Disclosed is a digital association and high precision positioning and tracking system for multimodal transport container, comprising a carrier terminal, a container terminal, and a remote digital monitoring platform; the carrier terminal is activated when the a container is in an associated state, and is used to collect high-precision positioning information and other status information of the container and send it to the remote digital monitoring platform; the container monitoring terminal is enabled when the container is in a non-associated state, and is used to collect container status information and send it to the remote digital monitoring platform; the remote digital monitoring platform is used to record and visualize relevant information; the carrier-container association and binding module sends instructions to the carrier terminal and the container monitoring terminal to complete the container-carrier association and unbinding, ensuring the security and positioning accuracy of the container during the multimodal transport process.

The invention discloses an antenna assembly comprising one or more sensors, possibly a fish-eye camera which produces images of the sky above the antenna, said images being processed to identify open sky and occulted sky areas, said identification being used to generate an antenna gain pattern shape wherein null zones are placed on the occulted sky areas, so as to eliminate the GNSS signals which are affected by multi-path reflection. The antenna assembly of the invention may be used with any GNSS receiver of the prior art. No specific data on the location of the receiver or its orientation is needed to perform the method of the invention, while in some embodiments, it may be useful to send some information on the number of satellites in view in the open sky.

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a magnetic locator for a GNSS device. The magnetic locator includes a magnetic field sensor configured to detect a magnetic field adjacent the magnetic locator; a controller coupled to the magnetic field sensor and configured to receive from the magnetic field sensor measurement data based on the magnetic field and calculate sensor data based on the received measurement data; a communication interface coupled to the controller and adaptable to transmit sensor data received from the controller to the GNSS device; a connector adaptable to connect the magnetic locator to a GNSS antenna of the GNSS device; and a housing.

Embodiments of the present disclosure relate to a magnetic locator for a GNSS device. The magnetic locator includes a magnetic field sensor configured to detect a magnetic field adjacent the magnetic locator; a controller coupled to the magnetic field sensor and configured to receive from the magnetic field sensor measurement data based on the magnetic field and calculate sensor data based on the received measurement data; a communication interface coupled to the controller and adaptable to transmit sensor data received from the controller to the GNSS device; a connector adaptable to connect the magnetic locator to a GNSS antenna of the GNSS device; and a housing.

A device of piloting sensors for a rotary wing aircraft having at least two IMU inertial modules, at least two GNSS receivers having respective first fault detection and exclusion modules for detecting and excluding failures and covering distinct GNSS satellite navigation systems, at least two second FDE modules, at least two hybridizing platforms, and at least one third FDE module. The FDE modules enable signals that are of integrity and/or signals that are erroneous to be detected so as to exclude each GNSS system that is defective. In addition, each hybridizing platform makes it possible to determine a hybridized ground speed in order to delivering a ground speed for said aircraft that is accurate and of integrity.

A device of piloting sensors for a rotary wing aircraft having at least two IMU inertial modules, at least two GNSS receivers having respective first fault detection and exclusion modules for detecting and excluding failures and covering distinct GNSS satellite navigation systems, at least two second FDE modules, at least two hybridizing platforms, and at least one third FDE module. The FDE modules enable signals that are of integrity and/or signals that are erroneous to be detected so as to exclude each GNSS system that is defective. In addition, each hybridizing platform makes it possible to determine a hybridized ground speed in order to delivering a ground speed for said aircraft that is accurate and of integrity.

Improvements in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing detection of a vehicle are disclosed utilizing bearing and/or range measurements acquired independently from GNSS technology. Bearing and/or range measurements are determined from a GNSS-calculated position. Additionally, bearing and/or range measurements are acquired from an independent sensor, such as a Radio Detection and Ranging (radar) and a terrain database. The differences between the GNSS-based bearing and/or range and the bearing and/or range determined from the independent sensor, along with any applicable sources of error or uncertainty (including the post-hoc residuals from the GNSS-calculated position), are input into an analytical algorithm (e.g., RAIM) to determine whether GNSS spoofing is present with respect to the calculated GNSS position. If spoofing is detected, an alternative position determining system can be used in lieu of GNSS technology, and alerts can be sent notifying appropriate entities of the spoofing result.

Improvements in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing detection of a vehicle are disclosed utilizing bearing and/or range measurements acquired independently from GNSS technology. Bearing and/or range measurements are determined from a GNSS-calculated position. Additionally, bearing and/or range measurements are acquired from an independent sensor, such as a Radio Detection and Ranging (radar) and a terrain database. The differences between the GNSS-based bearing and/or range and the bearing and/or range determined from the independent sensor, along with any applicable sources of error or uncertainty (including the post-hoc residuals from the GNSS-calculated position), are input into an analytical algorithm (e.g., RAIM) to determine whether GNSS spoofing is present with respect to the calculated GNSS position. If spoofing is detected, an alternative position determining system can be used in lieu of GNSS technology, and alerts can be sent notifying appropriate entities of the spoofing result.

A system is disclosed for determining a physical metric such as position. The system comprises a local signal generator (8) configured to provide a local signal and a receiver (4) configured to receive a signal having properties corresponding to those in a signal transmitted by a trusted remote source. An inertial measurement unit (12) is configured to provide a measured or assumed movement of the receiver. A correlator (6) is configured to provide a correlation signal by correlating the local signal with the received signal. A motion compensation unit (14) is configured to provide motion compensation of at least one of the local signal, the received signal, and the correlation signal based on the measured or assumed movement. A signal analysis unit (16) is configured to determine whether the received signal includes a component received in a direction that is different to a line-of-sight direction between the receiver and the trusted remote source, wherein the determination is based on the correlation signal. Finally, a metric determination unit or positioning unit (20) is configured to determine a physical metric associated with the receiver, such as its position, based on the determination made by the signal analysis unit (16).

A system is disclosed for determining a physical metric such as position. The system comprises a local signal generator (8) configured to provide a local signal and a receiver (4) configured to receive a signal having properties corresponding to those in a signal transmitted by a trusted remote source. An inertial measurement unit (12) is configured to provide a measured or assumed movement of the receiver. A correlator (6) is configured to provide a correlation signal by correlating the local signal with the received signal. A motion compensation unit (14) is configured to provide motion compensation of at least one of the local signal, the received signal, and the correlation signal based on the measured or assumed movement. A signal analysis unit (16) is configured to determine whether the received signal includes a component received in a direction that is different to a line-of-sight direction between the receiver and the trusted remote source, wherein the determination is based on the correlation signal. Finally, a metric determination unit or positioning unit (20) is configured to determine a physical metric associated with the receiver, such as its position, based on the determination made by the signal analysis unit (16).