming map comprising global jamming information, based on the local jamming information, determining, based on the global jamming map, a location of a communication jamming device, and causing to transmit global jamming information to a third vehicle. The global jamming information is associated with the location of the communication jamming device.
A device, a system, a method and computer program product for identifying interfering devices in position measurements
A interference detection device (22) perform the following actions: receiving individual position data from mobile terminals (4(j)) which individual position data indicates an area (12(j)) in which individual ones of the mobile terminals (4(j)) are located based on positioning signals received by the mobile terminals (4(j)); identifying if individual position data may have been affected by one or more interfering signals transmitted by interfering device (14(m)) and interfering with the positioning signals; (A) identifying if a number of mobile terminals (4.sub.v(j)) in a first area (18) is higher than a maximum threshold number, and, if so, determining that individual position data of the number of mobile terminals (4.sub.v(j)) may have been affected by the interfering signals; or (B) identifying if a number of the mobile terminals (4(j)) in a second area (36) is lower than a minimum threshold number; and, if so, determining that individual position data of the number of mobile terminals (4(j)) may have been affected by interfering signals; or (C) receiving further individual position data which indicates further areas (18) in which mobile terminals (4(j)) are located based on another positioning technique than a positioning technique used to determine the individual position data as received from the mobile terminals (4(j)); determining if the areas (12(j)) overlap with the further areas (18) at least to a minimum extent, and, if not, determining that individual position data of the mobile terminals (4(j)) may have been affected by the interfering signals.
SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR REALTIME INTERFERENCE LOCATION USING WIRELESS NETWORK FIELD MEASUREMENT DATA
A system may receive, from a network, an estimate of coordinates of a location of a potential interference source; determine, based in the estimate, whether the system is within a first threshold distance from the location; if the system is with the first threshold distance from the location, obtain real-time interference data from the network; determine, based on the real-time interference data, whether a source of interference exists near a first location that is within a second distance from a second location specified by the real-time interference data; and send a reply that indicates a result of the determination to the network.
ROUTE-BASED SIDELINK COMMUNICATION ASSIGNMENTS
Various aspects of the present disclosure generally relate to wireless communication. In some aspects, a user equipment (UE) may transmit route information indicating a route associated with the UE. The UE may receive, based at least in part on transmitting the route information, configuration information indicating at least one other UE assigned to the UE for sidelink positioning. Numerous other aspects are described.
PARTIAL MEASUREMENT OF REFERENCE SIGNAL FOR POSITIONING RESOURCE
In an aspect, a wireless node (e.g., UE, gNB) performs a partial measurement of a measurement type (e.g., RSTD, Rx-Tx, etc.) of a reference signal for positioning (RS-P) resource (e.g., PRS, SRS) that includes multiple symbols, the partial measurement being measured across a subset of the multiple symbols. The wireless node transmits a measurement report that includes an indication of the first partial measurement. The communications device receives the measurement report, and determines whether a spoofing attack is associated with the RS-P based at least in part upon the measurement report.