Systems, apparatus, methods, and techniques for functional safe execution of encryption operations are provided. A fault tolerant counter and a complementary pair of encryption flows are provided. The fault tolerant counter may be based on a gray code counter and a hamming distance checker. The complementary pair of encryption flows have different implementations. The output from the complementary pair of encryption flows can be compared, and where different, errors generated.

An information processing apparatus includes a memory storing a program, a system bus, a first control unit configured to read the program via the system bus and judge whether the read program is altered, a second control unit configured to read the program judged as not being altered, from the memory via the system bus and execute the program, and a clock control unit configured to control a frequency of a clock to be supplied to a module included in the first control unit, wherein the clock control unit controls the frequency of the clock in such a manner that the frequency of the clock from a time point at which the first control unit starts reading the program to a time point at which the reading is finished is higher than the frequency of the clock after the judgement about the program.

There is provided a method for testing a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) implemented in a device, said PUF being configured to receive at least one challenge, each challenge comprising a set of bits, and to produce a set of responses, each response comprising at least one bit and corresponding to one challenge, said PUF comprising a circuitry including a set of PUF elements, each PUF element being controlled by at least one input bit corresponding to at least one bit of said challenge, wherein the method comprises the steps of: applying at least one bit of the challenge to the PUF instance; determining (300) identifiers for at least some of the PUF elements, the identifier of each PUF element being determined from the response output by said PUF element in response to said at least one bit of the challenge; applying a statistical randomness test (304) to a group of identifiers comprising at least some of the identifiers determined for said PUF elements, which provides a test indicator; and testing said PUF based on said test indicator.

A system and method for the generation of a trusted polymorphic and distributed unique hardware identifier (ID) are provided. The method includes checking a device for a current ID; selecting a polymorphic policy setting randomly when no current ID is detected, wherein the polymorphic policy setting defines a functionality of at least one function of the device; selecting functional steps of the at least one function randomly, wherein the functional steps are selected from a number of states of a finite-state machine (FSM) used to construct the at least one function; pairing an output DNA mechanism to the at least one function; and generating the unique ID based on the paired DNA mechanism, its structure and its functional operation.

Embodiments of the invention provide a computer-implemented method for managing cryptographic objects in a key management system. This system comprises a set of one or more hardware security modules (HSMs), as well as clients interacting with the HSMs on behalf of users who interact with the clients. The method comprises monitoring, for each HSM of the set, an entropy pool and/or a load at each HSM. The entropy pool of a HSM is the entropy that is available at this HSM for generating cryptographic objects. The load induced at a HSM is the load due to the users interacting with the clients to obtain cryptographic objects. Cryptographic objects are generated, at each HSM, according to the monitored entropy pool and/or load. The extent to which such objects are generated depends on the monitored entropy pool and/or load.

A process for linking a key to a component is disclosed herein along with apparatus that implements the process and related compositions of matter. In various aspects, the key may be a password, hash, key, encryption key, decryption key, seed value, unlock code, or other alphanumeric identifier, and the component includes a computer in networked communication, and may further include a specific user of the computer. The process may include the process step of identifying the component using environmental variables associated with the component, and the process step of forming a representation of the key unique to said component. The representation is tested to determine that the identified component is the source of the representation, in various aspects. Accordingly, the process may include the process step of testing the representation against previous representations thereby determining the representation is not statistically duplicative of previous representations, and the process may include the process step of testing the representation against possible representations from said component where the possible representations are unique to the component.

A method for protecting against faults in a computation of a point multiplication Q=[k]P on an elliptic curve E defined over a prime field .sub.p, including: defining an integer r and a group ={()|/r} represented with elements having a group law that coincides with a group law used in the representation for E(.sub.p) and isomorphic to an additive group (/r).sup.+ through isomorphism ; forming a combined group E(.sub.p)

Methods, systems, and computer programs encoded on computer storage medium, for identifying a virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) that includes a plurality of components; identifying a secure boot state of each of the components; aggregating the secure boot state of each of the components to define an aggregated secure boot state of the VDI; comparing the aggregated secure boot state of the VDI with a secure boot lookup table to identify a measure of trust of the VDI; identifying access control policies for the VDI for the identified measure of trust of the VDI; and enabling access to one or more resources based on the identified access control policies for the VDI.

The embodiments herein are directed to a technique for providing secure communication between nodes of a network environment or within a node of the network using a verified virtual trusted platform module (TPM) of each node. The verified virtual TPM illustratively emulates a hardware TPM device to provide software key management of cryptographic keys used to provide the secure communication over a computer network of the network environment. Illustratively, the verified virtual TPM is configured to enforce a security policy of a trusted code base (TCB) that includes the virtual TPM. Trustedness denotes a predetermined level of confidence that the security property is demonstrated by the verified virtual TPM. The predetermined level of confidence is based on an assurance (i.e., grounds) that the verified virtual TPM demonstrates the security property. Trustedness of the virtual TPM may be verified by subjecting the virtual TPM to enhanced verification analysis configured to ensure conformance to an operational model with an appropriate level of confidence over an appropriate range of activity. The operational model may then be configured to analyze conformance to the security property. A combination of conformance by the virtual TPM to the operational model and to the security property provides assurance (i.e., grounds) for the level of confidence and, thus, verifies trustedness.

A method including receiving, by a cryptographic operation chip, a cryptographic operation request; measuring, by the cryptographic operation chip, cryptographic operation algorithm firmware by using a cryptographic operation measurement root to obtain a first measurement result, and sending, by the cryptographic operation chip, the obtained first measurement result to a security chip; receiving, by the cryptographic operation chip, a comparison result fed back by the security chip, wherein the comparison result is a result determined by the security chip and indicating whether the first measurement result is the same as a second measurement result stored in advance; and performing, by the cryptographic operation chip, a cryptographic operation when the comparison result indicates that the first measurement result is the same as the second measurement result. The present disclosure solves the technical problem that cryptographic operation algorithm firmware cannot be measured and consequently the credibility of cryptographic operations is low.