Methods and apparatus to adjust operation of a fluid flow control assembly are disclosed. An example safety valve controller apparatus includes comparator circuitry to compare a current measurement to at least one of a first threshold associated with a first flow setting of a fluid flow control assembly or a second threshold associated with a second flow setting of the fluid flow control assembly, and determine a first drive signal associated with the first flow setting or a second drive signal associated with the second flow setting in response to satisfying a respective one of the first or second thresholds, and current modulating circuitry to determine a third drive signal based on the current measurement, the third drive signal to modulate the flow setting of the fluid flow control assembly between the first and second flow settings.

A data-processing system having at least one operating memory holding operating data is provided with a protection unit having an execution environment protected from unauthorized access. At least one monitoring logic in the execution environment is connected to the operating memory for monitoring unauthorized modifications, access, or similar protection violations of the operating data stored in the operating memory and for generating an output on detection of such a protection violation. A protection logic in the execution environment holds replacement data capable of replacing the operating data and is connected to the monitoring logic for, on generation of the output, providing to the operating memory the replacement data for the operation or for a substitute operation of the data-processing system.

Methods and apparatus to adjust operation of a fluid flow control assembly are disclosed. An example safety valve controller apparatus includes comparator circuitry to compare a current measurement to at least one of a first threshold associated with a first flow setting of a fluid flow control assembly or a second threshold associated with a second flow setting of the fluid flow control assembly, and determine a first drive signal associated with the first flow setting or a second drive signal associated with the second flow setting in response to satisfying a respective one of the first or second thresholds, and current modulating circuitry to determine a third drive signal based on the current measurement, the third drive signal to modulate the flow setting of the fluid flow control assembly between the first and second flow settings.

A method for performing security failover in an industrial production environment includes a programmable logic controller (PLC) receiving notification that a function block (FB) or a function (FC) on the programmable logic controller has been maliciously revised. The PLC next determines whether the function block or the function is also maliciously revised on a failover computing device. If the failover computing device is not maliciously revised, a failover operation is performed by the PLC. This operation includes sending a data block comprising one or more input parameters to the function block or the function and receiving an output data resulting from executing the function block or the function with the data block on the failover computing device.

A safety management method sets a third space that both a worker and a robot can enter between a first space in which the worker is present and a second space in which the robot is disposed; sets, between the first space and the third space and between the second space and the third space, respectively, boundaries for monitoring crossing thereof; monitors the presence/absence of the robot or the worker in the third space; when a state of crossing of one boundary and a state of the worker or the robot in the third space are simultaneously switched to detection, restricts the operation of the robot, when crossing of another boundary is detected; and not restricts the operation of the robot when the state of crossing of the one boundary and the state of the worker or the robot in the third space are simultaneously switched to non-detection.

A method for performing security failover in an industrial production environment includes a programmable logic controller (PLC) receiving notification that a function block (FB) or a function (FC) on the programmable logic controller has been maliciously revised. The PLC next determines whether the function block or the function is also maliciously revised on a failover computing device. If the failover computing device is not maliciously revised, a failover operation is performed by the PLC. This operation includes sending a data block comprising one or more input parameters to the function block or the function and receiving an output data resulting from executing the function block or the function with the data block on the failover computing device.

A diagnostic system and method for a field device implemented in a safety instrumented system includes detecting an occurrence of a safety event associated with the field device, overriding normal control of the field device to cause the field device to enter a safe state in response to the detected occurrence of the safety event, verifying the override of normal control of the field device, and transmitting a control signal to cause the field device to enter the safe state.

A safety management method sets a third space that both a worker and a robot can enter between a first space in which the worker is present and a second space in which the robot is disposed; sets, between the first space and the third space and between the second space and the third space, respectively, boundaries for monitoring crossing thereof; monitors the presence/absence of the robot or the worker in the third space; when a state of crossing of one boundary and a state of the worker or the robot in the third space are simultaneously switched to detection, restricts the operation of the robot, when crossing of another boundary is detected; and not restricts the operation of the robot when the state of crossing of the one boundary and the state of the worker or the robot in the third space are simultaneously switched to non-detection.