Patent classifications
G06F11/1608
Operation of I/O in a safe system
A module health system includes a module health circuit comprising a hardware register that is set to a first value in response to the system starting, an application register that is set to the first value in response to the system starting and a watchdog timer register that is set to the first value in response to the system starting. The system further includes a power on self-test that determines whether the system has passed a plurality of tests and that selectively sets the hardware register to a second value based on the determination, an external software application that determines whether a safety critical system is healthy and selectively sets the application register based on the determination, a watchdog timer application that selectively sets the watchdog timer register, a central processing unit that determines whether to de-assert a module health signal.
Test circuit for 3D semiconductor device and method for testing thereof
Disclosed herein is a test circuit for a 3D semiconductor device for detecting soft errors and a method for testing thereof. The test circuit includes a first Multiple Input Signature Register (MISR) disposed in a first semiconductor chip, the first MISR compressing a first test result signal corresponding to a test pattern, a second MISR disposed in a second semiconductor chip stacked on or under the first semiconductor chip, the second MISR compressing a second test result signal corresponding to the test pattern, and a first error detector to detect a soft error by comparing a first output signal output from the first MISR with a second output signal output from the second MISR.
System and method for false pass detection in lockstep dual core or triple modular redundancy (TMR) systems
The disclosure relates to an apparatus and method for false pass detection in lockstep dual processing core systems, triple modular redundancy (TMR) systems, or other redundant processing systems. A false pass occurs when two processing cores generate matching data outputs, both of which are in error. A false pass may occur when the processing core are both subjected to substantially the same adverse condition, such as a supply voltage drop or a sudden temperature change or gradient. The apparatus includes processing cores configured to generate first and second data outputs and first and second timing violation signals. A voter-comparator validates the first and second data outputs if they match and the first and second timing violation signals indicate no timing violations. Otherwise, the voter comparator invalidates the first and second data outputs. Validated data outputs are used for performing additional operations, and invalidated data outputs may be discarded.
Information processing device, control method, and non-transitory computer readable medium
An information processing device that executes an arithmetic process includes a first processing circuit and a second processing circuit. The first processing circuit executes the arithmetic process N times consecutively. The second processing circuit executes the arithmetic process N times consecutively. N is an integer of 2 or more. The first processing circuit and the second processing circuit continue to operate according to a match between at least one result among the results of the N arithmetic processes executed by the first processing circuit and at least one result among the results of the N arithmetic processes executed by the second processing circuit. As a result, it is possible to suppress an increase in cost required for hardware and to suppress a temporary stop due to a temporary failure.
End To End FPGA Diagnostics For A Safety System
A system includes a first fail-safe chassis (FSC) receives module health signals from a plurality of modules and generates a first chassis health signal. The chassis health signal includes first and second portions. A plurality of modules receives the chassis health signal. The FSC determines whether one or more of the module heals signals indicates an associated module is unhealthy by comparing the module health signals and a predetermined health value. The FSC selectively de-asserts the first chassis health signal based on the comparison. A second FSC operates similarly. A safety relay box determines the health of the system in accordance with the first and second chassis health signals.
LOAD GENERATOR WITH A TOKEN MACHINE
In example implementations, an apparatus is provided. The apparatus includes a plurality of tokens, a plurality of states and an interface to a scheduler. Each one of the states represents a state of a state machine that is an abstraction of a business logic. Each one of the plurality of tokens is located at one of the plurality of states. A schedule of transitions for moving the plurality of tokens between two states of the plurality of states is received by the interface to the scheduler. The plurality of tokens is controlled in accordance with the schedule of transitions with a single call.
Method and Apparatus for Protecting a Program Counter Structure of a Processor System and for Monitoring the Handling of an Interrupt Request
A processor system comprises at least a program counter structure, an interrupt control device, a memory, and an apparatus. The interrupt control device is configured to respond to an interrupt request by providing the program counter structure with an address associated with the interrupt request. The program counter structure is configured to output the address to the memory via a memory interface. The apparatus is configured to protect the program counter structure in case of an interrupt request, the apparatus includes an interface, a comparing device, and an outputting device.
Generating a data structure to maintain error and connection information on components and use the data structure to determine an error correction operation
Provided are a computer program product, system, and method for generating data structure to maintain error and connection information on components and use the data structure to determine an error correction operation. For each of a plurality of first level components in enclosures connected to second level components, errors at the first level component and a connection between the first level component to one of the second level components are determined and error variables are set to indicate whether an error was reported at the first level component. A data structure is generated indicating connections among the first level components and the second level components. The error variable values and the data structure are used to determine an error correction operation with respect to at least one of the first level component and the connected second level component.
SENSOR DATA
Examples disclosed herein relate, among other things, to a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium encoded with instructions executable by a processor of a computing device to cause the computing device to obtain data from a plurality of sensors of at least a first type and a second type. The instructions may also cause the computing device to determine, for each sensor of the second type, whether the data obtained from the sensor of the second type is reliable based at least on the data obtained from a sensor of the first type that is associated with the sensor of the second type.
ERROR DETECTION
An apparatus 2 comprises at least three processing circuits 4 to perform redundant processing of a common thread of program instructions. Error detection circuitry 16 is provided comprising a number of comparators 22 for detecting a mismatch between signals on corresponding signal nodes 20 in the processing circuits 4. When a comparator 22 detects a mismatch, this triggers a recovery process. The error detection circuitry 16 generates an unresolvable error signal 36 indicating that a detected area is unresolvable by the recovery process when, during the recovery process, a mismatch is detected by one of the proper subset 34 of the comparators 22. By considering fewer comparators 22 during the recovery process than during normal operation, the chances of unrecoverable errors being detected can be reduced, increasing system availability.