H01L23/576

Die package having security features

Methods and apparatus for providing an assembly including a base substrate, a lid substrate, and a ring frame between the base substrate and the lid substrate to define a protected volume, where the ring frame includes through vias. A die may be contained in the protected volume. Sensor circuitry can include conductive pillars in the protected volume and the die can include circuity to determine an impedance of the pad and the pillars for tamper detection. An edge cap can be coupled to at least one side of the assembly for tamper detection.

Snooping detection between silicon elements in a circuit
09846187 · 2017-12-19 · ·

An electronic circuit with protection against eavesdropping, including a first circuit element embedded in the electronic circuit, a second circuit element embedded in the electronic circuit, one or more connection lines between the first circuit element and the second circuit element, a first monitoring unit in the first circuit element for measuring capacitance of at least one of the connection lines between the first circuit element and the second circuit element, wherein the first monitoring unit is configured to identify changes in capacitance of the connection lines and to initiate actions to prevent eavesdropping in response to identifying changes.

PROTECTIVE SEMICONDUCTOR ELEMENTS FOR BONDED STRUCTURES

A bonded structure with protective semiconductor elements including a semiconductor element with active circuitry and a protective element including an obstructive layer and/or a protective circuitry layer. The obstructive layer is configured to inhibit external access to at least a portion of the active circuitry. The protective circuitry layer is configured to detect or disrupt external access to the protective element and/or the active circuitry of the semiconductor element. The semiconductor element and the protective element are directly bonded without an adhesive along a bonding interface.

SECURITY CIRCUITRY FOR BONDED STRUCTURES
20220373593 · 2022-11-24 ·

A bonded structure is disclosed. The bonded structure can include a first semiconductor element having a first front side and a first back side opposite the first front side. The bonded structure can include a second semiconductor element having a second front side and a second back side opposite the second front side, the first front side of the first semiconductor element directly bonded to the second front side of the second semiconductor element along a bond interface without an adhesive. The bonded structure can include security circuitry extending across the bond interface, the security circuitry electrically connected to the first and second semiconductor elements

ELECTRONIC DEVICE HAVING A PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTION IDENTIFIER

Electronic device comprising at least: a plurality of MOSFET FD-SOI type transistors among which the first transistors are such that each first transistor comprises a channel in which a concentration of the same type of dopants as those present in the source and drain of said first transistor is greater than the concentration in the channel of each of the other transistors in said plurality of transistors; and an identification circuit capable of determining a unique identifier of the electronic device starting from at least one intrinsic electrical characteristic of each of the first transistors, the value of which depends at least partly on the conductance of said first transistor; and in which the length of a gate of each of the first transistors is less than or equal to about 20 nm.

TAMPER-PROOF ELECTRONIC PACKAGES WITH STRESSED GLASS COMPONENT SUBSTRATE(S)

Tamper-proof electronic packages and fabrication methods are provided which include a glass substrate. The glass substrate is stressed glass with a compressively-stressed surface layer. Further, one or more electronic components are secured to the glass substrate within a secure volume of the tamper-proof electronic package. In operation, the glass substrate is configured to fragment with an attempted intrusion event into the electronic package, and the fragmenting of the glass substrate also fragments the electronic component(s) secured to the glass substrate, thereby destroying the electronic component(s). In certain implementations, the glass substrate has undergone ion-exchange processing to provide the stressed glass. Further, the electronic package may include an enclosure, and the glass substrate may be located within the secure volume separate from the enclosure, or alternatively, the enclosure may be a stressed glass enclosure, an inner surface of which is the glass substrate for the electronic component(s).

SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PHYSICALLY DETECTING COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS

A system for inspecting or screening electrically powered device includes a signal generator inputting a preselected signal into the electrically powered device. There is also an antenna array positioned at a pre-determined distance above the electrically powered device. Apparatus collects RF energy emitted by the electrically powered device in response to input of said preselected signal. The signature of the collected RF energy is compared with an RF energy signature of a genuine part. The comparison determines one of a genuine or counterfeit condition of the electrically powered device.

ELECTRONIC CHIP
20170301635 · 2017-10-19 ·

An electronic chip including: a plurality of first semiconductor bars of a first conductivity type and of second semiconductor bars of a second conductivity type arranged alternately and contiguously on a region of the first conductivity type; two detection contacts arranged at the ends of each second bar; a circuit for detecting the resistance between the detection contacts of each second bar; insulating trenches extending in the second bars down to a first depth between circuit elements; and insulating walls extending across the entire width of each second bar down to a second depth greater than the first depth.

Secure integrated-circuit systems
11670602 · 2023-06-06 · ·

A method of making a secure integrated-circuit system comprises providing a first integrated circuit in a first die having a first die size and providing a second integrated circuit in a second die. The second die size is smaller than the first die size. The second die is transfer printed onto the first die and connected to the first integrated circuit, forming a compound die. The compound die is packaged. The second integrated circuit is operable to monitor the operation of the first integrated circuit and provides a monitor signal responsive to the operation of the first integrated circuit. The first integrated circuit can be constructed in an insecure facility and the second integrated circuit can be constructed in a secure facility.

Bulk thinning detector
09754901 · 2017-09-05 · ·

In one embodiment, a semiconductor device comprises: a bulk comprising a bulk material characterized by a potential designated as a ground, and a bulk thinning detector being a section of the bulk that includes one or more conducting materials. The bulk thinning detector is adapted to be connected to the ground when a part of the bulk material is underneath and contiguous with a portion of the one or more conducting materials in the section. The semiconductor device further comprises: one more electronic components in at least one active layer of the semiconductor device, the one or more electronic components and the bulk thinning detector being included in a circuit for detecting whether there is backside thinning of the semiconductor device by detecting whether at least one of: the bulk thinning detector is disconnected from the ground, or there is a change in resistance of the bulk thinning detector.