Techniques are provided for GNSS carrier phase multipath mitigation using a blanked correlator in conjunction with a full correlator. A tracking loop may track a carrier of the GNSS signal utilizing the full correlator. A chip-edge accumulation (CEA) unit of the tracking loop may accumulate chip edges of a ranging code to generate CEA output. A blanked correlator may receive the CEA output to generate blanked correlator values. A running-sum filter may utilize the blanked correlator values to generate a running-sum value. A phase estimate may utilize the running-sum value to generate phase estimator output. In an exemplary embodiment, the blanked correlator operates as a monitoring correlator and the phases estimator output is the estimated carrier phase multipath error. In an exemplary embodiment, the blanked correlator provides input to the tracking loop and discriminator output is subtracted from the phase estimator output to generate the estimated carrier phase multipath error.

A method of and a receiver for mitigating multipath interference in a global navigation satellite system. In accordance with an embodiment, GNSS signals are received from a plurality of satellites in at least two frequency bands. A likelihood indicator is determined which is indicative of how likely the received GNSS signals are affected by multipath interference. In response to the likelihood indicator, all GNSS signals from at least one frequency band of the at least two frequency bands are discounted. The received GNSS signals are processed by taking into account said discounting of all GNSS signals in the at least one frequency band. The discounting may include assigning less weight to the discounted frequency bands or disregarding each of the discounted frequency bands in their entirety.

A method of and a receiver for mitigating multipath interference in a global navigation satellite system. In accordance with an embodiment, GNSS signals are received from a plurality of satellites in at least two frequency bands. A likelihood indicator is determined which is indicative of how likely the received GNSS signals are affected by multipath interference. In response to the likelihood indicator, all GNSS signals from at least one frequency band of the at least two frequency bands are discounted. The received GNSS signals are processed by taking into account said discounting of all GNSS signals in the at least one frequency band. The discounting may include assigning less weight to the discounted frequency bands or disregarding each of the discounted frequency bands in their entirety.

A computer architecture for geolocation spoofing/meaconing detection is disclosed. According to some aspects, a computer accesses an incoming geolocation positioning signal. The computer determines, using a signal characteristics calculation subsystem, geolocation positioning signal characteristics for the incoming geolocation positioning signal. The computer provides, using a geolocation positioning spoofing/meaconing detection subsystem, the geolocation positioning signal characteristics as an input vector to a neural network, wherein the neural network determines whether the incoming geolocation positioning signal is legitimate or fake. If the incoming geolocation positioning signal is determined to be fake: the computer computes, using a Bayesian inference subsystem, a likelihood and a severity of a geolocation positioning technology based attack. The computer provides, as a digital transmission, an indication of whether the incoming geolocation positioning signal is legitimate or fake.

A computer architecture for geolocation spoofing/meaconing detection is disclosed. According to some aspects, a computer accesses an incoming geolocation positioning signal. The computer determines, using a signal characteristics calculation subsystem, geolocation positioning signal characteristics for the incoming geolocation positioning signal. The computer provides, using a geolocation positioning spoofing/meaconing detection subsystem, the geolocation positioning signal characteristics as an input vector to a neural network, wherein the neural network determines whether the incoming geolocation positioning signal is legitimate or fake. If the incoming geolocation positioning signal is determined to be fake: the computer computes, using a Bayesian inference subsystem, a likelihood and a severity of a geolocation positioning technology based attack. The computer provides, as a digital transmission, an indication of whether the incoming geolocation positioning signal is legitimate or fake.

A method is provided for acquiring a signal from a satellite in a global navigation satellite system. The signal includes a pseudorandom code. The method includes, for each time period of a plurality of time periods: generating samples of the signal, segments of the samples of the signal are correlated with a local copy of the pseudorandom code, thereby producing correlation values for the time period. A discrete Fourier transform is performed using, as inputs, the correlation values for the respective time period, thereby producing a frequency representation of the correlation values for the time period. The frequency representations of the correlation values for the plurality of time periods are combined according to a data hypothesis. When a magnitude of the combined frequency representations meets predefined criteria, a frequency corresponding to the magnitude is selected as a tracking frequency for the satellite.

A positioning method is applied to a terminal device that includes a positioning chip and a system on chip (SoC). The method includes receiving, by the positioning chip, a satellite signal transmitted by at least one satellite, obtaining, by the positioning chip using the SoC, a differential correction value sent by a reference station, and performing, by the positioning chip based on a carrier phase differential technology, positioning calculation using the satellite signal and the differential correction value.

A method for detecting the spoofing of a signal from a satellite in orbit. A receiver can be located on an aircraft to receive an apparent satellite signal. The method can include determining at least two characteristic signatures of the signal including a power level, and indicating the apparent satellite signal is a spoofed satellite signal.

A method and system are provided. The method includes receiving, by a GNSS receiver, a GNSS signal, rotating, by a carrier rotator, samples of the GNSS signal with carrier phase inputs, inverting, by a chip matched filter (CMF), the rotated samples, and generating, by the CMF, an output based on the inverted samples.

A method and system are provided. The method includes receiving, by a GNSS receiver, a GNSS signal, rotating, by a carrier rotator, samples of the GNSS signal with carrier phase inputs, inverting, by a chip matched filter (CMF), the rotated samples, and generating, by the CMF, an output based on the inverted samples.