G07F19/2055

DEVICES AND SYSTEMS FOR DETECTING UNAUTHORIZED COMMUNICATION OF DATA FROM A MAGNETIC STRIPE DEVICE OR EMBEDDED SMART CHIP DEVICE
20170365134 · 2017-12-21 ·

Disclosed are devices, systems and the like for determining unauthorized communication of data from a card device equipped with a magnetic stripe and/or smart chip. The card device is able to count by recording the number of instances in which the card device has either been swiped at a magnetic card reader or communicated data via an embedded Integrated Circuit (IC). In specific embodiments, the device is further configured to differentiate between authorized swipes/data communications and unauthorized data communications.

System to identify vulnerable card readers

Example embodiments relate to a network-based vulnerability detection system configured to access a database of customer transaction data corresponding to a set of card readers that includes transaction codes, receive an identification of a set of compromised card readers among the set of card readers, identify common transaction codes within the transaction data of the set of compromised card readers, and correlate the common transaction codes to one or more instances of fraud associated with the compromised set of card readers. In some example embodiments, the vulnerability detection system may be applied to monitor one or more card readers, receive transaction data corresponding to transaction conducted through the card readers, identify the common transaction codes correlated to the instances of fraud, and cause display of a notification that includes an indication of the instance of fraud at a client device.

CARD READER

A card reader may include a card passage; a shutter member to close the card passage; a magnetic head on a rear side of the shutter member reads or records data in a magnetic strip of a card; an electrostatic capacitance sensor on the rear side or the shutter member; a first guide member which structures at least a part of a face on a first direction side of the card passage when one side in a thickness direction of the card passing the card passage is referred to as a first direction; and a second guide member which structures at least a part of a face on a second direction side of the card passage. The first guide member may include insulating material and the second guide member may include conductive material. The electrostatic capacitance sensor may be attached to the first guide member.

SECURED BODY OF MEMORY CARD READER
20170346208 · 2017-11-30 ·

A memory card reader body has a generally rectangular parallelepiped shape and a slot for inserting a memory card. The reader body furthermore includes a housing for receiving a memory card connector, and at least one protection circuit. The body includes an upper lid and a lower lid, where the protection circuit is positioned on an internal face of the upper lid.

Currency trapping detection

Cash trapping at an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) is detected in real time. One or more images from one or more cameras are analyzed. The camera(s) is/are focused overhead of the ATM or on a cash slot of a dispense module for the ATM. The images are analyzed for determining one or more of whether the dispenser module is authentic, whether the cash slot opened or did not open when it should have opened for a cash withdraw, whether visual features of the dispense module have changed over a configurable period of time, and whether hands, gestures, and actions of a person present at the ATM indicate that cash trapping is taking place at the ATM. When cash trapping is detected at the ATM a variety of automated actions are processed, such as shutting down the dispense module, shutting down the ATM, notifying a financial institution, and/or notifying legal authorities.

Tamper resistant rugged keypad

A tamper-resistant or tamper-evident keypad device for use in secure transactions. The keypad comprises multiple security mechanisms to prevent tampering to the device, and thus access to users' private information. The keypad is made of resilient materials and contains a tamper-resistant collar for housing the keypad's connector interface. The keypad comprises a multi-layered printed circuit board with at least two internal security-shield layers comprising switch trace protection, as well as additional security layers for tamper protection. The keypad comprises a silicon-rubber keypad actuator that engages tamper switches on the flexible security circuit. The keypad comprises metal discs mounted on the front or rear face of the flexible circuit and an optional dome layer.

Method for detecting the presence of a smart card cloning device in an automatic payment and/or withdrawal terminal and respective automatic payment and/or withdrawal terminal
11263875 · 2022-03-01 · ·

It is described a method for detecting the presence of a device for cloning a smart card in an automatic payment and/or withdrawal terminal, comprising the steps of detecting that a smart card has not been at least partially inserted inside a reader of the terminal; simulating the presence of a smart card inside the reader; measuring a current or voltage value generated by the simulation; comparing the measured current or voltage value with respect to a defined threshold value; detecting the presence of the cloning device if, as a function of said comparison, it results that the measured current or voltage value is greater than or equal to the threshold value; and blocking the operation of the automatic payment and/or withdrawal terminal in case of detecting the presence of the cloning device.

Obfuscation of information obtained by a card reader

An example method may include transmitting a noise signal through a reader connection of a magnetic reader element. The control component and the magnetic reader element may be associated with a card reader device of a transaction device, and the magnetic reader element may be configured to read a magnetic strip of a transaction card. The method may include receiving, from the magnetic reader element, a reader connection signal from the reader connection. The reader connection signal may include the noise signal. The method may include extracting, from the reader connection signal, a card information signal associated with the transaction card from the magnetic strip. The card information signal may be extracted based on the noise signal. The method may include performing an action associated with the card information signal.

Multiplexed tamper detection system
09799180 · 2017-10-24 · ·

A payment reader includes a tamper detection system for monitoring and protecting against attempts to tamper with the payment reader. The tamper detection system includes tamper detection devices such as tamper switches or tamper meshes, and tamper detection circuitry to control and interface with the tamper detection devices. Pulses are selectively provided from each of a plurality of tamper signal pins of the tamper detection circuitry to an associated tamper detection device, the outputs of the tamper detection devices are multiplexed, the multiplexed signal is received at a tamper detection pin, and a tamper attempt is identified if a pulse was not received within the multiplexed signal. While not transmitting, each of the tamper signal pins is switched to an input state, and a tamper attempt is also identified if any aberrant signal is received at the tamper signal pins while in the input state.

MR Sensor and Card Reader

An MR sensor structured to detect whether or not magnetic data are recorded in a magnetic stripe of a card having first and second tracks may include a first resistor and a second resistor serially-connected with each other and disposed at positions where the first track is passed; and a third resistor and a fourth resistor serially-connected with each other and disposed at positions where the second track is passed. The second resistor and the fourth resistor may be connected with a power supply, and the first resistor and the third resistor may be ground grounded. A potential difference between a first midpoint between the first resistor and the second resistor and a second midpoint between the third resistor and the fourth resistor may be an output of the MR sensor.