H04L9/065

WATERMARKING OF GENOMIC SEQUENCING DATA

Examples are described for dynamically applying a digital watermark to a file, such as a dataset of genomic sequencing data. In one example, a method of dynamically applying a watermark to at least a portion of a file includes generating, using a secret key, a first random seed, generating, using the first random seed, an ordered pseudorandom set of integers, generating, using entity information and timing information, a second random seed, selecting, using the second random seed, a subset of the ordered pseudorandom set of integers, and modifying data at data locations in the file corresponding to at least a portion of the identifiers included in the subset to generate a watermarked file. The method may further include performing a check to determine whether the watermark is present in a file using a sequence of watermark elements that are generated based on the secret key.

Efficient deduplication using block-based convergent encryption

Systems and methods are described for providing secure storage of data sets while enabling efficient deduplication of data. Each data set can be divided into fixed-length blocks. The plaintext of each block can be convergently encrypted, such as by using a hash of the plaintext as an encryption key, to result in block-level ciphertext that can be stored. If two data sets share blocks, the resulting block-level ciphertext can be expected to overlap, and thus duplicative block-level ciphertexts need not be stored. A manifest can be created to facilitate re-creation of the data set, which manifest identifies the block-level ciphertexts of the data set and a key by which each block-level ciphertext was encrypted. By use of block-level encryption, nearly identical data sets can be largely deduplicated, even if they are not perfectly identical.

Secure communication between a contact lens and an accessory device

Described herein are systems and methods that allow for secure wireless communication between a contact lens system and an accessory device to protect sensitive data and prevent unauthorized access to confidential information. In certain embodiments, tampering attempts by potential attackers are thwarted by using a Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) circuit that is immune to reverse engineering. In addition, sensors monitor a to-be-protected electronic device to detect tampering attempts and physical attacks to ensure the physical integrity of the communication system.

SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION DELINEATION
20230011742 · 2023-01-12 ·

Decoding a partially encrypted data stream may include receiving and scanning the partially encrypted data stream. Scanning the partially encrypted data stream may include identifying an encrypted portion sentinel in the partially encrypted data stream subsequent to a first portion, identifying an encrypted portion in the partially encrypted data stream subsequent to the encrypted portion sentinel, and generating a decrypted data portion by decrypting the encrypted portion. Decrypting the encrypted portion may include identifying an encrypted data portion in the encrypted portion, the encrypted data portion omitting an end encrypted portion sentinel, decrypting the encrypted data portion, and identifying an end encrypted portion sentinel in the encrypted portion subsequent to the encrypted data portion. Decoding the partially encrypted data stream may include including the decrypted data portion in the decrypted output data stream, and outputting the decrypted output data stream to a client device in the second network domain.

Compact key with reusable common key for encryption

Techniques for secure public exposure of digital data include extracting first digital data comprising one or more batches, each batch comprising a plurality of no more than a number T of packets, each packet containing a plurality of a number n of bits. A random binary matrix A consisting of T rows and n columns is generated. For a first batch, a first random n-bit temporary key is generated. For a packet in the first batch, a first packet vector key is generated based on random non-overlapping pairs of bit positions for both the temporary key and for a first packet-corresponding row of matrix A. An encrypted packet is generated for the packet based on the packet and the first packet vector key. The encrypted packet is exposed publicly.

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR STATE MACHINE SECURITY DEVICE
20180007047 · 2018-01-04 ·

A security device may be utilized to provide security measures to an electronic device that may incorporate the security device or be coupled to it. The security measures may comprise authentication (e.g., authentication of devices, users, or activities), and/or encryption measures (e.g., encrypting or decrypting exchanged data). A transaction or access via the security device may be authenticated by communicating an authentication request by the security device to an authentication server, which may generate, in response, a sequence of information requests that are sent to the security device. The security device may then generate, in response, a sequence of responses that are sent to the authentication server, with the sequence of responses comprising a sequence of reported values each of which are unique. The authentication server may then authenticate the security device based on comparing of the sequence of reported values with a sequence of expected values that identifies the security device.

CACHING AND DELIVERING MEDIA CONTENT FROM MULTIPLE STREAMING PROVIDERS
20230006810 · 2023-01-05 ·

In a system and method for distribution of media content, a cable provider gateway cooperates with a broker API, one or more streaming provider gateways, and one or more streaming applications to locally cache and display media content from the streaming provider gateways even when the streaming applications do not have connectivity to their gateways.

High definition secure playback with downloadable DRM for android platforms

A Trustonic DRM Plug-in is provided that can be downloaded and operate in conjunction with an Android framework. The solution also includes a PVP with the downloadable DRM. The system includes components that can be added by Trustonic based on the Android 4.3 Framework in addition to current t-base 300 that can be used by any DRM vendor. The system enables the DRM to be downloaded in the field since all DRMs could use the standard API services of the Android 4.3 OS. With a codec component employed like H.264 or HEVC that can use the PVP with the downloaded DRM component, the Android video player can use the component to satisfy HD content security requirements.

Replica: an improved communication concealment cipher
11716192 · 2023-08-01 ·

Replica is an encryption algorithm where security is based on lavish use of randomness rather than on mathematical complexity and the cipher is decoy-tolerant, namely it can readily distinguish between bona fide ciphertext bits and randomized meaningless bits. This attribute allows its users to project as much security as they care by mixing the message bits with more and more decoy bits. It also allows its user to conceal their pattern of communication in a fixed rate of message bit flow.

Systems And Methods For Encrypted Content Management
20230231709 · 2023-07-20 · ·

Systems and methods for encrypted content management are provided and include generating a user private key, a user public key, and a symmetric encryption key. A group private key, a group public key, and a group symmetric encryption key are generated and the group private key is encrypted with the group symmetric encryption key. A first shared-secret key is generated based on the user public key and the group private key using a diffie-hellman exchange algorithm. The group symmetric encryption key is encrypted using the first shared-secret key to generate an escrow key. Plaintext data is encrypted using a content symmetric key. A second shared-secret key is generated based on an ephemeral private key and the group public key using a diffie-hellman exchange algorithm. The content symmetric key is encrypted using the second shared-secret key.