A multibeam Radio Frequency (RF) lens antenna is designed as a receiver for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) applications, such as GPS (Global Positioning System), Galileo, GLONASS, COMPASS, and others. The RF lens and plurality of associated feed elements and receiver circuits combine to form a plurality of resulting high-gain relatively narrow beams that, taken together, allow reception of signals from GNSS satellites over the entire upper hemisphere. Any kind of RF lens can be used, where the lens can be of homogeneous or inhomogeneous, dielectric or metamaterial metasurface construction. The benefit of this approach to build a GNSS receiver over existing alternatives is increased gain and decreased noise at each receiver, which improves the signal to noise ratio (SNR) and improves the accuracy and reliability of the position and time measurements, while also reducing the impact of, and sensitivity to, interference, jamming, and spoofing signals. The approaches described in this patent can be combined with existing signal processing and accuracy improvement methods (such as Real-Time Kinematic (RTK), Precise-Point Positioning (PPP), and Differential GPS (DEPS)) for further benefits. This system has applications within the surveying, maritime, land mobility, aerospace, and government positioning market areas.

Disclosed is a technique that can provide one or more countermeasures against spoofers. A direction from which a spoofing attack occurs is identified. A beamformer can control an antenna pattern of a CRPA to null out signals from that direction, which can assist a GNSS receiver to avoid error induced by the spoofing attack. Further, after two or more observations, the location of the spoofer can be identified.

Disclosed is a technique that can provide one or more countermeasures against spoofers. A direction from which a spoofing attack occurs is identified. A beamformer can control an antenna pattern of a CRPA to null out signals from that direction, which can assist a GNSS receiver to avoid error induced by the spoofing attack. Further, after two or more observations, the location of the spoofer can be identified.

A method and a function for checking the integrity of the processing of a radionavigation signal emitted by a satellite, the signal being received by a receiver comprising reception means and processing means, the processing means comprising a linear anti-interference filter, the integrity checking method comprising at least a first phase of detection of a risk of false lock-on comprising the following steps: a step of recovery of a nominal theoretical self-correlation function of the received signal not processed by the linear anti-interference filter; a step of determination of a mean theoretical self-correlation function of the signal received and processed by the linear anti-interference filter over a defined integration period; a step of determination of the number of local maxima of the modulus or of the modulus squared of the mean theoretical self-correlation function, a risk of false lock-on being detected if the number of local maxima is greater than or equal to two.

A method and a function for checking the integrity of the processing of a radionavigation signal emitted by a satellite, the signal being received by a receiver comprising reception means and processing means, the processing means comprising a linear anti-interference filter, the integrity checking method comprising at least a first phase of detection of a risk of false lock-on comprising the following steps: a step of recovery of a nominal theoretical self-correlation function of the received signal not processed by the linear anti-interference filter; a step of determination of a mean theoretical self-correlation function of the signal received and processed by the linear anti-interference filter over a defined integration period; a step of determination of the number of local maxima of the modulus or of the modulus squared of the mean theoretical self-correlation function, a risk of false lock-on being detected if the number of local maxima is greater than or equal to two.

A configuration for virtual sensing via sensor sharing for C-V2X scheduling. The apparatus receives, from a first wireless device, a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity transmits data that interferes with transmission of BSMs. The apparatus determines a candidate resource of a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus transmits, to at least a third wireless device, the BSM on a determined candidate resource.

A receiver determines whether an outbound carrier frequency among a plurality of outbound carrier frequencies, as received, includes interference. Based at least in part on a result of the determining, a new outbound carrier frequency is selected for the receiver. Optionally, the receiver sends an interference report to a system controller.

A receiver determines whether an outbound carrier frequency among a plurality of outbound carrier frequencies, as received, includes interference. Based at least in part on a result of the determining, a new outbound carrier frequency is selected for the receiver. Optionally, the receiver sends an interference report to a system controller.

An aircraft flight control apparatus includes a flight track acquiring unit and a determining unit. The flight track acquiring unit is configured to measure a position of an aircraft to acquire a flight track of the aircraft. The determining unit is configured to determine, when an own-aircraft deviation amount gradually increases, whether the aircraft receives a spoofed signal as a satellite positioning system signal, on the basis of the own-aircraft deviation amount. The own-aircraft deviation amount is an amount of deviation of the flight track acquired by the flight track acquiring unit from a scheduled flight route of the aircraft.

Location may be determined in a way that does not primarily rely on jam-able or spoof-able techniques. For example, an apparatus may have multiple location-determining units, each unit having a different level of trust. One unit may have a first (e.g., highest) level of trust, a second such unit may have a second (e.g., medium) level of trust lower than the first level of trust, and a third such unit may have a third (e.g., lowest) level of trust lower than the first and second levels of trust. The apparatus may generally prefer to determine its location using the highest level of trust unit that is available at any given time.