Embodiments herein provide for reverse engineering of integrated circuits (ICs) for design verification. In example embodiments, an apparatus receives a gate-level netlist for an integrated circuit (IC), generates a list of equivalence classes related to signals included in the gate-level netlist, determines control signals of the gate-level netlist based at least in part on the list of equivalence classes, determines a logic flow of a finite state transducer (FST) based at least in part on the control signals, and generates register transfer level (RTL) source code for the IC based on the FST.

A method for manufacturing a semiconductor device to which corresponds a layout diagram stored on a non-transitory computer-readable medium. The method includes generating the layout diagram using an electronic design system (EDS), the EDS including at least one processor and at least one memory including computer program code for one or more programs are configured to cause the EDS to execute the generating. Testing the semiconductor device. Revising, the layout diagram, based on testing results indicative of selected standard functional cells in the layout diagram which merit modification or replacement. Programming one or more of the ECO cells which correspond to the one or more selected standard functional cells resulting in one or more programmed ECO cells. Routing the one or more programmed ECO cells correspondingly to at least one of the selected standard functional cells or to one or more other ones of the standard functional cells.

Various embodiments of the present disclosure provide a scan-based architecture for register-transfer-level (RTL) or gate-level designs that improves the security of scan chain-based design-for-testability (DFT) structures. In various embodiments, the scan-based architecture includes invisible scan chains that are hidden in such a way that an attacker cannot easily identify or locate the invisible scan chains for exploitation and revealing internal secure information of the design. The invisible scan chains are dynamically configurable into a scan chain with select flip-flops, such that scan paths of the invisible scan chains may be different between different designs, chips, or testing operations. Various embodiments further employ key-based obfuscation by combining a scan control finite state machine with existing state machines within a design, which improves design security against unauthorized use and increases confidentiality. Specific sequences of key patterns cause the design to transition into a test mode or a normal mode.

A method includes obtaining, by a computer processor according to computer instructions, data models of intellectual property (IP) cores for hierarchical clock domain crossing (CDC) and reset domain crossing (RDC) verification, where the IP cores include reusable units of logic for a system on a chip (SoC), and performing, by the computer processor based on the data models of the IP cores, the hierarchical CDC and RDC verification for the SoC according to integration of the IP cores in the SoC, where the hierarchical CDC and RDC verification includes consistency verification of functional assumptions with structural analysis of the IP cores individually and in a context of use in the SoC.