An actuating mechanism includes a target, a smasher, an elastic component, and a blocker. The smasher is movably disposed at a side of the target. The elastic component is configured to provide an elastic force to drive the smasher to move toward the target. The blocker is movably disposed corresponding to the smasher. When the blocker contacts the smasher, the blocker clamps the smasher. When the blocker is moved to a position where the clamping to the smasher is released, the smasher is driven by the elastic force to move toward and smash the target. An electronic device is also provided.

A chip tampering detector is disclosed. The chip tampering detector includes a plurality of resistor-capacitor circuits. Each resistor-capacitor circuit includes a capacitor having a planar area that covers a sensitive area of an integrated circuit of the chip. The resistor-capacitor circuits can be probed with an input signal to generate output signals. The output signals can be measured to determine respective time-constants resistor-capacitor circuits. Tampering with a chip can alter the capacitance of a capacitor covering a sensitive area. Accordingly, a significant change of a time-constant of one or more of the resistor-capacitor circuits can be used to detect chip tampering.

The invention relates to a device for checking whether a package has been opened or not, comprising at least one package (10), at least one electronic unit (18), at least one battery (12) which supplies the electronic unit (18) with energy, at least one display (14) which can be controlled by the electronic unit (18), said electronic unit (18), the battery (12) and the display (14) being arranged on the package (10). At least two contact tracks (23, 24) and/or electrodes (26, 28) and/or at least one strain sensor (25) are provided as means for detecting whether the package (10) has been opened or not.

Tamper-respondent assemblies and methods of fabrication are provided which include at least one tamper-respondent sensor and a detector. The at least one tamper-respondent sensor includes conductive lines which form, at least in part, at least one tamper-detect network of the tamper-respondent sensor(s). The detector monitors the tamper-respondent sensor(s) by applying an electrical signal to the conductive lines of the at least one tamper-respondent sensor to monitor for a non-linear conductivity change indicative of a tamper event at the tamper-respondent sensor(s). For instance, the detector may monitor a second harmonic of the electrical signal applied to the conductive lines for the non-linear conductivity change indicative of the tamper event, such as an attempted shunt of one or more conductive lines of the tamper-respondent sensor(s).

In various embodiments, a chip card module is provided. The chip card module includes a chip card module contact array having six contact pads that are arranged in two rows having three contact pads each in accordance with ISO 7816, and three additional contact pads that are arranged between the two rows. Each additional contact pad is electrically conductively connected to a respective associated contact pad from a row from the two rows.

A cable seal is provided for attachment to a cable connector. The cable seal generally includes a base portion and a breakaway portion. The breakaway includes a tooth which is positioned under the cable release lever to prevent removal of the cable connector from a communications port. If removal of the cable seal is desired, a breakaway portion of the cable seal is permanently detached from the remainder of the cable seal evidencing access to the port has been gained.

A security device in an electronic device which protects against unauthorized disassembly includes light sources, a plurality of photosensitive elements, a detection unit, a storage unit, a processor, and light guiding devices. Light conducting channels are provided between the light sources and the induction elements. Barrier objects that block light are installed at certain first light guiding channels of the light guiding channels, and are removed from the first light conducting channels when the electronic device is disassembled, so that induction signals output by the photosensitive elements are changed from the model or original digitally-recorded signals.

A circuit board enclosure comprises a circuit breaker, platform, base, cover, and circuit board. The circuit breaker includes two conductors and a plate, which is connected to the conductors. The platform receives the circuit breaker. The base has a bottom member and an opening arranged in the bottom member. The base receives the platform with the circuit breaker such that the plate of the circuit breaker is accommodated substantially within the opening of the bottom member. The cover is configured to cover the base and form an interior space. The interior space accommodates the platform, the circuit breaker, and the circuit board. The circuit board is connected to the circuit breaker. The circuit board enclosure can be adhered to a substantially planar surface. The plate is configured such that removal of the circuit board enclosure from the substantially planar surface will damage the connection of the plate to the conductors.

Tamper-proof electronic packages and fabrication methods are provided which include a glass enclosure enclosing, at least in part, at least one electronic component within a secure volume, and a tamper-respondent detector. The glass enclosure includes stressed glass with a compressively-stressed surface layer, and the tamper-respondent detector monitors, at least in part, the stressed glass to facilitate defining the secure volume. The stressed glass fragments with an attempted intrusion event through the stressed glass, and the tamper-respondent detector detects the fragmenting of the stressed glass. In certain embodiments, the stressed glass may be a machined glass enclosure that has undergone ion-exchange processing, and the compressively-stressed surface layer of the stressed glass may be compressively-stressed to ensure that the stressed glass fragments into glass particles of fragmentation size less than 1000 μm with the intrusion event.

Tamper-proof electronic packages and fabrication methods are provided which include a glass substrate. The glass substrate is stressed glass with a compressively-stressed surface layer. Further, one or more electronic components are secured to the glass substrate within a secure volume of the tamper-proof electronic package. In operation, the glass substrate is configured to fragment with an attempted intrusion event into the electronic package, and the fragmenting of the glass substrate also fragments the electronic component(s) secured to the glass substrate, thereby destroying the electronic component(s). In certain implementations, the glass substrate has undergone ion-exchange processing to provide the stressed glass. Further, the electronic package may include an enclosure, and the glass substrate may be located within the secure volume separate from the enclosure, or alternatively, the enclosure may be a stressed glass enclosure, an inner surface of which is the glass substrate for the electronic component(s).