Methods and system for embedding digital watermark information into textual data arranged in a table of cells are provided. A first subset of cells are selected and for each primary cell key and cell partition number are determined. A portion of a digital watermark ID code is embedded at an embedding position determined based on the partition number. Methods and systems for extracting digital watermark information from the textual data are also provided. A cell is fetched from the table and the presence of portion of the digital watermark ID code is determined. A primary cell key and cell partition number are determined. A portion of the digital watermark ID code is extracted at the embedding position within the cell, the embedding position determined based on the cell partition number. The digital watermarking systems and methods provide tracking for unauthorized copying of the data while modifying only a subset of the data.

Examples are disclosed to perform signature matching using noise cancellation models to achieve consensus. Example apparatus disclosed herein include a signature matcher to compare a first stream of monitored media signatures to streams of reference signatures representative of corresponding reference media to determine a first signature match, and compare a second stream of monitored media signatures to the streams of reference signatures to determine a second signature match; a match selector to use at least one the first signature match or the second signature match to identify a first one of the reference media corresponding to the monitored media data; and a creditor interface to output identification data for the first one of the reference media identified with the at least one the first signature match or the second signature match, the identification data to be used to credit a media exposure corresponding to the monitored media.

Methods and systems disclosed herein describe obfuscating plaintext cryptographic material stored in memory. A random location in an obfuscation buffer may be selected for each byte of the plaintext cryptographic material. The location of each byte of the plaintext cryptographic material may be stored in a position tracking buffer. To recover the scrambled plaintext cryptographic material, the location of each byte of the plaintext cryptographic material may be read from the position tracking buffer. Each byte of the plaintext cryptographic material may then be read from the obfuscation buffer and written to a temporary buffer. When each byte of the plaintext cryptographic material is recovered, the plaintext cryptographic material may be used to perform one or more cryptographic operations. The scrambling techniques described herein reduce the likelihood of a malicious user recovering plaintext cryptographic material while stored in memory.

The disclosure concerns implementing, by a cryptographic circuit, a set of substitution operations of a cryptographic process involving a plurality of substitution tables. For each set of substitution operations of the cryptographic process, a series of sets of substitution operations are performed. One set of the series is a real set of substitution operations corresponding to the set of substitution operations of the cryptographic process. One or more other sets are dummy sets of substitution operations, each dummy set being based on a different permutation of said substitution tables.

In various embodiments, a method for performing a lattice-based cryptographic operation is provided. The method includes obtaining a noise polynomial, a secret polynomial and a public polynomial, disguising at least one of the noise polynomial, the secret polynomial and the public polynomial by means of multiplying it with a random blinding polynomial, calculating the sum of the noise polynomial with the product of the public polynomial and the secret polynomial based on the disguised at least one polynomial, and determining a result of the lattice-based cryptographic operation based on the calculated sum of the noise polynomial with the product of the public polynomial and the secret polynomial.

An electronic device for checking a randomness of an identification key device, a random key checker circuit for an electronic device and a method of checking randomness for an electronic device. An electronic device for checking a randomness of an identification key device includes an identification key generator, configured to generate an identification key. A random key checker circuit, configured to receive the identification key from the identification key generator, calculates a randomness value of the identification key according to the identification key for checking a randomness of the identification key and generates an output of the identification key with high randomness.

Some implementations disclosed herein enable matching identifiers across multiple sources. This may involve adding a unique attribute (e.g., anonymous unique homomorphic identifiers) and/or using randomization to enable comparing data from multiple sources, while also maintaining data privacy. In one example, matches across multiple sources are identified, for example, identifying that there are 100 user identifiers that are in private data sets of three different sources. Such matching may be used to enable private, multi-touch attribution. In another example, techniques are used to determine that data maintained by one source is not also within other sources (e.g., identifying that there are 200 user identifiers that are in data from a first source but not in data from a second source and not in data from a third source. Such determinations may be used to generate control group data that does not match data from other sources.

This disclosure describes systems on a chip (SOCs) that prevent side channel attacks (SCAs). An example SoC of this disclosure includes an engine configured to encrypt transmission (Tx) channel data using an encryption operation set configured with a first polynomial, and to decrypt encrypted received (Rx) channel data using a decryption operation set configured with a second polynomial different from the first polynomial. The SoC further includes a security processor configured to multiplex the encryption operation set against the decryption operation set with a varied sequence of selection inputs on a round-by-round basis to generate a mixed sequence of encryption rounds and decryption rounds, and to control the engine to encrypt the Tx channel data and decrypt the encrypted Rx channel data in a combined datapath according to the mixed sequence of encryption rounds and decryption rounds.

A device and method for resisting, non-invasive attacks are disclosed herein. The device includes a random number generator that generates a random number, and a multiplier that multiplies first data and second data in a unit of a bit length determined based on the random number.

A universal tag linked to the content of a data file for protecting the authenticity of the data file and/or the owner/creator of a digital file. The universal tag is linked to the content in the data file via one or more input keys/seeds that are used to generate the universal tag and rely on data associated with the content. Once generated, the universal tag is registered on a distributed ledger of at least on distributed trust computing network, which acts as a source of truth to validate the universal tag and, as such, validate (i) an authenticity of the data file, and/or (ii) the user associated with the data file (e.g., rightful possessor and/or creator of the digital file).