Methods and apparatuses for a receiver of signals from one or more satellite navigational systems to detect and/or eliminate impaired satellites from the set of estimated/acquired satellites in view are described. One method includes acquiring coarse position, time, and frequency values for each of a plurality of satellites from one or more satellite navigational systems, the plurality of satellites being those currently estimated to be in view of the receiver; determining whether one or more of the acquired coarse values are within a minimum range; and if it is determined that the one or more acquired coarse values are within the minimum range: determining a pseudo-true peak of a position domain correlogram comprising Line of Sight (LOS) vectors of each of the plurality of satellites; and identifying any satellite whose cross-correlation peak is beyond a maximum distance from the pseudo-true peak as an impaired satellite.

For validation of position, navigation, time (PNT) signals, a hash included in messages with PNT data is used to validate the source of the message without backhaul. Different tags from a hash chain are included in different messages. The receiver is pre-loaded with the root or later trusted hash tag of the chain as created. The hash of any received message may be hashed by the receiver. The result of the hashing will match the pre-loaded or trusted hash tag if the transmitter of the message is a valid source. The PNT data may be validated using a digital signature formed from the PNT data for one or more messages and the hash tag wherein a hash tag of the chain in a subsequently received message is used as the key. The digital signature may be formed from data across multiple messages.

A method, system and apparatus are claimed for receiving, blindly despreading, and determining geo-observables, of true civil Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) navigation signals generated by any of the set of satellite vehicles and ground beacons, amongst false echoes and malicious GNSS signals from spoofers and repeaters; for identifying malicious GNSS signals, and preventing those signals from corrupting or capturing Pointing, Navigation, and Timing tracking operations; and for geolocating malicious GNSS signals. The invention also provides time-to-first-fix over much smaller time intervals than existing GNSS methods and can operate both in the presence of signals with much wider disparity in received power than existing techniques, and in the presence of arbitrary multipath. Further embodiments employing spatial/polarization diverse receivers that remove non-GNSS jammers received by the system, as well as targeted GNSS spoofers that can otherwise emulate GNSS signals received at victim receivers, are also claimed.

A system includes at least one sensing unit, the sensing unit including a sensing element. The system includes at least one spatial Lorentz filter coupled to the sensing element. The spatial Lorentz filter (SLF) includes an input coupled to the sensing element and an analog to digital converter (ADC) providing a filtered output signal. The sensing unit is connected to a processor configured for determining velocity or position with respect to a magnetic field and/or a geographic position by processing SLF output signals.

In an aspect, a wireless node (e.g., UE, gNB) performs a partial measurement of a measurement type (e.g., RSTD, Rx-Tx, etc.) of a reference signal for positioning (RS-P) resource (e.g., PRS, SRS) that includes multiple symbols, the partial measurement being measured across a subset of the multiple symbols. The wireless node transmits a measurement report that includes an indication of the first partial measurement. The communications device receives the measurement report, and determines whether a spoofing attack is associated with the RS-P based at least in part upon the measurement report.

Concepts and technologies directed to global positioning system spoofing countermeasures are disclosed. Embodiments can include a system that comprises a processor and a memory that stores computer-executable instructions that configure a processor to perform operations that include identifying a mobile transportation equipment that includes an electronic logging device and a low-power wide area device, where the electronic logging device obtains GPS location data from a GPS receiver unit and the low-power wide area device obtains independent location data via a narrow band path of a low-power wide area network. The operations can include determining that a spatio-temporal misalignment exists between the independent location data and the GPS location data for the mobile transportation equipment, and providing spatio-temporal data alignment. The operations can include determining that a GPS spoofing attack has occurred, and creating a GPS spoofing alert for the mobile transportation equipment.

Improvements in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing detection of a vehicle are disclosed utilizing bearing and/or range measurements acquired independently from GNSS technology. Bearing and/or range measurements are determined from a GNSS-calculated position. Additionally, bearing and/or range measurements are acquired from an independent sensor, such as a Radio Detection and Ranging (radar) and a terrain database. The differences between the GNSS-based bearing and/or range and the bearing and/or range determined from the independent sensor, along with any applicable sources of error or uncertainty (including the post-hoc residuals from the GNSS-calculated position), are input into an analytical algorithm (e.g., RAIM) to determine whether GNSS spoofing is present with respect to the calculated GNSS position. If spoofing is detected, an alternative position determining system can be used in lieu of GNSS technology, and alerts can be sent notifying appropriate entities of the spoofing result.

Embodiments of the invention provide that when performing a position fix a user who makes use of RTK or dGNSS correction data from a RTK/dGNSS service to obtain more accurate position fixes also receives from that same service data derived from the encrypted GNSS channels that authenticates whether the position fix determined by the mobile terminal based on the RTK/dGNSS data can be relied upon. By providing such an integrated service the mobile user terminal is able to obtain an authenticated, highly accurate positional fix which it can be certain can be relied upon.

System and method for concurrently protecting Iridium and GPS L1/L2 band received satellite signals against interference signals (e.g., jamming signals) using space-time adaptive processing (STAP). While the GPS signal is protected against jamming using Nulling of the interfering signals, the Iridium signal is protected using Beamforming. A single broadband small controlled reception pattern antenna (sCRPA) array receives both the GPS (L1 and L2) and Iridium signals for the STAP-based antijam solutions outputting filtered Iridium and GPS signals. Use of a common (small) broadband antenna and common front end signal processing of the received signals enables an integrated system for use on size, weight, and power constrained platforms such as drones, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and helicopters.

Disclosed herein are example embodiments for unoccupied flying vehicle (UFV) location assurance. For certain example embodiments, at least one machine, such as a UFV, may: (i) obtain one or more satellite positioning system (SPS) coordinates corresponding to at least an apparent location of at least one UFV; or (ii) perform at least one analysis that uses at least one or more SPS coordinates and at least one assurance token. However, claimed subject matter is not limited to any particular described embodiments, implementations, examples, or so forth.