A value corresponding to an input for a cryptographic operation may be received. The value may blinded by multiplying the value based on an exponentiation of a random number raised to an exponent value that is associated with a public key. A cryptographic operation may be performed based on the blinded value.

A method and a system for encryption and decryption based on continuous-variable quantum neural network CVQNN. The method includes: updating a weight of the CVQNN with a training sample; triggering, by a sender, a legal measurement bases synchronization between the sender and the CVQNN; converting, by the sender, the information to be sent into a quadratic plaintext according to the synchronized measurement bases, and sending the quadratic plaintext to the CVQNN; encrypting, by the CVQNN, a received quadratic plaintext, and sending an encrypted quadratic plaintext to a receiver; after receiving the encrypted quadratic plaintext, sending by the receiver the encrypted quadratic plaintext to the CVQNN for decryption to obtain decrypted information. The embodiments implement data encryption and decryption by introducing CVQNN model and synchronization measurement technology. The embodiments provide advantages of high reliability, high security and easy realization.

A system, method and computer-readable storage medium with instructions for protecting an electronic device against fault attack. The technology includes operating the electronic device to determine two half-size exponents, dp and dq, from the exponent d; to split the base m into two sub-bases mp and mq determined from the base m; and to iteratively compute a decryption result S by repeatedly multiplying an accumulator A by m, mp, mq or 1 depending on the values of the i-th bit of dp and dq for each iteration I′. Other systems and methods are disclosed.

Disclosed herein is an apparatus for calculating a cryptographic component R.sup.2 mod n for a cryptographic function, where n is a modulo number and R is a constant greater than n. The apparatus comprises a processor configured to set a start value to be equal to R mod n, perform b iterations of a shift and subtract operation on the start value to produce a base value, wherein the start value is set to be equal to the base value after each iteration, set a multiplication operand to be equal to the base value, and perform k iterations of a Montgomery modular multiplication of the multiplication operand with the multiplication operand to produce an intermediate result, wherein the multiplication operand is set to be equal to the intermediate result after each iteration, wherein the shift and subtract operation comprises determining a shifted start value which is equivalent to the start value multiplied by two, and subtracting n from the shifted start value if the shifted start value is greater than or equal to n.

Disclosed herein is an apparatus for calculating a cryptographic component R.sup.2 mod n for a cryptographic function, where n is a modulo number and R is a constant greater than n. The apparatus comprises an arithmetic logic unit configured to iteratively perform Montgomery multiplication of a first operand with a second operand to produce an intermediate result, wherein the first operand and the second operand are set to the intermediate result after each iteration, responsive to a termination condition being met, determine an adjustment parameter indicative of a difference between the intermediate result and the cryptographic component, and perform Montgomery multiplication of the intermediate result with the adjustment parameter, to calculate the cryptographic component for the cryptographic function.

The present invention relates to a method of secure generation by a client device and a server device of an RSA signature of a message to be signed with a private exponent component d of an RSA key (p, q, N, d, e), wherein said client device stores a client device private exponent component dA, a client value, and a client dynamic offset, and said server device stores a server device private exponent component dB, where dB=d−dA modulo phi(N), a server value, a server dynamic offset and a failure counter, comprising: a. receiving from the client device a client part of said RSA signature (HS1) of said message to be signed, after incrementing its client value (pvA) by a first predetermined step E, from the client device private exponent component and from an updated client dynamic offset function of said client dynamic offset and of said client value, b. setting said failure counter to a first default value, c. incrementing said server value (pvB) by a second predetermined step (E′), d. generating a server part of said RSA signature (HS2) of said message to be signed, from the server device private exponent component and from an updated server dynamic offset function of said server dynamic offset and of said server value, e. generating said RSA signature by combining said client part of said RSA signature (HS1) and said server part of said RSA signature (HS2), f. checking if the generation of the RSA signature was a failure and when it was a failure, incrementing said failure counter and g\ iteratively repeating above steps c\ to f\, until said RSA signature is successfully generated or said failure counter reaches a first predetermined threshold S.

Systems and methods for securing user location data are described. A method includes receiving, by a location server computer, an encrypted location from a mobile device. The encrypted location is a location of the mobile device encrypted with a public key. The method then includes receiving, by the location server computer, a location request message from an interaction processing server and partially decrypting, by the location server computer, the encrypted location with a first private key share to form a partially decrypted location. The method further includes transmitting, by the location server computer to the interaction processing server, a location response message with the encrypted location and the partially decrypted location. The interaction processing server then uses the partially decrypted location and the second private key share to form a decrypted location.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection establishment between a client and a server for a new session is enabled using an ephemeral (temporary) key pair. In response to a request, the server generates a temporary certificate by signing an ephemeral public key using the server's private key. A certificate chain comprising at least the temporary certificate that includes the ephemeral public key, together with a server certificate, is output to the client by the server, which acts as a subordinate Certificate Authority. The client validates the certificates, generates a session key and outputs the session key wrapped by the ephemeral public key. To complete the connection establishment, the server applies the ephemeral private key to recover the session key derived at the client for the new session. The client and server thereafter use the session key to encrypt and decrypt data over the link. The ephemeral key pair is not reused.

A mobile network gateway receives, from a user equipment device (UE), a session request for a session between the UE and an application hosted by a hosting device, where the session request includes an application identifier (ID) associated with the application. The mobile network gateway identifies a network slice of a mobile network based on the application ID and an ID associated with the UE, and retrieves a security profile from memory based on the application ID and the identified network slice. The mobile network gateway establishes a secure tunnel between the gateway and the hosting device using the retrieved security profile, and forwards data units associated with the requested session between the UE and the hosting device via the secure tunnel.

Systems and methods for an end-to-end secure operation from an expression in natural language. Exemplary methods include: receiving a set of queries from a natural language processor, the set of queries being produced by a method including: getting data schemas associated with a target data source; obtaining the expression in natural language; performing natural language processing on the expression to determine a desired operation; and generating the set of queries using at least one of matching and inference techniques over the desired operation with respect to the data schemas; encrypting the set of queries using a homomorphic encryption technique; providing the encrypted set of queries to a server, the server including the target data source; acquiring encrypted results, the encrypted results being responsive to the encrypted set of queries; and decrypting the encrypted results using a decryption key to produce desired results.