A process for an electronically steerable parasitic array (ESPAR) antenna includes operating the ESPAR antenna with a receiver in Normal Mode until an internal flag is generated by the receiver indicating jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, causing the ESPAR antenna to switch to Anti-jam Mode. Anti-jam Mode includes a Search Mode and a Track Mode. The ESPAR antenna is steered in Search Mode, causing the ESPAR antenna to beam in a circular pattern to locate a spatial direction of the jamming RF noise, identify the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise preventing Normal Mode operation, and place a null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise. The ESPAR antenna switches to Track Mode to maintain the null in the spatial direction of the jamming RF noise until the jamming RF noise is not present. The ESPAR antenna then returns to operating in Normal Mode.

Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for detecting spoofing of a navigation device. A plurality of anti-spoofing techniques are provided. The plurality of anti-spoofing techniques detect interference with data provided by one or more navigation devices for a plurality of threat situations. Positioning, timing and frequency characteristics associated with the one or more navigation devices are analyzed in order to identify a threat situation among the plurality of threat situations. Based on the identified threat situation one or more of the anti-spoofing techniques are executed. The one or more anti-spoofing techniques can be executed in parallel in order to provide various anti-spoofing detection techniques at the same time.

A system to provide privacy from third party vehicles includes a radio circuit configured to send a privacy indication in a beacon frame; and a movable device including a radio circuit to receive the beacon frame and a motor actuator controlled to comply with the privacy indication.

Methods and apparatus for detecting, geo-locating and/or classifying a GPS or GNSS jamming signal are disclosed. One such method comprises the steps of analysing a spectrogram of the jamming signal using a tree-based decision process and as a result, then selecting one of a number of types of jamming signal, wherein one of the decisions (1103) in the tree is whether the spectrogram has spectral periodicity.

A drone defense system having a mast assembly with a telescoping mast is provided. The drone defense system includes a housing rotatably coupled to a top portion of the telescoping mast. The housing has a flying drone tracking system and a flying drone countermeasure system. The drone defense system includes a computer that communicates with the flying drone tracking system and the flying drone countermeasure system. The flying drone tracking system detects a flying drone within a predetermined distance from the housing and generates a detection signal in response to detecting the flying drone. The computer receives the detection signal and generates a first control signal in response to the detection signal. The flying drone countermeasure system transmits an RF jamming signal in response to the first control signal.

Disclosed herein are system, method, and computer program product embodiments for adapting to malware activity on a compromised computer system by detecting timing anomalies between timing signals. An embodiment operates by analyzing first timing data accessed from a validated source and second timing data accessed from an unvalidated receiver source in order to compute a threat detection value, which is utilized to determine if there is a discrepancy or anomaly in the timing or frequency of either the validated and unvalidated sources.

An anti-drone weapon having a housing and at least one antenna positioned within the housing. The at least one antenna capable of operating at a frequency at least between 400 MHz and 6 GHz. In some configurations, a power supply, processor and control circuitry and a control panel, within the housing. In some configurations, the at least one antenna includes three antenna, including, a double helical antenna, a quasi-yagi antenna and a log-periodic antenna.

Disclosed is a low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle surveillance system. According to an embodiment, monitoring is performed using a balloon main body filled with gas and staying in the air; radar; camera units being provided outside the balloon main body, and including a camera taking an image of a subject; radio frequency detectors; and sound detectors and correspondingly, interceptor means is included. As interceptor means, a jammer, a jamming gun, and a spoofing device corresponding to jamming are disclosed.

Systems and methods for GNSS anti-jamming using interference cancellation are described herein. In certain embodiments, a system includes an antenna that receives signals, wherein the signals comprise a weak portion associated with one or more GNSS satellites and a strong interference portion from an interfering signal source. The system also includes a GNSS anti-jammer. The GNSS anti-jammer includes an interference isolator that receives the received signals and provides an estimated strong interference portion as an output. The GNSS anti-jammer also includes a summer that subtracts the estimated strong interference portion from the received signals to create a summed signal. Further, the GNSS anti -jammer includes a local noise remover that removes noise generated by the interference isolator from the summed signal, wherein the local noise remover is a processor that digitally removes the noise. Further, the system includes a GNSS receiver coupled to receive the summed signal from the processor.

The present disclosure relates to a controller (10) for a counter measure system against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the controller (10) comprising a display device (18) and a processor configured to: receive target position data indicative of a position of a target UAV; receive effector position data indicative of a position of at least one counter measure effectors (12, 14); receive effector orientation data indicative of an orientation of the at least one counter measure effector (12, 14) relative to geographic cardinal directions; determine a field of effect (30, 32) of the at least one counter measure effector on the basis of the effector position data and the effector orientation data, said field (30, 32) of effect being indicative of an area covered by electromagnetic radiation emitted, in use, by the at least one counter measure effector; and, generate a display signal for displaying, on the display device, the position of the target UAV with respect to the field of effect (30, 32) of the at least one counter measure effector (12, 14).