According to one embodiment, an information processing apparatus is applied to an embedded system in an electric device and includes a first circuit. The first circuit is configured to request a server different from the information processing apparatus to determine whether a debug or software change is possible in response to external access.

A key case includes an outer case having an opening portion at one end of the outer case and an inner case accommodating an electronic key and placed inside the outer case. The outer case and the inner case of the key case are plated with metal or composed of metal.

A method, a computer program, and a device for reducing interference of temporary communication resources used for a wireless communication between a transportation vehicle key and a transportation vehicle. The method includes determining whether interference of the temporary communication resources is present and switching off the device causing the interference or adjusting the use of the temporary communication resources for the wireless communication between the transportation vehicle key and the transportation vehicle in response to interference being present.

System and techniques for a secure wireless lock-actuation exchange are described herein. After receiving a request to actuate a lock from a device, a controller can calculate a challenge counter and then perform verification iterations until an end condition is metwhich is a failure of a verification iterations or the number of iterations reaches the challenge count. If the verification iterations reach the challenge count (e.g., there are no failed iterations), then the controller actuates the lock. Each iteration includes an exchange between the device and the controller that the device validates by signing a message with a private key shared by the device and the controller. The exchange also includes a freshness value integrated into the device validation to prevent replay attacks.

System and techniques for a secure wireless lock-actuation exchange are described herein. After receiving a request to actuate a lock from a device, a controller can calculate a challenge counter and then perform verification iterations until an end condition is metwhich is a failure of a verification iterations or the number of iterations reaches the challenge count. If the verification iterations reach the challenge count (e.g., there are no failed iterations), then the controller actuates the lock. Each iteration includes an exchange between the device and the controller that the device validates by signing a message with a private key shared by the device and the controller. The exchange also includes a freshness value integrated into the device validation to prevent replay attacks.

Disclosed is a distance measuring system for measuring distance of a first transceiver from second transceivers, comprising the first transceiver having a first time zone, a second transceiver having a second time zone, and a control unit having a control-unit time zone. The second transceiver ascertains a time-zone relationship between the second transceiver and the first transceiver, and transmits the time-zone relationship to the control unit. The control unit receives the time-zone relationship, and ascertains, using the received time-zone relationship, a time-zone relationship between the control-unit time zone and the first transceiver. The first transceiver transmits at a defined instant in time or for a defined time period of the first time zone a distance measurement command to the second transceiver. The first transceiver transmits a measurement signal at a further defined instant in time, and the second transceiver switches from an inactive into an active receiving or measuring state.

Systems and methods for preventing digital key relay attacks are provided. A method includes determining a threshold response time for a wireless communications device to process a challenge. Determining the threshold response time may include determining a benchmark response time for the wireless communications device to respond to the challenge based on one or more conditions of the wireless communications device, and setting the threshold response time to the benchmark response time. The method further includes sending the challenge to the wireless communications device. The method further includes receiving a response to the challenge from the wireless communications device within a response time. The method further includes authenticating the wireless communications device based on the response time being less than the threshold response time. Associated systems are also provided.

Passive entry systems, such as passive entry-passive start vehicle systems, using short-range wireless communication signals to determine a distance between nomadic devices and unlockable devices based on a round trip time of flight (TOF) measurement.

The performance of an action for a transportation vehicle, wherein a relay attack is prevented. In response to a transmission of a first radio signal at a first frequency, on the one hand, a second radio signal at a second frequency is received from an ID transponder authorized for the transportation vehicle and, on the other hand, a further radio signal at the first frequency is received. The action is performed for the transportation vehicle only in response to the second radio signal originating from an ID transponder authorized for the transportation vehicle and only in response to the signal strength of the further radio signal lying below a predefined signal strength threshold.

There is provided a method and a system for authorizing a user device to send a request to a vehicle in order to prevent a physical layer relay attack. The system comprises a vehicle comprising an acoustic transducer and an RF transceiver and a user device comprising an acoustic transducer and an RF transceiver. The method relates to a signaling scheme using a combination of acoustic and RF signals for preventing a successful physical layer relay attack.