A method of restoring navigational performance for a navigational system, the method comprising receiving by a first navigational system and a second navigational system a collection of data points to establish a real-time navigational route for the aircraft, comparing navigational performance values and/or drift ranges and establishing a new navigational route based on the collection of data points.

A system and method to distinguish spoofing signals from true GNSS signals is disclosed. One aspect of the present invention combines measuring GNSS carrier signals with measuring jitter in a vehicle's position via a low-cost inertial measurement unit (IMU) to distinguish spoofing signals from true GNSS signals. The present invention employs natural and/or artificial jitter of a vehicle, that, when combined with a tightly coupled inertial navigation system (INS), allows the receiver to distinguish the spoofing GNSS signal from the true GNSS signal. This spoofer survivability algorithm may be implemented, for example, in the software of a GNSS (or GPS) navigation system.

Existing networks of precisely surveyed GNSS receivers that are used for dGNSS or RTK positioning techniques can be used to measure GNSS time across a territory or region such as a country. The measured GNSS time base signals from each receiver are then fed back to a collating service, similar to the existing dGNSS/RTK systems, which also receives an accurate time base signal from a trusted third-party time base supplier which maintains a trusted time base. The collating service then compares the GNSS time signals from the network of GNSS receivers with the trusted time base and determines whether the GNSS time signals are accurate when compared to the trusted time base, and if they are not accurate, calculates the error. The collating service may provide the calculated error to users and the necessary correction that needs to be applied to measured GNSS time to obtain accurate UTC time.

Systems and methods for detecting spoofing attempts are disclosed. In one embodiment, a ground station system for detecting a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoof signal includes a receiver configured to receive data collected by a detection satellite that (1) is on a first orbit that is lower than a second orbit used by a GNSS satellite and (2) includes: a first antenna positioned to receive signals originating from a planetary surface, and a second antenna positioned to receive signals originating from the GNSS satellite on a higher orbit than the first orbit of the detection satellite. The ground station further includes one or more processors configured to calculate, using the time of arrival of the signal received at the first antenna and the position of the detection satellite determined based on the signal received at the second antenna, a geolocation of a source of the signal originating from a planetary surface.

A system and method for detecting spoofing of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) system using a plurality of antennas. Signals received by at least two of the plurality of antennas are authentication by use of one or more of a carrier phase authentication procedure, a signal power authentication procedure, and/or a channel distortion authentication procedure.

Systems, methods, and non-transitory computer program products for mitigating global navigation satellite system spoofing (GNSS). Real-time correlation data derived from a GNSS signal is received from a tracking channel over a time period. The real-time correlation data includes one or more peaks. The one or more peaks of the real-time correlation data are monitored to determine a presence of at least two distinct peaks separated by at least a predetermined minimum amount of time. An authentic peak is identified within the at least two distinct peaks based on a comparison of predicted correlation data with the real-time correlation data. A tracking command is provided to the tracking channel to facilitate modifying tracking points to center on the authentic peak.

Presented herein are techniques for GPS attack prevention in association with wireless communication devices. In at least one embodiment, a method may include receiving, at a mobile device from a first access point (AP), first location information and one or more of a first token or first neighbor information relating to neighboring APs. The mobile device may receive from a second AP, second location information and one or more of a second token or second neighbor information relating to neighboring APs. The first token may be compared to the second token to determine whether the first and second tokens are consistent, and/or the first neighbor information may be compared to the second neighbor information to determine whether the first and second neighbor information are consistent. It may be determined whether the first location information provided by the first AP and the second location information provided by the second AP are valid based on the comparison(s).

A configuration for virtual sensing via sensor sharing for C-V2X scheduling. The apparatus receives, from a first wireless device, a message indicating a threat entity within a threat zone. The threat entity transmits data that interferes with transmission of BSMs. The apparatus determines a candidate resource of a set of candidate resources on which to transmit a BSM based at least in part on the message indicating information related to the threat entity from the first wireless device. The apparatus transmits, to at least a third wireless device, the BSM on a determined candidate resource.

A device includes a memory configured to store a first position estimate of a first vehicle. The device also includes a receiver configured to receive a second position estimate of a second vehicle. The device further includes a sensor configured to generate sensor data indicating a first relative position estimate of the first vehicle relative to the second vehicle. The device also includes one or more processors configured to determine, based on a comparison of the first position estimate and the second position estimate, a second relative position estimate of the first vehicle relative to the second vehicle. The one or more processors are also configured to determine whether the first position estimate is reliable based at least in part on determining whether the first relative position estimate matches the second relative position estimate.

Method, systems, and computer-readable media containing instructions which, when executed by a computing device, cause it to receive data from an inertial measurement unit, including GPS data, velocity data, and bearing data, receive data from a digital magnetic compass, including bearing data, receive data from a Doppler sensor, including velocity data and distance data, determining whether GPS location data is in consensus with a previous derived multi-source reckoning system location, determining a consensus distance value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the Doppler sensor, determine a consensus heading value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the digital magnetic compass, determine a consensus geolocation value from a weighted average of data from the inertial measurement unit and the previous derived multi-source reckoning system location, and determine a derived multi-source reckoning system location.