Patent classifications
H01L23/576
MRAM-BASED CHIP IDENTIFICATION WITH FREE RANDOM PROGRAMMING
A magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM) device having chip identification using normal operating voltages is provided. No dedicated programming is needed. Instead, programming of the MRAM device is free and random and is a result of providing a magnetic via structure sufficiently close to the magnetic free layer of the magnetic junction tunnel (MTJ) structure such that the magnetic via structure projects a magnetic field that interacts with the magnetic free layer and aligns the magnetization of the magnetic free layer with the magnetization of the magnetic via structure. Thus, the orientation of the magnetization of both the magnetic via structure and the magnetic free layer are aligned in a same direction. The magnetization of the magnetic via structure can thus be used as a physical unclonable function and the MTJ structure can be used to read out this information.
Packaging techniques for backside mesh connectivity
The embodiments herein are directed to technologies for backside security meshes of semiconductor packages. One package includes a substrate having a first interconnect terminal of a first type and a second interconnect terminal of a second type. The package also includes a first security mesh structure disposed on a first side of an integrated circuit die and a conductive path coupled between the first interconnect terminal and the second interconnect terminal. The first security mesh structure is coupled to the first interconnect terminal and the second interconnect terminal being coupled to a terminal on a second side of the integrated circuit die.
PROTECTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR ELEMENTS FOR BONDED STRUCTURES
A bonded structure with protective semiconductor elements including a semiconductor element with active circuitry and a protective element including an obstructive layer and/or a protective circuitry layer. The obstructive layer is configured to inhibit external access to at least a portion of the active circuitry. The protective circuitry layer is configured to detect or disrupt external access to the protective element and/or the active circuitry of the semiconductor element. The semiconductor element and the protective element are directly bonded without an adhesive along a bonding interface.
Physically unclonable function device, method and apparatus
A physically unclonable function (PUF) device 1 capable of exhibiting a unique quantum mechanical effect as a result of quantum mechanical confinement exhibited by the device 1. The device 1 comprises a group IV semiconductor heterostructure. The group IV semiconductor heterostructure may comprise Silicon/Germanium. The device 1 may comprise a group IV semiconductor resonant tunnelling diode (RTD). A Si-integrated circuit, method, use, and apparatus are also provided.
SEMICONDUCTOR STRUCTURE
A semiconductor structure serves to generate a physical unclonable function (PUF) code. The semiconductor structure includes a metal layer, N Titanium (Ti) structures, and N Titanium Nitride (Ti-N) structures, where N is a positive integer. The metal layer forms N metal structures. The Ti structures are respectively formed on one end of each metal structure. The Ti-N structures are respectively formed on top of the Ti structures. The metal structures and the corresponding Ti structures and the corresponding Ti-N structures respectively form a plurality of pillars. The pillars respectively provide a plurality of resistance values, and the resistance values serve to generate the PUF code.
MULTI CHIP HARDWARE SECURITY MODULE
A laminate carrier-like module lid including multiple laminate layers of non-conductive materials stacked one atop another, sensor circuitry embedded within the laminate carrier-like module lid, the sensor circuitry providing a continuous electrical circuit surrounding the electronic components of the multi-chip module package, and thermal circuitry embedded within the laminate carrier-like module lid, the thermal circuitry comprising solid copper traces to thermally conduct heat from the electronic components of the multi-chip module package.
METHOD OF DETECTING A POSSIBLE THINNING OF A SUBSTRATE OF AN INTEGRATED CIRCUIT VIA THE REAR FACE THEREOF, AND ASSOCIATED DEVICE
A semiconductor substrate includes a buried semiconductor layer and semiconductor wells. A device for detecting a possible thinning of the semiconductor substrate via the rear face thereof is formed on and in the semiconductor wells. The device is a non-inverting buffer including an input terminal and an output terminal, the device being powered between a supply terminal and a reference terminal where the buried semiconductor layer provides the supply terminal. A control circuit delivers an input signal in a first state to the input terminal and outputs a control signal indicating a detection of a thinning of the substrate if a signal generated at the output terminal in response to the input signal is in a second state different from the first state.
RRAM DEVICE AS PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION DEVICE AND MANUFACTURING METHOD
A resistive random access memory array includes a plurality of memory cells. Each memory cell includes a gate all around transistor and a resistor device. The resistor device includes a first electrode including a plurality of conductive nanosheets. The resistor device includes a high-K resistive element surrounds the conductive nanosheets. The resistor device includes a second electrode separated from the conductive nanosheets by the resistive element. The resistive random access memory array is used to generate physical unclonable function data.
Process of realization on a plate of a plurality of chips, each with an individualization area
A method for producing a plurality of chips each comprising an individualisation region, each chip comprising at least: a first and a second level of the electrical tracks, and an interconnections level comprising vias. The method includes producing on the dielectric layer covering the first level a mask having openings located in line with the electrical tracks and making the dielectric layer accessible. The method includes producing, in a region of the chip comprising the individualisation region, patterns conformed so that: first openings of the hard mask are not masked by the patterns, and second openings of the hard mask are masked by the patterns. The method includes producing via openings in the dielectric layer in line solely with the first openings. The method further includes filling in the via openings with an electrically conductive material, and producing the second level of the electrical tracks on the vias.
Side-channel attack mitigation for secure devices with embedded sensors
Embodiments include cryptographic circuits having isolated operation with respect to embedded sensor operations to mitigate side-channel attacks. A cryptographic circuit, a sensor, and an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuit are integrated into an integrated circuit along with a cryptographic circuit. A sensed signal is output with the sensor, and the sensed signal is converted to digital data using the ADC circuit. Further, cryptographic data is generated using one or more secret keys and the cryptographic circuit. The generation of the cryptographic data has isolated operation with respect to the operation of the sensor and the ADC circuit. The isolated operation mitigates side-channel attacks. The isolated operation can be achieved using power supply, clock, and/or reset circuits for the cryptographic circuit that are electrically isolated from similar circuits for the sensor and ADC circuit. The isolated operation can also be achieved using time-division multiplex operations. Other variations can also be implemented.