A consent block is a type of block that may be stored in a blockchain. Each consent block has an owner and may store an owner consent contract, i.e., a smart contract containing owner-specified access rules that determine who may access data assets that are stored in other blocks of the blockchain and owned by the same owner. The consent block may alternatively store a global consent contract containing global access rules that supersede owner-specified access rules. The consent block also stores a hash value determined from the consent contract and a previous hash value of the block immediately preceding the consent block. The consent contract and the position of the consent block in the blockchain are verifiable from the hash value. Each consent block, once added to the blockchain, becomes part of the immutable record of data stored in the blockchain, and therefore leaves an auditable trail.

A computer-implemented security may be implemented on a blockchain comprising applying a one-way function to a first secret value to create a first veiled secret value; communicating the first veiled secret value to a user; receiving a second veiled secret value from the user, wherein the second veiled secret value is created by applying a one-way function to the second secret value; and constructing a first blockchain transaction comprising the first veiled secret value and the second veiled secret value, the first blockchain transaction arranged to be unlockable to transfer control of a first resource upon provision of both the first secret value and the second secret value to a respective blockchain transaction.

A computer security lock having separate key pairs includes an encryption board inserted between a main board and a hard disk, and an encryption board being inserted into the encryption board to perform a real-time authentication process. The electronic key and the encryption board performs the real-time authentication process and hardware anti-copy self-testing process, and encrypt the data communicated between the encryption board and the electronic key. After passing the authentication process and the hardware anti-copy self-testing process, the electronic key combines an internally stored key list with the key list on the encryption board, and selects a user key to encrypt/decrypt the data on the disk according to the partition of the hard disk where the encrypted data is written to. The computer security lock can assure the safety of the data, and the hardware is prevented from being copied.

An electronic device is disclosed. The electronic device includes a memory configured to store at least one instruction, and store homomorphic ciphertexts storing a plurality of variable data in an encrypted state in plurality, and a processor configured to execute at least one instruction, and the processor is configured to generate, by executing the at least one instruction, number data corresponding to a variable combination by using a bin mask having different variable data classified for each of the homomorphic ciphertexts based on an operation instruction on the plurality of homomorphic ciphertexts being received.

A message is embedded within an entropy stream. The message is encrypted using a onetime pad (OTP) and thus looks like part of the entropy string since the OTP encrypted messages is, as long as the “pad” material and message content are known, itself random to the observer. The encrypted message contains information used to identify and/or point to relevant information in another part of the entropy stream. For example, the OTP-encrypted message may indicate the number of units of the message, and point to a position in another part of the stream where another message is located. The stream may be randomly and deterministically expanded. Other techniques encrypt a stream using standard encryption, the stream comprising messages that are deterministically OTP encrypted; expand said encryption using a byte vector/array of randomness including at least one random vector; periodically swap out at least one member from the vector; hide vector random bytes in messages and/or using the messages to direct which bytes to remove from the stream of randomness/entropy; and store a stash of randomness separately from the messages and/or pull off the random/entropy stream as directed by the messages. By using true random and determinism, we create a method of generate a known pool of randomness that, if intercepted, cannot be discovered through mathematical analysis.

The foundation of Matrix Encryption is a discrete function called the Modified Combinatorial Batch Decimation Function (CBDF-Mod) and its asymmetric inverse (CBDI-Mod). Herein we disclose the nature of Matrix Encryption, an encryption technology built upon these two discrete functions, together with their shared, Secondary Variable Functions. Matrix Encryption implements a block encryption with arbitrary block size dependent upon the length of text to be encrypted, thereby allowing for keys of user desired length and for the surpassing of industry standards of security. A Master Key may be used to generate a Key Set containing keys of appropriate length for any data presented above a minimum length, up to a length corresponding to the length of a message for which the Master Key is appropriate. Matrix Encryption reads and writes numerically encrypted text to text files as designated by the user.

The present disclosure relates to highly secure, high speed encryption methodologies suitable for applications such as media streaming, streamed virtual private network (VPN) services, large file transfers and the like. For example, encryption methodologies as described herein can provide stream ciphers for streaming data from, for example, a media service provider to a plurality of users. Certain configurations provide wire speed single use encryption. The methodologies as described herein are suited for use with blockchain (e.g. Bitcoin) technologies.

Methods and apparatus for the scrambling of control symbols. In one embodiment, the control symbols are associated with an HDMI interface, and the methods and apparatus are configured to scramble the symbols to as to mitigate the effects of electromagnetic interference (EMI) created by the transmission of otherwise unscrambled sequences of symbols which may contain significant “clock pattern” or other undesirable artifact.

A computer-implemented method is disclosed. The method includes: receiving, via a computing device in a locked state, input of a first PIN; determining that the first PIN is associated with a first cryptographic key that is stored in a memory; responsive to determining that the first PIN is associated with the first cryptographic key, retrieving, from the memory, an encrypted form of a first credential that is associated with the first cryptographic key; recovering the first credential from the encrypted form using the first cryptographic key; and causing the computing device to be unlocked using the recovered first credential.

Plurality of users share a common key while permitting change of members sharing the common key and computational complexity required for key exchange is reduced. R.sub.i and c.sub.i are computed based on a twisted pseudo-random function in a first key generation step. sid is generated based on a target-collision resistant hash function and (sid, R.sub.α, R.sub.β) is transmitted to communication devices U.sub.i in a session ID generation step. T.sub.1 and T′ are computed based on a pseudo-random function in a representative second key generation step. T.sub.j is computed based on the pseudo-random function in a general second key generation step. k′ is computed based on the twisted pseudo-random function and T′.sub.j is computed with respect to each j in a third key generation step. K.sub.1.sup.l and k.sub.1 are computed in a first session key generation step. A common key K.sub.2 is generated based on the pseudo-random function in a second session key generation step.