A pay television satellite broadcast includes validation data that can be used to validate authenticity of live global positioning system (GPS) data. The validation data may be included within entitlement messages and encrypted for security and selective reception by authorized receivers. A navigation system may compute checksums of received live GPS data and compare with the validation data for a match. A decision about whether or not to use the live GPS data may be taken based on whether or not the computed checksums match the validation data received via the pay television satellite broadcast signals.

A system and method for detecting multiple spoofed or faulty global navigation satellite signals are provided. The system comprises a single antenna configured to receive satellite signals from a plurality of global navigation satellites, the single antenna located on a vehicle; a receiver in the vehicle, the receiver coupled to the single antenna; and at least one processor in the vehicle, the processor in communication with the single antenna through the receiver. The processor is operative to determine a unit vector in a direction from the vehicle to a global navigation satellite in local coordinates, from the satellite signals; determine a plurality of signal blocks, wherein the signal blocks are a collection of subsets of the satellite signals and a covariance matrix for the satellite signals; and determine which satellite signals in the signal blocks are spoofed or faulty by comparing a geometry of the local coordinates with satellite coordinates.

A multibeam Radio Frequency (RF) lens antenna is designed as a receiver for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) applications, such as GPS (Global Positioning System), Galileo, GLONASS, COMPASS, and others. The RF lens and plurality of associated feed elements and receiver circuits combine to form a plurality of resulting high-gain relatively narrow beams that, taken together, allow reception of signals from GNSS satellites over the entire upper hemisphere. Any kind of RF lens can be used, where the lens can be of homogeneous or inhomogeneous, dielectric or metamaterial metasurface construction. The benefit of this approach to build a GNSS receiver over existing alternatives is increased gain and decreased noise at each receiver, which improves the signal to noise ratio (SNR) and improves the accuracy and reliability of the position and time measurements, while also reducing the impact of, and sensitivity to, interference, jamming, and spoofing signals. The approaches described in this patent can be combined with existing signal processing and accuracy improvement methods (such as Real-Time Kinematic (RTK), Precise-Point Positioning (PPP), and Differential GPS (DEPS)) for further benefits. This system has applications within the surveying, maritime, land mobility, aerospace, and government positioning market areas.

Disclosed is a technique that can provide one or more countermeasures against spoofers. A direction from which a spoofing attack occurs is identified. A beamformer can control an antenna pattern of a CRPA to null out signals from that direction, which can assist a GNSS receiver to avoid error induced by the spoofing attack. Further, after two or more observations, the location of the spoofer can be identified.

A configuration for virtual sensing via sensor sharing for C-V2X scheduling. The apparatus receives, from a first wireless device, a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity transmits data that interferes with transmission of BSMs. The apparatus determines a candidate resource of a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus transmits, to at least a third wireless device, the BSM on a determined candidate resource.

One or more computing devices, systems, and/or methods for detecting spoofing attacks are provided. Location information of a base station may be evaluated to determine a true position of the base station. Satellite signals received by the base station may be processed and evaluated to calculate a real time position of the base station. A distance between the real time position and the true position may be calculated. In response to the distance exceeding a threshold distance, an alert is generated to indicate that the base station is experiencing a spoofing attack.

A receiver determines whether an outbound carrier frequency among a plurality of outbound carrier frequencies, as received, includes interference. Based at least in part on a result of the determining, a new outbound carrier frequency is selected for the receiver. Optionally, the receiver sends an interference report to a system controller.

An aircraft flight control apparatus includes a flight track acquiring unit and a determining unit. The flight track acquiring unit is configured to measure a position of an aircraft to acquire a flight track of the aircraft. The determining unit is configured to determine, when an own-aircraft deviation amount gradually increases, whether the aircraft receives a spoofed signal as a satellite positioning system signal, on the basis of the own-aircraft deviation amount. The own-aircraft deviation amount is an amount of deviation of the flight track acquired by the flight track acquiring unit from a scheduled flight route of the aircraft.

A system includes at least one sensing unit, the sensing unit including a sensing element. The system includes at least one spatial Lorentz filter coupled to the sensing element. The spatial Lorentz filter (SLF) includes an input coupled to the sensing element and an analog to digital converter (ADC) providing a filtered output signal. The sensing unit is connected to a processor configured for determining velocity or position with respect to a magnetic field and/or a geographic position by processing SLF output signals.

An exemplary method includes a monitoring system identifying a time period during which a vehicle equipped with a tracking device travels at least a threshold distance, determining that the tracking device fails to acquire a desired signal for a predetermined amount of time during the time period, and, in response to determining that the tracking device fails to acquire the desired signal, determining that the tracking device is potentially being interfered with during the time period by a signal jamming device.